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ABSTRACT
The Philippines and Thailand are the two countries in the Southeast Asian region 
that share the most similar economic characteristics. In the 1950s and the 1960s, the 
growth performance of both countries was similar. However, in the 1970s, when both 
countries faced similar kinds of external shocks, growth performance began to differ. By 
the mid 1980s, comparative economic performance became clear: Thailand was growing 
at a rate of more than 10 per cent per year in real terms while the Philippines experienced 
a negative real growth rate. The adjustment in response to the changing external 
environment in Thailand also led to a favourable economic transformation. Many pre­
conditions for take off were seen and the country was destined to become another 
member of the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs). On the other hand, the 
Philippine economy was still shaky and vulnerable to any shock that may arise.
The question is why, despite the similarity in economic characteristics and 
exposure to the same kind of external shocks, Thailand has been able to perform 
relatively better than the Philippines? The difference in economic performance could be 
the result of differences in political and economic structure, the magnitude of external 
shocks, and policy adjustments in response to the shocks. This Thesis investigates how 
these three factors can help to explain the difference in economic performance between 
the two countries. The differences in economic structure and the magnitude of the shocks 
were found to be minimal. It was the difference in economic policy response to the 
external shocks that mattered and largely explains the relatively poor economic 
performance in the Philippines.
Four approaches were used to investigate the differences in economic policy 
responses. The first is to use a simple macroeconomic model with one final good to 
analyse the effects of external shocks and how an economy can respond to them. The 
external shocks analysed were the volume of trade shock (a fall in export demand) and 
the oil terms of trade shocks (a rise in the relative prices of oil to home goods). Because 
the terms of trade shock may have different effects on different sectors in the economy, 
the Australian model of traded/non-traded goods is also applied. This explains the effect 
of the oil terms of trade shock (the relative prices of oil input to the final traded goods) on 
the real exchange rate (the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods) which affects the 
allocation of resources between the traded and non-traded sectors. These two approaches 
deal with the case of a fully anticipated shock, whether temporary or permanent. The 
third approach attempted to explain adjustments in the event that the shock is not 
anticipated, and so there could be a cost associated with the incorrect expectation. The 
model being used is a simple dynamic model with two periods of adjustment. The final 
approach is a decomposition of the current account and policy responses of a country.
This approach was developed by Bela Balassa, EdmarBacha and Gerald Helleiner in the 
early 1980s. The approach was a rough and ready tool to analyse the effects of external 
shocks and domestic policy responses such as export promotion policy, im port 
substitution policy, etc.. However, it did not have an explicit linkage between the 
changes in the current account and domestic macroeconomic response in terms of 
consumption, savings and investment. Therefore, this approach was reviewed and 
another decomposition method proposed.
The essence of macroeconomic adjustment in response to external shocks is the 
skilful use of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. The thesis also investigates the 
conduct of these policies and identifies the major differences in policy conduct that led to 
macroeconomic policy being a more effective instrument in Thailand than in the 
Philippines. The concluding chapter of the thesis also suggests some lessons for other 
developing countries to learn from the comparative study of the Philippines and Thailand 
in response to external shocks.
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CHAPTER 1
1
INTRODUCTION
I. Statement of the Problem
Among the countries in South-east Asia, the Philippines and Thailand share the 
most similar economic characteristics. Both are lower middle-income countries with 
similar size of the economy, population, resource endowments, and the level of 
development. With these similarities, one would not expect the economic performance of 
the two countries to be greatly different. However, this was not the case for the 
Philippines and Thailand.
In the 1950s, the Philippines achieved an average annual growth rate of 6.3 per 
cent, the highest in the South-east Asian region. The Philippine economy was watched 
and praised by its neighbouring countries. By contrast, in the same decade, Thailand's 
economic growth was mediocre and fluctuated widely. But in the following decades, 
Thailand quickly caught up with the Philippines. After the period of turbulent external 
environment in the 1970s and early 1980s, Thailand's economic performance eventually 
surpassed that of the Philippines.
Why did the Philippine, which performed the best in the 1950s, fail to keep on 
track after 1960? Why, despite the similarities in economic characteristics and exposure 
to external environment in the 1970s and early 1980s, has the Philippines performed 
relatively poorer than Thailand? What are the important factors that explain the reversal in 
the relative economic performance of the two countries?
Numerous studies have attempted to explain why the Philippine economy has 
been faltering in recent years, and others have examined the success of the Thai 
economy.1 Yet these studies are generally country specific and either make little or no 
reference to the other. A few studies have examined the contrasting performance of the 
two economies with other developing countries but they have not provided a direct 
comparison of the Philippines and Thailand.2
1 For example, tor the Philippines, De Dios et. al. (1984), Sicat (1985), Daquila (1987), Montes 
(1987), Doner and Intal (1988), Montes and Sakai (1989), World Bank (1989a), Yap (1991), and Austria 
(1992). For Thailand, Wibulswasdi (1987), Warr and Nidhiprabha (1989), World Bank (1989b), 
Robinson, Byeon, Teja and Tseng (1991).
2 For example, see Naya (1984), Hill and Jayasuriya (1985), Rana and Alburo (1987), Balassa (1991), 
Cooper (1991), Corden (1991), Pangestu (1991).
2II. Objective of the Study
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the questions set out above and attempt to 
identify the important factors that explain the reversal in relative economic performance of 
the two countries. Although there are many political and social factors that could 
contribute to the different economic performance, economic factors will be considered as 
the necessary conditions for the differential performance to arise while other factors are 
only sufficient to explain the degree of variation.
There are four possibilities that may explain why economic performance may vary 
from country to country. First, there may be differences in political and economic 
structure, including the political regime, the size of the economy, population, resource 
endowments, etc. Second, even with the same political and economic structure, the 
economic performance may vary if they face different external environments. Third, 
there may be differences in major macroeconomic policies such as fiscal, monetary, 
exchange rate policies, and other policies that affect microeconomic behaviour in the 
economy. Finally, there may be differences in the institutional structure in which such 
economic interaction takes place.
Thus, this thesis attempts to answer the following main questions:
1. Is there a major difference in the political and economic structure that 
significantly contributes to the unequal economic performance of the Philippines and 
Thailand?
2. During the 1970s and 1980s, when the external environment was 
unfavourable to both countries, the relative economic performance of the two countries 
started to differ. Was this because of unequal magnitude in the external shocks they were 
facing?
3. Apart from any differences in economic structure and the magnitude of 
external shocks, is there any difference in macroeconomic policies that contributed to the 
better economic performance of Thailand relative to the Philippines? What is the 
appropriate adjustment for a country in response to external shocks such as occurred in 
the 1970s and 1980s? Were the adjustments in the Philippines and Thailand in response 
to such shocks appropriate? Finally, what lessons can other developing countries learn 
from the relative experiences of the Philippines and Thailand?
III. Organisation of the Thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organised into 8 chapters as follows:
Chapter two presents an overview of the Philippine and Thai economies. It 
provides a brief historical and political background as a basis for understanding the 
underlying differences in non-economic characteristics. It then contemplates the major 
economic characteristics common to both countries as well as the one which could 
explain the difference in their initial economic performance. The last section compares 
the major macroeconomic indicators of the two countries and highlights the differences 
that will set the course of investigation into why performance differs.
Chapter three identifies the major external shocks both countries confronted 
during 1970-1989. The most important one was a sharp deterioration in the terms of 
trade (the decline in the relative prices of exports to imports), of which the rise in the 
international prices of oil imports was the major factor. This chapter estimates the effect 
of the terms of trade shocks by comparing the actual cost of imports and the hypothetical 
cost of imports if the terms of trade had not declined. The difference between the actual 
and hypothetical cost of imports is thus the income losses due to a decline in the 
country's terms of trade. This is to see whether the divergent economic performances of 
the Philippines and Thailand were the result of unequal magnitude in the external shocks 
they were facing.
Chapter four analyses the appropriate macroeconomic adjustment in response to 
external shocks in terms of the volume of trade and the terms of trade shocks using a 
simple model with one final good. The simplicity of this model allows one to clearly see 
the effects of external shocks on the aggregate demand and supply, and the price 
adjustments in the economy. It then investigates the actual evidence of adjustment in the 
Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989. This includes the movement of the real 
exchange rate (the relative prices of foreign goods to home goods) and a development 
over time of the adjustment towards internal and external balances.
Chapter five explores the appropriate macroeconomic adjustment in response to 
external shocks in a different way. A single final good model in chapter four provides a 
useful analysis of the effects of external shocks on aggregate demand and supply of the 
economy but omits the interesting issue that the shocks may have had a different impact 
on different sectors, particularly the traded and non-traded sectors. In this chapter the 
Australian model of traded/non-traded goods is applied. Specifically, it investigates the 
effects of the oil price shock on the markets of traded and non-traded goods, and the price 
adjustment in terms of the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods. It also 
investigates the actual adjustment in the Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989.
4
Chapter six analyses the macroeconomic adjustment in the context of a temporary 
and permanent expectation hypothesis. The analysis in chapters four and five has 
provided the possible macroeconomic adjustments in a static framework and when the 
nature of the shock is known. In reality, the exact nature of the shock -as the name 
suggests, shall not be known for sometime. Thus, the adjustment strategy will have to 
depend on the country's expectation as to whether the shock will be temporary or 
permanent. It is therefore necessary to consider the adjustment in the dynamic context. 
To maintain simplicity of analysis, a dynamic model with two periods of adjustment is 
used. Although this type of model lacks the ability to track the long-run optimal 
adjustment of the economy, it is sufficient to analyse the case of anticipated and 
unanticipated shocks. This chapter also investigates the actual adjustments made by the 
two countries. Finally, it contemplates whether the decision to invest more heavily in the 
Philippines in the 1970s was justified.
Chapter seven considers the other approach that has been used to analyse the 
effects of external shocks and policy responses. This approach was developed by Bela 
Balassa, Edmar Bacha and Gerald Helleiner. Basically, it decomposes the effects of 
external shocks on current account into various components such as the terms of trade 
effect, the volume of trade effect, the interest rate effect, etc.. These effects are then 
responded to by various policies such as the export promotion policy, import substitution 
policy, etc.. The approach is an ad-hoc analytical tool to examine the effects of external 
shocks and domestic policy responses. However, it lacks the basis of a theory that 
explains why certain policy, e.g. the export promotion, is pursued. Besides, there was 
no linkage between the effects of external shocks, which are exogenous variables, and 
the domestic adjustments in terms of consumption, investment and saving decisions, 
which are endogenous variables. Therefore, this chapter reviews and considers the pros 
and cons of this approach. Finally, it proposes another decomposition method that 
explicitly links the effects of external shocks to the domestic adjustments mentioned 
above.
Chapter eight comes back to the issue of institutional structure in which the 
macroeconomic adjustments take place. The success of the adjustment depends upon 
how effective the macroeconomic policies are as the tools to the policy makers. This 
chapter investigates the conduct of the Fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies and 
identifies the major difference that led to macroeconomic policies being more effective 
instruments in one country than the other.
Chapter nine concludes the comparative study and suggests the lessons other 
developing countries can learn in relation to macroeconomic adjustment in response to 
external shocks.
CHAPTER 2
5
AN OVERVIEW OF THE TWO ECONOMIES
I. Introduction
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Philippines and Thailand share many 
similar economic characteristics. This chapter examines the important characteristics that 
they have in common as well as the one which could explain the difference in their initial 
economic performance. These characteristics are the structure of the economy in terms of 
contribution to GDP of various sectors, labour force participation in economic sectors, 
and dependency of imported energy. It also provides basic macroeconomic indicators of 
the two countries in the last two decades. The chapter then compares the past 
macroeconomic performance of both countries. The performance indicators considered 
are the growth rate of the economy, price inflation, foreign trade, investment-savings 
gap, current account and debt accumulation. A comparison of the two countries will 
enable us to identify the major differences in economic performance that will set the 
course of investigation into why that performance differs.
This chapter is organised into four sections. The next section provides historical 
and political backgrounds for the two countries. This is essential in order to understand 
how a different domestic environment and institutional setting can affect economic 
performance. In section three, the important economic characteristics are discussed. 
Section four presents the major indicators of economic performance and seeks to identify 
their differences. The last section concludes the comparison and provides a guide to the 
course of research that will be conducted in the thesis.
II. Historical and Political Backgrounds
In this section, a brief historical and political background is given to provide an 
insight to the two countries. Most of the account on the Philippines, and some parts on 
Thailand, are drawn from the Far East and Australasia 1992, published by Europa 
Publications Limited.
The Philippines
The Philippines is an archipelago lying between the South China Sea and the 
Pacific Ocean. The country comprises about 7,100 islands, but of this number, only 880 
are inhabited. It has a total area of 300,000 square kilometres. The two largest islands 
are Luzon (with an area of 104,688 sq km.) and Mindanao (with an area of 94,630 sq
6
km.). The next seven largest islands are Samar, Negros, Palawan, Panay, Mindoro, 
Leyte and Cebu.
The population of the Philippines in 1990 was 60.68 million. The average 
growth rate of population during 1980-87 was 2.5 per cent. About 60 per cent of the 
total population live in the islands of Luzon and Mindanao. The average population 
density is 202.3 per sq km. The vast majority are Christian, predominantly Catholic. 
The Muslim minority constitute about 5 per cent of the total, and are largely concentrated 
in the southern islands. In comparison to other Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese 
population constitutes only about one per cent of the total population.
The nation's capital is Manila with a population of 1.6 million at the 1989 census. 
However, if the entire Metropolitan area is taken into account, the total population is 
approximately 6 million. The other major cities are Cebu City in the Visayas island, 
Davao City in south-east Mindanao, and Zamboanga City in south-west Mindanao.
Before the arrival of the Spanish in 1512, the country was occupied by 
fragmented indigenous tribes who had relatively little contact with the major cultural 
centres in Asia -India and China. Spain established its first settlement in Cebu in 1565 
and gradually extended to other islands. In 1571 the new Spanish colony was formed 
and Manila was established as its capital. The colonisation of the archipelago met little 
resistance mainly because the powerful traditional kingdom, which was a dominant 
feature in mainland Southeast Asia, was lacking in the Philippines.
The principal aim of Spanish's rule was claimed to be the religious conversion of 
animistic people. However, the real intention seems to be securing the spices trade and 
countering the expansion of other European empires. From the commencement of 
Spanish rule until 1834, the country's external trade was monopolised and restricted to 
between Manila and Acapulco in Mexico. The country was fully opened to international 
trade only in the late 19th century. This marked the increase in the production and 
exports of crops such as sugar, coconut, Manila hemp (abaca) and tobacco which became 
the foundation of the economy until modem days.
In 1898 the United States declared war on Spain. Subsequently, it defeated Spain 
and took over the claim on the Philippines islands. This event changed the political facet 
of the Philippines but not the economic. Under American rule, political and bureaucratic 
positions were made accessible to the indigenous people. The Americans introduced the 
US style of administration and broadly imposed American cultural values into the society. 
On the economic front, the country became heavily dependent on agricultural exports to 
the US. This further strengthened the exploitation of large-scale land ownership which 
had been introduced by Spain.
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In the early 1930s, there was an increasing demand for independence of the 
Philippines. This was supported by an American public which found it difficult to 
reconcile its own proud heritage in gaining independence from Britain with its 
colonisation of the Philippines. Above all, the depression in the US led to demands for a 
cut in assistance to its colonies, and especially to restrict the Philippines access to the US 
market. The decolonisation process was interrupted when the Pacific War broke out in 
1942. In December 1941, the Japanese forces invaded the country and occupied it until 
February 1945.
After the war, the Philippines was granted political independence from the US on 
4 July 1946. However, it was still under the Commonwealth, and the US President 
retained the power to effect constitutional changes and control national defence, foreign 
policy, the currency, and external trade. The devastation of the economy during the war 
forced the Philippines to rely heavily on American assistance. The watershed of this 
economic tie was the Bell Trade Relation Act of 1946, passed by the US Congress to 
provide duty-free entry for Philippine exports into the US market until 1954, subject to 
quotas. Then, from 1954 quotas were to be reduced gradually and replaced with an 
increase in tariff until 1974 when the full tariff scale was to be applied. At the same time, 
the Act also prohibited the Philippine government from imposing export duties, 
maintained a fixed exchange rate between the peso and U.S. dollar, and granted equal 
treatment to US business operating within the country.
In the 1950s and 1960s, US foreign policy was to contain a communist 
expansion in South-east Asia. This led to an increase in political, military and economic 
assistance to the Philippines. The democratic process in the Philippines was fostered 
with the election of a President and Congress along the American style. Multinational 
agencies such as the World Bank and IMF were also involved to provide economic 
assistance that will put the country as a forefront of succeeding developing countries. 
The relationship with the countries in the region also increased. In 1954, the Philippines 
joined the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO); the organisation to defend 
communist expansion in the region. In 1967, it jointly founded the Association of South 
East Asian Nation (ASEAN).
The period between 1965-1986, when President Ferdinand E. Marcos was in 
power, was the most important period in modem Philippines history. In his early tenure 
of office he gained popularity by increasing government expenditure on infrastructure. 
This was later transformed into political patronage and gradually corruption. In 
September 1972, he abolished the constitution and declared martial law. This effectively 
allowed him to continue in power beyond the statutory of two-term maximum, and 
marked a period of dictatorship and political suppression. When the turbulent external 
environment occurred in the 1970s, the country was affected economically. The stability
8
of his government was shaken and political unrest developed. In August 1983, the 
opposition leader, Senator Benigno Aquino Jr., was assassinated upon his return from 
exile. This event further aggravated the political and economic turmoil. In 1986, 
President Marcos was deposed by "people power", and the government of Corazon 
Aquino, wife of former Senator Aquino, came to power. Despite a more democratic 
government, management of the country remained difficult. Instability still prevailed as 
the country had been enmeshed in internal rivalries and a communist threat. In May 
1992, the Philippines had a general election and a new President, General Fidel Ramos, 
was elected. Although the domestic and international economic situation had slightly 
improved, the country was still faced with the problems of a massive debt overhang and 
intermittent natural calamity. This caused the country’s development to remain relatively 
far behind its neighbours in the region.
Thailand
Thailand is located on the South-east Asian mainland. The country was formerly 
known as Siam until it was changed to Thailand in 1939. The country shares borders 
with Myanmar (Burma) to the west, Laos and Cambodia to the east, and Malaysia to the 
south. It has a total area of 513,115 square kilometres. The country has a large flat land 
in the central plain and mountains and high plateau in the north and north-east.
The population of Thailand in 1990 was 54.53 million. Average population 
growth during 1980-87 was 2.0 per cent. Average population density is 106.3 per sq 
km. About 95 per cent of the population is Buddhist, predominantly Hinayan 
(Theravada). There is a Muslim minority in the southern part of the country which 
constitutes about 3 per cent. The ethnic Chinese were estimated to be about 2.25 million, 
or 12 per cent of the total population in 1950 (Manarungsan, 1989). However, they have 
been largely assimilated into Thai society and the ethnic tension is relatively minor 
compared to other countries in the region.
The nation's capital is Bangkok with a population of approximately 6 million in 
1990. It is the commercial and industrial centre of the country. The other largest cities 
are Chiang Mai in the north, Khon Kaen in the north-east, and Songkhla in the south.
The native Thai people are believed to have descended from people who originally 
inhabited southern Mongolia, although recent archaeological findings suggest that they 
have existed in this region before. The first Siamese kingdom was established in 
Sukhothai in AD 1238. Later, the kingdom moved to Ayudhaya (AD 1368-1767) and 
Thonburi (AD 1768-1781); which is part of Bangkok. The present dynasty, Chakri, 
moved the capital across the Chao Phraya river to Bangkok in 1782. The present king, 
Bhumibol Adulyadej (Rama IX), ascended the throne in 1946 and is widely respected as 
the centre of the nation.
Unlike its neighbours in the region, the Kingdom of Thailand was not colonised. 
In 1855 the country was forced to open up trade with the British under the Bowring 
Treaty, although trade with other Asian cities was already flourishing. The main exports 
were rice, timber and other tropical products. Production of the cash crops such as sugar 
and tobacco that were in high demand by the Europeans were not introduced into the 
kingdom. To some extent, this helped avoid the concentration of land ownership by one 
group of people that is the major characteristic of the Philippine economy. At least two 
factors inhibited such activity. First, the sovereignty of the kingdom allowed the Crown 
to retain its control on international trade. Fear of foreign competition and interference in 
domestic affairs led the Crown to prohibit foreign ownership of land or domestic 
transaction of goods. Moreover, the main interest of the Crown was to control trade and 
collect taxes on the transaction of goods. Thus, no state-owned enterprise engaged in 
production of export crops. They were left to the local people. This avoided introduction 
of the large-scale production of estate crops that occurred in other colonised countries. 
Second, the traditional feudal system of land ownership was tied to the hierarchical 
administration system, rather than being a means to monopolise land ownership by one 
class of people. During the period of absolute monarchy, the civil servants earned their 
living from collecting rents or from the use of land granted to them by the king. There 
was no salary paid directly from the Treasury. The amount of land granted to civil 
servants was in relation to their position (Sakdina). This effectively led to a distribution 
of land to various groups of civil servants who then rented out to or share-cropped with 
the locals. This helped limit the extensive acquisition of land for production of estate 
crops.
Exposure to western values later induced a significant political change in the 
country. In 1932, there was a revolution that led to the change of absolute monarchy to 
constitutional one. Although the Westminster system of Parliament was adopted, it was 
not well prepared. There have been more military coups than elections ever since.
During the Second World War, Thailand sustained relatively little damage. When 
Japan invaded Thailand in December 1941 the country fought briefly but then sought an 
alliance with Japan. After the war, the country also escaped retaliation from the Allies. 
The Free Thai movement, which was set up during the war to resist Japanese control, 
gained recognition from the Americans and British. Prominent members of the group 
were invited to form a new government which helped negotiate with the Allies for a more 
lenient terms of surrender.
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Thailand was ruled by a military dictatorship. 
The authoritarian regime was further strengthened by political, military and economic 
support from the US to resist communist expansion. The country also became a member 
of the South-East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954, and in 1967 jointly
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founded ASEAN. Like the Philippines, economic development in this period was largely 
supported by the US and multinational agencies, especially on infrastructure.
The following decades began another chapter of political change. Slow economic 
progress together with repressive and corrupt administration led to a student uprising in 
October 1973. The demonstrations brought down the military rule and installed a 
democratic government. A new Assembly was elected, and a civilian government was 
formed. The period of civilian rule that followed was short-lived because of infighting 
and weak party organisation. In 1976, there was a military coup that returned the country 
into authoritarian regime.
In 1980, the military Prime Minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda came to power. 
His government controlled the country for eight years and achieved impressive economic 
growth and stability. The election in 1988 brought in another civilian government led by 
retired General Chatichai Choonhavan. However, the corruption scandal within his 
government created the opportunity for military intervention. In 1991, his government 
was overthrown by the military and a dualistic political machine was installed. On the 
political side, the military still hold the power but on the administrative side, a capable 
civilian government was formed. The election that followed in April gave way to more 
military intervention. General Suchinda Kraprayoon became the Prime Minister, though 
unelected, but in May he was forced to resign following mass demonstrations and blood­
shed.
Like the Philippines, Thailand also experienced political instability throughout the 
last half century. Although the communist threat was subdued in Thailand, military 
intervention has not diminished. Despite the political change, economic management in 
Thailand was relatively unaffected. Even though there were periods of authoritarian rule, 
economic policy was largely in the hands of civil servants. This is a distinctive aspect 
that will be elaborated more in chapter 8.
III. The Economic Characteristics
Apart from the historical and political differences, the Philippines and Thailand 
share similar economic characteristics such as size of the economy, population, and levels 
of development. According to the World Bank classification, both are in the group of 
lower middle-income countries (World Bank, 1991). They are both major producers of 
agricultural commodities, and have been dependent on oil imports. Until recently, both 
progressed on a similar economic transformation. The importance of agriculture in the 
economy declined; shares of manufacturing and services increased; and both countries 
geared towards outward-oriented trade policy.
1 1
This section presents the major economic characteristics of both countries. 
Discussion will be descriptive in general and without analysis. Also, it concentrates on 
economic changes in the last two decades (1970-1989).
Phil ippines
The Philippines is well endowed with natural resources such as metal base 
minerals, forestry and fishery resources. The major mineral resources are such as 
copper, nickel, gold and silver. These resources have been largely over-exploited in 
recent years. Economic activity is predominantly agriculture with major commodities 
including coconut, sugar, abaca (Manila hemp), rice, and com. The contribution of each 
economic sector in the Philippines is shown in Table 2.1
In the decades prior to 1970, agriculture was the mainstay of the economy, with 
its share to real GDP of about one-third. From 1970 to 1980 the economic structure of 
the Philippines changed in line with the general pattem of developing countries, i.e. 
agriculture's share in real GDP declined and manufacturing's share increased. After 
1980 this process slowed down, with agriculture's share remaining steady or even 
increasing and the share of manufacturing remaining unchanged.
Table 2.1 Percentage share of real GDP by industrial origin in the 
Philippines: 1960-1989
1960 1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Agriculture 31.5 29.2 25.6 29.2 29.7 28.1 27.4 27.1
Mining and Quarrying 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5
Manufacturing 20.5 24.4 25.0 24.0 23.8 24.2 24.9 25.1
Construction 4.6 3.4 7.7 4.7 3.7 4.2 4.3 4.6
Electricity and Water 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0
T ransport 3.4 4.6 5.2 5.5 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4
Trade and Finance 23.7 21.9 20.9 20.4 21.1 22.0 21.9 22.0
Other services 14.0 13.6 12.2 12.6 12.5 12.4 12.5 12.3
T o t a l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: World Bank (1992), World Tables 1991.
National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippines Statistical Yearbook, various issues.
The structural change in the economy is also reflected by a declining share of 
labour engaged in agriculture, and a rising share of labour in non-agriculture. This is 
shown in Table 2.2. In 1970, the share of labour force engaged in agriculture was 53.8 
per cent compared to 11.9 per cent in manufacturing and 34.3 per cent in services. By 
1989, the share of labour force in agriculture fell to 45 per cent while the share of labour 
force in services rose to 43.7 per cent. Manufacturing, on the other hand, experienced a 
downward trend in the mid-1980s, and only increased slowly thereafter.
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Table 2.2 Percentage share of labour force engaged in production 
activity in the Philippines: 1970-1989
1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total labour force (million) 12.30 17.31 21.32 22.07 22.98 23.45 23.88
Employed (million) 11.77 16.43 19.80 20.59 20.81 21.50 21.84
Agriculture (%) 53.8 51.4 49.0 50.0 47.7 46.1 45.0
Manufacturing (%) 11.9 11.0 9.7 9.2 9.9 10.4 10.6
Mining (%) 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7
Others (%) 34.3 a 37.0 40.7 40.1 41.6 42.7 43.7
Sources: Asian Development Bank (1984), Key Indicators of Developing Member Countries ofADB.
Asian Development Bank (1991), Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
Note: a Including mining
In terms of energy resources, the Philippines has few petroleum reserves but has 
substantial geo-thermal energy that is yet to be exploited. The latter is estimated to be 
capable of producing 200,000 Megawatts of electricity equivalent (ADB; 1989, pp. 426). 
A brief energy profile during 1973-87 is provided in Table 2.3.
In the past, the country had to rely heavily on energy imports . The oil crisis in 
1974 forced the oil-importing countries to reduce dependence on imports and substitute 
domestic sources. In the Philippines, dependence on imported energy was reduced from 
95.3 per cent in 1973 to 73.9 per cent in 1987. The per capita consumption of energy 
was also gradually reduced and after 1982 was below the average per capita consumption 
of the member countries of ADB (excluding India and People's Republic of China).
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Table 2.3 Total energy consumption and import dependency in the 
Philippines: 1973-1987
Final commercial 
energy consumption
('000 toe)
Per capita consumption 
Country (Average)
(Standard kilograms of oil 
equivalent)
Net energy import 
dependency
Per cent
Net oil import 
dependency
Per cent
1973 7983 232 (141) 95.3 95.2
1974 7217 213 (143) 92.4 92.3
1975 7799 227 (153) 92.9 92.8
1976 8142 226 (166) 94.5 94.4
1977 8540 237 (179) 94.2 93.4
1978 8914 241 (196) 89.2 88.0
1979 9357 241 (215) 86.3 85.3
1980 9111 225 (218) 84.3 83.0
1981 8589 206 (213) 78.2 77.3
1982 8241 193 (195) 69.1 68.5
1983 8693 193 (197) 76.2 75.1
1984 7271 148 (188) 60.7 58.5
1985 7198 132 (183) 66.4 60.9
1986 7620 134 (185) 66.9 62.7
1987 8271 155 (206) 73.9 71.5
Source: Asian Development Bank (1989), Energy Indicators of Developing Member Countries
Of ADB.
Note: toe is tonnes of oil equivalent.
Average per capita consumption is the average of the member countries of ADB, excluding 
India and the People's Republic of China.
Thailand
The endowment of natural resources in Thailand is similar to the Philippines. It 
has a large fertile arable area in the central plain. Metal base minerals such as zinc and 
copper are abundant in the north, and tin is found in the south. It has forestry and fishery 
resources, although they have been depleted in recent years. The pattern of economic 
activity in Thailand is similar to the Philippines. It is a major producer and exporter of 
agricultural commodities such as rice, com, tapioca, sugar and rubber. However, in 
recent years the importance of these commodities in terms of exports has been replaced 
by manufacturing products such as textiles, jewellery and electronic components.
The contributions of each economic sector in Thailand is shown in Table 2.4. 
Agriculture used to be the major contributor to GDP, but its importance was 
overshadowed by the manufacturing sector since 1980. The contrasting feature of the 
change in economic structure between the Philippines and Thailand appeared in the 
1980s. The changing pattem of economic structure in Thailand continued towards a 
higher contribution from non-agriculture while in the Philippines, that pattern slowed 
down.
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Table 2.4 Percentage share of real GDP by industrial origin in Thailand: 
1960-1989
1960 1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Agriculture 41.3 27.0 20.6 19.9 19.1 17.4 16.9 16.1
Mining and Quarrying 1.3 2.9 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.6
Manufacturing 11.4 16.0 21.7 20.7 21.8 22.6 23.3 23.9
Construction 5.0 5.3 4.5 4.2 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.7
Electricity and Water 0.2 1.0 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.9
Transport 7.3 6.5 6.7 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1
Trade and Finance 18.3 25.4 24.5 23.7 23.5 24.6 24.9 25.7
Public administration 4.7 4.4 5.1 5.4 5.4 5.1 4.7 4.1
Other services 10.5 11.5 12.3 13.9 13.9 14.1 13.6 12.9
T o t a l 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, National Income o f Thailand,
various issues.
The changing pattern of labour force engaged in each economic sector is also 
similar to the Philippines. This is shown in Table 2.5. It is noted that the changing 
structure of employment in agriculture occurred at a slower pace than the change in 
structure of output as shown in Table 2.4 above.
Table 2.5 Percentage share of labour force engaged in production 
activity in Thailand: 1980-1989
1970 1980 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Total labour force (million) 22.73 27.11 27.75 29.42 30.32 31.21
Employed 22.52 25.85 26.61 27.52 29.27 30.61
Agriculture (%) 70.8 68.4 66.7 64.2 66.3 66.6
Manufacturing (%) 7.9 8.0 7.7 8.8 8.4 9.0
Mining (%) 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1
Others (%) 21.1 23.4 25.5 26.9 25.3 24.3
Sources: Asian Development Bank (1984), Key Indicators o f Developing Member Countries o f ADB.
Asian Development Bank (1991), Key Indicators o f Developing Asian and Pacific Countries.
Note: •• indicates that there is no available data.
Before 1980, the energy situation in Thailand was no different from that in the 
Philippines. The country had to rely heavily on imports of energy. This is shown in the 
energy profile in Table 2.6. The 1974 oil crisis affected the country as much as it did to 
the Philippines. This led to an attempt to lessen dependence on imported energy which 
was not successful until 1981 after the discovery and production of natural gas in the 
Gulf of Thailand. By 1987, Thailand had reduced the net energy import dependency to 
56 per cent.
15
Table 2.6 Total energy consumption and import dependency 
in Thailand: 1973-1987
Final commercial 
energy consumption
('000 toe)
Per capita consumption 
Country (Average)
(Standard kilograms of oil 
equivalent)
Net energy import 
dependency
Per cent
Net oil import 
dependency
Per cent
1973 6844 207 (141) 94.7 94.4
1974 6665 194 (143) 89.6 89.2
1975 7009 193 (153) 90.2 89.8
1976 7818 213 (166) 88.4 87.9
1977 8455 231 (179) 92.8 92.4
1978 8740 245 (196) 92.7 92.3
1979 9651 248 (215) 91.7 90.7
1980 9563 253 (218) 97.8 96.7
1981 9489 234 (213) 86.6 85.9
1982 9669 207 (195) 75.2 73.8
1983 10643 227 (197) 77.1 76.1
1984 11828 233 (188) 68.8 67.5
1985 11866 204 (183) 55.3 53.7
1986 12652 207 (185) 53.2 52.0
1987 14276 227 (206) 55.7 54.7
Source: Asian Development Bank (1989), Energy Indicators o f Developing Member Countries
OfADB.
Note: toe is tonnes of oil equivalent.
Average per capita consumption is the average of the member countries of ADB, excluding 
India and the People's Republic of China.
For a background to the analysis that will follow in the rest of the Thesis, recent 
basic macroeconomic indicators during 1970-1989 in the Philippines and Thailand are 
provided in Tables 2.7-2.8
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IV. Economic Performance
In general, economic performance of the Philippines and Thailand did not differ 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Progress was largely achieved with the help of stable external 
trading condition and foreign assistance. In the 1970s and early 1980s, both countries 
experienced similar adverse external shocks. Their economic performance was affected 
but did not show any relative disparity. But by the mid-1980s, the relative economic 
performance of the two countries had veered in favour of Thailand. The Thai economy 
achieved high growth and the country was destined to become another member of the 
Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs). On the other hand, the Philippines experienced 
its first negative-growth since the Second World War.
This section presents the major macroeconomic indicators of both countries and 
attempts to collate the major differences that will set the course of investigation in the 
following chapters. These indicators are output growth, price inflation, foreign trade, the 
investment-savings gap, the current account and debt.
Output growth
To compare growth performance of the Philippines and Thailand over time and 
across the selected developing countries in Asia, the average annual growth rate of real 
GDP and per capita GNP are provided in Tables 2.9 and 2.10 respectively.
In the 1950s, the Philippines was one of the best performers in the region. 
During that period, the economy grew at an average of 6.3 per cent per annum in real 
terms. Per capita GNP in 1960 was US$ 250, which was close to Malaysia but higher 
than South Korea. Over the same period, the Thai economy grew at an average of 5.7 
per cent per annum. Per capita GNP was only US$ 94 in 1960, or about one-third of the 
Philippines’ level.
Table 2.9 Average annual growth rates o f real GDP in selected 
Asian developing countries: 1950-1989
21
1950-60 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89
ASEAN Countries
Indonesia 4.0 3.6 7.2 5.5
Malaysia 6.6 8.0 5.7
Philippines 6.3 5.3 6.3 1.7
Singapore 8.7 9.0 7.1
Thailand 5.7 8.2 7.0 7.8
Other Asian Countries
South Korea 5.0 8.5 10.1 9.4
China 3.1 5.8 8.9
Hong Kong 9.7 11.4 10.9 13.5
India 3.9 3.9 2.7 5.7
Sources: World Tables, data tape as derived from the International Economic Data Bank, 
The Australian National University, October 1992.
Table 2.10 Per capita GNP in US dollar at current prices
in selected Asian developing countries: 1950-1989
1950 I960 1970 1980 1986 1987 1988 1989
ASEAN Countries
Indonesia 16 80 470 520 490 480 500
Malaysia 270 390 1690 1850 1830 1930 2160
Philippines 171 250 230 680 560 590 630 700
Singapore 438 950 4540 7390 7900 9090 10450
Thailand 57 94 210 670 790 850 1030 1230
Other Asian Countries
South Korea 49 153 270 1620 2570 2950 3600 4400
China 130 300 310 310 330 360
Hong Kong 283 330 900 5210 6900 8190 9250 10320
India 55 72 110 240 290 310 340 340
Sources: World Tables, data tape as derived from the International Economic Data Bank, 
The Australian National University, October 1992.
In the 1960s, the Thai economy quickly caught up with the Philippines. Average 
real GDP growth during that period was 8.2 per cent, compared to 5.3 per cent in the 
Philippines. Faster growth rates of output also enabled the per capita GNP in Thailand to 
rise close to the Philippines' level. By 1970 the per capita GNP in Thailand rose to US$ 
210, against US$ 230 in the Philippines.
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In the decades following 1970, the growth performance in the Philippines lagged 
behind all other ASEAN countries. Its per capita GNP was also rising more slowly. In 
contrast, growth performance in Thailand remained strong and per capita GNP became 
much higher than the Philippines.
A comparison of the long-term growth trend between the Philippines and 
Thailand in Figure 2.1 provides another interesting contrast. In the 1950s, the real GDP 
growth in Thailand was lower and fluctuated widely compared with that in the 
Philippines. However, this pattern changed after 1960. By the early 1980s the growth 
rate of real GDP in the Philippines fell out of its long-term trend.
Figure 2.1 Growth rate of real GDP in the Philippines and Thailand:
1951-1990
Philippines Thailand
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Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
various issues.
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
National Income o f Thailand, various issues.
Price Inflation
The inflation rate in the Philippines and Thailand since 1950 is shown in Figure 
2.2. In the 1950s, the inflation rate in Thailand was higher than the Philippines. 
However, after 1960 the situation was reversed. Note that Thailand has successfully 
maintained a record of low inflation since 1960. This is a feature that will be discussed 
further in chapter 8.
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Figure 2.2 Inflation rate in the Philippines and Thailand: 1950-1990
ThailandPhilippines
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Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
various issues.
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 
National Income of Thailand, various issues.
Foreign Trade
The indicator of foreign trade performance in the two countries is shown by the 
trade balances in Figure 2.3. In the period prior to the first oil price shock in 1974 both 
countries had small trade deficits, with the Philippines in a better position than Thailand. 
After 1974 both countries experienced a sharp deterioration in the terms of trade, and the 
trade deficit in both countries became large. This was somehow improved in 1986 when 
the external environment became less restricted, and after economic adjustment programs 
were implemented in both countries.
Figure 2.3 Trade balance in the Philippines and Thailand (million US$)
Philippines Thailand
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Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
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The terms of trade index in the Philippines and Thailand is shown in Figure 2.4. 
In general, the terms of trade of both countries declined over time. This is because the 
prices of agricultural commodities of which both are major exporters, tended to decline 
relative to the prices of manufactured and imported capital goods. From the graph, two 
main features can be noted. Before the commodity boom in 1973, the terms-of-trade of 
the Philippines was relatively higher than Thailand, but thereafter proceeded along the 
same path. This was because the prices for the Philippines' traditional exports have 
declined much more since 1960. It also shows that the second oil price shock did not 
have as severe an effect on the terms of trade as the first oil price shock.
Figure 2.4 Terms of trade index in the Philippines and Thailand
(1985=100)
Philippines Thailand
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Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
Another indicator of trade performance in both countries is the share of exports 
and imports to GDP shown in Figure 2.4-2.5. It is shown that the shares of exports and 
imports to GDP in Thailand are larger than in the Philippines. This means that the Thai 
economy was moving towards more open international trade than the Philippines.
25
Figure 2.5 Ratios of exports and imports to GDP in the Philippines:
1961-1990
Export
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Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
Figure 2.6 Ratios of exports and imports to GDP in Thailand: 1961-1990
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Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
Investment-Saving Gap
The investment-savings gaps (as a percentage of GNP) in the Philippines and 
Thailand are shown in Figures 2.7 and 2.8 respectively. These charts show the 
investment in terms of Gross capital formation and savings in terms of Gross national 
savings. From Figure 2.7 the investment ratio of the Philippines is peculiar. It rose 
sharply in 1974 when there was the first oil price shock. It then fell significantly in 1983 
and became lower than the savings ratio. The savings ratio also exhibited a similar trend. 
It rose sharply from 20 per cent in 1973 when the commodity boom commenced and 
remained at that level until 1981. After that the savings ratio fell below 20 per cent.
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In Thailand, the investment and saving ratios were higher than in the Philippines. 
Prior to 1986, the investment ratio was approximately 25 per cent while the savings ratio 
was about 20 per cent. Despite the period of oil price shocks in the 1970s and the early 
1980s, the two ratios remained unaffected.
Figure 2.7 Investment-savings gap in the Philippines: 1970-1989
Saving/GNPInvestment/GNP
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Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook,
various issues.
Figure 2.8 Investment-savings gap in Thailand: 1970-1989
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Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
National Income of Thailand, various issues.
Current Account and Debt
The current account balance of the Philippines and Thailand is presented in Figure 
2.9. As with the trade balance, the current account of the two countries did not differ 
greatly. After the first oil price shock the current account of both countries deteriorated.
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This was improved only in 1986 when the external environment became less restricted 
and major economic adjustments took place in both countries.
Figure 2.9 Current account balance in the Philippines and Thailand
(million US$)
ThailandPhilippines
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Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
The similar pattern of the trade and current account deficits suggests that the 
effects of the external shocks on the two economies in the 1970s and early 1980s should 
not differ greatly. Whether this is true or not will be the subject of discussion in the next 
chapter. However, when one looks at the accumulation of foreign debt in the two 
countries, it tells a different story.
In Table 2.11 the data on total foreign debts in the two countries during 1970- 
1989 are presented. It is shown that the Philippines had accumulated about US$ 25.3 
billion of debt in the last twenty years. Most of the accumulation occurred during 1975- 
1982, which is also the period when the investment-savings gap in the Philippines was 
widest. This is another issue that will be investigated in chapter 6 along with the 
investment and savings behaviour in the two countries. The other distinctive point is that 
during the same period the total interest rate payment on its debt was US$ 21.8 billion. 
Most of the increase in interest rate costs occurred after 1984 and was the result of heavy 
borrowing in the preceding years.
In contrast, the stock of debt in Thailand at the beginning of the 1970s was 
smaller. During the same period of 1970-1989, the country accumulated only US$ 15.6 
billion of debts . This was about 60 per cent of the Philippines's total debt accumulation, 
despite the fact that both countries had experienced similar deterioration in the current 
account. In addition, the interest rate payment in Thailand was US$ 9.7 billion, or about 
one-third of the Philippines' level.
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V. Summary and Conclusions
A comparison between the Philippines and Thailand reveals three interesting areas 
which can be highlighted as follows:
1. The Philippines can be characterised as an externally dependent economy. The 
country has been subject to foreign influences since the 16th century. This has imposed 
certain institutional, political and economic structures that are also crucial in explaining 
current economic performance. The most distinctive features are the lack of centralised 
government's control due to geographical disadvantage, concentration of land ownership 
in few families and the deepening dependence on a few commodities exported. The first 
led to regional rivalry among interest groups, the second hampered the transformation of 
the economy's agricultural-base to manufacturing because of pressure from land owners 
to protect their interests in the agricultural sector, while the last increased the vulnerability 
of the export sector to world agricultural trade.
In contrast, Thailand was less dependent on external forces. The country was not 
colonised by foreign powers and so its institutional, political and economic structures 
were preserved. This independence had a price and in the 1950s and earlier, Thailand 
achieved little economic progress compared to the Philippines. When the country geared 
toward an outward-oriented strategy, high economic growth was achievable.
2. Apart from the historical and political differences, the Philippines and Thailand share 
many common economic characteristics. Both have similar size of economy, population, 
and level of economic development. Both also operated with market-oriented economic 
systems. Until recent years, dependence on imported energy in the two countries was 
similar.
3. Despite these similarities in economic characteristics, recent economic performance of 
the Philippines and Thailand differed significantly. The major differences can be 
identified as follows:
3.1 Declining and unstable economic growth in the Philippines as compared to 
high and strong growth performance in Thailand.
3.2 Growth rate of population in the Philippines remained higher than in 
Thailand, so that per capita GNP in the Philippines is growing slower and falling further 
behind Thailand.
3.3 Price inflation, once low in the Philippines, became high and fluctuated 
widely. The opposite was true in Thailand.
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3.4 Foreign trade performance (as a percentage of export and import to the 
country's GDP) in the Philippines was lower than Thailand. This was the result of 
external and internal factors. Externally, the terms of trade in the Philippines deteriorated 
more than in Thailand. Internally, the Philippines was less successful in diversifying its 
export structure.
3.5 Investment and savings ( as a ratio to the country's GNP) in the Philippines 
was lower than in Thailand. This led to lower potential output in the future.
3.6 Although development of the trade and current account balances did not 
differ greatly, the Philippines accumulated far more foreign debt than Thailand. The 
consequence of this was that interest payments by the Philippines were also higher. The 
debt over-hang also remained an obstacle to economic growth in the Philippines for many 
years.
The difference in economic performance between the Philippines and Thailand 
has suggested four major points of research into why it differs. This will be pursued in 
the way of hypothesis setting as follows:
1. Why did the growth rate in the Philippines tend to decline whereas growth 
performance in Thailand remained strong?
It is hypothesised that declining growth performance in the Philippines was the result of a 
declining or stagnant productivity of major economic sectors, particularly agriculture, and 
a failure of the country's macroeconomic management. The former has been studied 
elsewhere in terms of the sources of growth of the country. Examples are Oshima (1983) 
and Austria (1992). In this thesis, the question is approached in the context of recent 
growth performance which was associated with government policy in response to 
external shocks. This is the subject of analysis in chapters 4-6, when the theory of 
macroeconomic adjustment in response to external shocks is examined.
2. In the 1970s and early 1980s, when the external environment was unfavourable to 
both countries, the adjustments in the Philippines led to the accumulation of debts. This 
did not occur to the same extent in Thailand. Why was that? Was it because of unequal 
magnitude of external shocks or because of the relatively lax attitude in the Philippines to 
adjusting the country's consumption, investment and savings strategy?
It is hypothesised that the magnitude of external shocks in both countries was similar and 
played a minor role in affecting the growth of one country more than the other. It was the 
inability to adjust appropriately to the shocks in the first place, and that led the Philippines 
to be more vulnerable to subsequent shocks. This thesis will examine what should have 
been the appropriate policy in response to the external shocks and whether the Philippines 
and Thailand adjusted appropriately. The framework of analysis consists of two kinds:
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the formal analysis of the macroeconomic model in chapters 4-6, and a decomposition 
approach in chapter 7.
3. Why was the performance of the trade sector in the Philippines less impressive? Did 
the external shocks particularly affect the traded sector more?
This question is examined in chapter 5 where the Australian model of traded/non-traded 
goods is applied. It is hypothesised that the worsening of the oil terms of trade may not 
necessarily and adversely affect the traded sector. It is possible to have an allocative 
effect of resources from the non-traded to traded sector which enables the country to 
compensate for the adverse effect of the trade shocks. It is hypothesised that such 
allocative effect of resources from the non-traded to traded sector did not take place in the 
Philippines.
4. What contributed to the relatively stable economic system, especially price stability in 
Thailand in the last two decades?
This is looked at in chapter 8 where a comparison is made of the conduct of fiscal, 
monetary and exchange rate policies in the two countries. The conservative attitude of 
Thai policy makers, including influential civil servants, and the factor of less political 
interference in economic management is assumed to be the major factor that enhances the 
credibility and effectiveness of macroeconomic policy in Thailand.
CHAPTER 3
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EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE TWO
ECONOMIES
I. Introduction
In the 1950s and 1960s, international economic conditions could be characterised 
as unusually stable and conducive to high growth for developing countries. In those 
periods both the Philippines and Thailand enjoyed substantial economic growth. The 
external environment they were facing changed dramatically in the following decades. 
There were external shocks on both the current and capital accounts. On the current 
account, the significant shocks were the commodity boom in 1973; the oil price rise in 
1974 and in 1979-80; and the worldwide economic slump in 1980-82. On the capital 
account, there was the rise in international interest rates during 1980-82 and the 
investment boom during 1986-89.
Both countries were affected by these external shocks but their economic 
performance was strikingly different. This has been shown earlier in the previous 
chapter. This chapter investigates the nature of the external shocks during 1970-1989 to 
see whether the divergent economic performance was a result of unequal magnitude in 
external shocks.
II. The Nature of External Shocks
In this thesis, an external shock is defined as an unanticipated change in the 
external environment that directly or indirectly affects the economic well being of a 
country. The shock can be positive (e.g. a sudden rise in the price of exportable goods 
or foreign aid received) or negative (e.g. a sudden rise in the price of importable goods or 
a fall in foreign aid). In an open economy, the shock comes through a sudden change in 
the current and capital accounts of the balance of payments.
In the last two decades, the Philippines and Thailand were affected by similar 
external shocks that can be characterised in chronological order as follows:
1. The commodity boom: 1973-1974
There were unprecedented rises in the prices of the primary commodities of which 
the two countries were major exporters. For example, the export price of Philippine 
sugar rose from US0 7.78 per pound in 1972 to US0 21.03 per pound in 1974; the copra 
price rose from US$ 142.33 per metric ton in 1972 to US$ 668.67 per metric ton in
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1974, and the price of Thai rice rose from US$ 149.92 per metric ton in 1972 to US$ 
541.50 per metric ton in 1974 (IMF, 1989).
In the Philippines, this commodity boom resulted in a rise in the unit value of 
exports by 47 per cent and the volume of exports by 7 per cent in 1973. Over the same 
period, the unit value of exports in Thailand rose by 53 per cent while the volume of 
exports fell by 7 per cent (IMF, 1989).
2. The first oil price rise: 1974
The Arab-Israel conflict led to an oil embargo to the western countries and 
eventually resulted in a sharp rise in the price of oil. The price of Saudi Arabian oil (Ras 
Tanura) increased from the average of US$ 2.70 per barrel in 1973 to US$ 9.76 per 
barrel in 1974 (IMF, 1989).
In the Philippines, the import cost of oil rose from US$ 188 million in 1973 to 
US$ 653 million in 1974. In Thailand, the import cost of oil went up from US$ 226 
million in 1973 to US$ 617 million in 1974. The oil price rise also caused the inflation 
rate in the Philippines to rise from 16.2 per cent in 1973 to 34.5 per cent in 1974. In 
Thailand, the inflation rate increased from 15.6 per cent in 1973 to 24.3 per cent.
3. The fall in US government expenditure: 1975
Following the fall of the Indochinese states to the communist regime, US 
involvement in the region diminished. US government expenditure, once a major source 
of foreign exchange receipts for the Philippines and Thailand, declined dramatically. In 
Thailand, there was a withdrawal of US military bases and US government expenditure 
became almost nil by 1975. In the Philippines, US government expenditure also 
declined, but not as much as in Thailand, since it became the only host to a US military 
installation in South-east Asia.
4. The second oil price rise: 1979-1982
In 1979, the oil producing countries in the Middle East broke their long-term 
commitment to supply oil to the major oil companies and started to sell it on the spot 
market. At the same time, there was a cut back in oil production in Iran after the Islamic 
revolution. This led to another period of rising oil prices. The Iraq-Iran war further 
spurred the oil price rise. The price of Saudi Arabian oil (Ras Tanura) went up from US$ 
12.70 per barrel in 1978 to US$ 28.67 per barrel in 1980, and to a peak of US$ 33.47 
per barrel in 1982 (IMF, 1989).
In the Philippines, the import cost of oil increased from US$ 1.03 billion in 1978 
to US$ 2.25 billion in 1980. The import cost of oil in Thailand rose from US$ 1.12
34
billion to US$ 2.87 billion in the same period. As with the first oil price shock, it caused 
inflation to go up to 18.2 per cent in the Philippines and 19.7 per cent in Thailand.
5. World recession and high international interest rates: 1980-1982
Adjustments in the industrial countries in response to the second oil price rise led 
to another second-round shock that affected developing countries. These were the 
tightening fiscal and monetary policies in the industrialised countries, that led to a 
slowdown of growth in the industrial countries, and caused a decline in demand for 
exports from developing countries and the international interest rate to rise sharply.1
In the Philippines the average annual growth rate of real GDP fell to 3.8 per cent 
during this period, compared to 6.0 per cent during 1970-1979. The value of exports 
also fell steadily from US$ 5.79 billion in 1980 to US$ 5.02 billion in 1982. In 
Thailand, the average annual growth rate of real GDP fell to 5.1 per cent, compared to 
7.0 per cent during 1970-1979. The value of exports did not fall but grew only 
marginally from US$ 6.45 billion to US$ 6.83 billion in 1982.
6. The fa ll in oil price: 1983-1989
An attempt by oil importing countries to reduce the consumption of petroleum 
products and the collapse of the OPEC monopoly led to an excess supply of oil in the 
world market by 1983. The price of Saudi Arabian oil (Ras Tanura) softened from a 
peak of US$ 34 per barrel in 1982 to US$ 2930 per barrel in 1983. In 1986 the price of 
oil dropped to US$ 13.80 per barrel (IMF, 1989).
In the Philippines, the import cost of oil declined from US$ 2.25 billion in 1980 
to US$ 0.87 billion in 1986. In the same period, the import cost of oil in Thailand also 
declined from US$ 2.86 billion to US$ 1.23 billion. The fall in oil prices also 
contributed to an improvement in the trade balances of both countries.
7. A rise in services income: 1980-1989
While the second oil price shock had an adverse effect on the trade balances of 
both countries, it also had a compensating effect on the non-merchandise account, 
although this did not completely offset the former. This effect came largely as an increase 
in workers' remittances and tourist income. The increase in workers' remittances came 
largely from contracted workers in the Middle East, while tourist income rose because of 
increasing tourism in the region.
1 Dunng 1980-1982, the average annual growth rate of real GNP of all industrial countries fell to 0.9 
per cent, compared to an average of 3.3 per cent during 1970-1979 (IMF, 1988; pp. 60). Also, in the 
same period, the interest rate on 3-month Lodon Inter Bank Offer Rates (LIBOR) on US dollar deposits 
rose to 14.8 per cent, compared to an average of 8 per cent dunng 1970-1979 (IMF, 1989).
35
In 1989 the receipts of workers' remittances and tourist income in the Philippines 
amounted to US$ 1 billion and US$ 0.47 billion respectively. In Thailand, the receipts 
of workers' remittances and tourist income was US$ 80 million and US$ 3.7 billion 
respectively.
8. The investment boom: 1988-1989
The restructuring of the Newly Industrialised Economies (NIEs), as they entered 
the next stage of development in the mid-1980s led to a relocation of labour-intensive 
industries into South-east Asia. A stronger Japanese yen resulting from Japan's chronic 
balance of payments surplus also encouraged Japanese investment in the region to avoid 
rising production cost. This led to an unusual surge of foreign investment boom in the 
countries of Southeast Asia.
Thailand benefited most from this investment influx with net direct foreign 
investment amounting to US$ 1.7 billion in 1989. In the same year, net direct investment 
inflow in the Philippines was only US$ 850 million.
The magnitude of these external shocks on the balance of payments of both the 
Philippines and Thailand can be seen in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. In Tables 3.3 
and 3.4 the same information as in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 is provided but are expressed in 
terms of a percentage of the country's GNP.
From Tables 3.3 and 3.4, a comparison of the magnitude of external shocks on 
the balance of payments of the two countries reveals six interesting points. First, the 
significance of exports of non-fuel primary products declined gradually in the Philippines 
while it was more or less maintained in Thailand. The commodity boom raised the 
exports of non-fuel primary products in both countries with the Philippines benefiting 
more than Thailand. Second, before and during the period of the first oil price shock 
(1974-1978), the cost of petroleum imports in both countries as a percentage of GNP 
was similar. However, after the second oil price shock Thailand was affected far more 
than the Philippines. When the price of oil fell in 1986 the cost of petroleum imports in 
both countries as a percentage of GNP fell to the same level. It should be noted that 
Thailand began to harness natural gas production from the Gulf of Thailand in 1981 to 
substitute for imported oil. If not for this the cost of petroleum imports in Thailand could 
have risen more than in the Philippines.
36
e/3
Xl
V
JS
H
rr>
3
G 3
H
N
et
 D
ire
ct
 In
ve
stm
en
t -2
8 -4 -2
2 64 28 12
5
14
4
21
6
10
0 20
-1
02 17
5 17 11
2 17 17 14
0
32
6
98
6
85
4
U
S 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
ts iN h f f '0 ( 'i3' 0 !J>'—ri ^  h  '—
i ■H i—4 r —4 i—-4 i—4 i—-4 i—H • 1 » 14 »—4 i—4 i—H
To
ur
ist
s 
In
co
m
e a \ v o r i h 'n - iO\ ^ ^ f Gr i ^-rivC \COThi / i Q ' C —< —• n  r m  tn ' f  w 'A c  t  ^
W
or
ke
rs
'
Re
m
itt
an
ce
s
10 5 5 55 11
8
10
3
11
1
21
3
29
1
36
5
42
1
54
6
81
0
94
4
65
9
69
4
69
6
80
9
87
4
10
02
Im
po
rts
 o
f 
Pe
tro
le
um
 P
ro
du
ct
s 11
9
14
1
14
9
18
8
65
3
77
0
89
0
99
3
10
30
13
85
22
48
24
58
21
05
21
23
16
49
14
52 86
9
12
49
10
96
13
97
To
ta
l I
m
po
rts
Q 'Ci ovocoo\''3- ir) n <Nr' - vDi' - t^ O '-<'3; t'~ o\ 0\
Ex
po
rts
 o
f N
on
-F
ue
l 
Pr
im
ar
v 
Pr
od
uc
ts
o}coro<r>or^cocomt^-r'~o o j r '- -o ^ c s ic o o  ^ o - '(N a \o o o 't o o o ^ o\ M '- ' |n c o |n t v oor  ^ "J ONOO\ ^ M M » r <DO\ 'n -Hi nmf no \ 0\ 0 'n c —i n  -  -  n  ci ri n  m ri n  n  ^  oi oi
To
ta
l E
xp
or
ts r ,  o  x  ri O', h  tr, n  c  oc n  n  c  n  t  n  h  no —" - 'OChri iTi^ l - ^ h h C O m ^ oOhOc»
Y
ea
r 0  —'M r o 't 'O 'O M X i a o -H^r'l co t^wvor'CXJON r' r- r- r ' r- t ' r' r^ r ' r-oooocxjoooooooooooooo 0\ 0\ 0n0\ 0\ O\ 0\ 0n0n0\ 0\ 0n0\ 0n0\ 0\ 0n0\ 0\ O
1 ■ 4 H 1—4 i—4 1— 4 *—4 1—4 »■ H i—4 r—4 i—4 i—4 i—4 i—4 i—4 i—H *■■ H i—4 »—4 i—-4
<u
3OGO
Id 
Ta
bl
37
!ZS
D
s0
3
1
e
►>
S3
o>
o
oo
S3
3
’s
JS
</)
" O
S3
03ra
03
.£3
H
DC
S
’■*2o
.4»
S3
S3
J3
t /3
73
S3u
K0>
o
a>
T30*■»
’2
DC
03
2
■C
H
N
rr>
ZJ
3
S3
H
N
et
 D
ire
ct
 In
ve
stm
en
t
42
.8
38
.9
 
68
.6
 
77
.8
18
8.
3
85
.6
 
79
.1
10
6.1 49
.7
 
51
.3
18
6.
3
29
1.
6
18
8.
6 
35
6.
2
40
7.
1
16
1.
2 
26
1.
6 
18
3.
2
11
02
.5
16
92
.3
U
S 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
Ti o  -  m o  n  n  n  Ti -  -  -H 0\ in 'O n
a i r i ö r i ^ o o r i r i w i ' t ^ o o Ö M r i ö a o ö r i aCl Cl Cl - ' '—1 - 1 ■—> Ol '—l ^-lr—1
To
ur
ist
s 
In
co
m
e
10
4.
3 
10
6.
2
13
0.
7
16
4.
6
18
6.
8 
21
9.
9
19
5.
6 
22
5.
8
43
7.
3 
55
0.
1 
86
7.
5
98
3.
3 
10
38
.2
10
89
.1
11
55
.6
11
69
.7
 
14
19
.0
 
19
44
.9
31
18
.2
37
53
.3
W
or
ke
rs
'
Re
m
itt
an
ce
s
M ^ " ' O o a c i ^ r n ( > a ; ' r i h i - i i n o q h h q ' n  
c K r c ^ c i c i d d r C O C c r r c d O x c i c » —‘ X r r i U Ö  - ' c o c i v o ^ c i - ' c i a ' ß x h c h x r i c o o  C- ■—1 C1 — «-•
Im
po
rts
 o
f 
Pe
tro
le
um
 P
ro
du
ct
s o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o  c i ^ d ' d K c k o ö ^ f ' d c S o ö ' d c i ' - J v d o ö ö r ^ v o ' d  —' ci o  o\ —<r i r i o i ' o o o t o p o o o m - ' o o o- - H ^ c l ' > D ' C M O ^ i n D C O \ ' C ' T ^ O C I M C C I  ^  ^  h  M d  Cl Cl Cl Cl —* —* >—i cl
To
ta
l I
m
po
rts
12
69
.6
 
12
88
.8
14
72
.8
20
39
.5
31
04
.7
31
66
.1
35
02
.3
47
06
.1
54
05
.9
75
15
.4
92
78
.6
98
99
.2
84
05
.2
 
10
18
6.
0 
10
24
8.
9
93
27
.5
93
41
.8
13
27
2.
8 
19
72
6.
1
25
21
0.
9
Ex
po
rts
 o
f N
on
-F
ue
l 
Pr
im
ar
y 
Pr
od
uc
ts 6
29 70
6
86
4
12
02
20
06
17
85
23
99
28
04
30
42
38
83
45
78
49
81
49
15
42
84
47
80
42
22
48
21
54
49
75
97 n.
a.
To
ta
l E
xp
or
ts
68
6.
0
80
2.
5
10
45
.7
15
15
.6
24
05
.6
21
76
.9
29
58
.9
34
54
.1
40
43
.8
52
34
.1
64
47
.3
68
84
.4
68
34
.9
63
07
.7
73
40
.1
 
70
58
.3
 
88
01
.6
11
59
0.
2
15
78
6.
1
19
85
6.
9
Y
ea
r o —' oircd-iri 'or- 'OOONO—>cico'3;iO'or' 'OOON t'^t-'r~'t^C'r~'r'-r'--r' 'r~'OOoooooooooooooooooo 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 ' 0 n0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ Ö ' 0 m> 0 \ 0 m3 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 nO O
-d
§
o
H3o
GO
in
k, 
W
or
ld
 T
ab
le
s 
19
91
.
3.
3 
T
he
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f e
xt
i
38
a<
Z
O
o
VOf)
co v u  a>
a
■+2
co
►»
C5
&4
o
a>u
c3
5
.&
7«a>
s
'S«
a<
p«<
2
z*
o
-c
-w
Of)
fi
' S(J
6CO
.*oo
JS
Vi
2
Bua>
co
H
N
et
 D
ire
ct
 In
ve
st
m
en
t Q i n x i Q O \ o \ o t o h O \ ' O i o ' n i n ^ ) i r i o o
d d d d d d d H o d o d d d d d d d r i Hi l l  i
U
S 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
OOONONr^t^ ' nTtTt -g- rococo' ^^O'^f ' ^- in^t ro
H H Ö d d d ö d ö d d d ö ö d ö ö ö ö ö
To
ur
is
ts
 In
co
m
es o ( X ) ^ h t n h v i h o o o o o \ 0 \ ^ o ^ i r ) - i o o o^ o ^ d d d d d d d d o H r t H H r i r t r t H
W
or
ke
rs
'
R
em
itt
an
ce
s
^ ' O v c n o i r i r m - i \ r o r ) \ p h ^ ' C ' - ' h ^ h  « O O i n o ) ' £ \ o o r i r i r W O h 0 ^ m m f i r i  
d  d  d  d  d  d  d  ^  ^  ci ci ri ri ci ri ri ci
Im
po
rts
 o
f 
Pe
tro
le
um
 P
ro
du
ct
s COMONtv ' tOOrnO\ONO\OOQvDror)MOO'n--i '0' S o o h h ' t o o o N h M ' O n ^ f n o c i ' n o o ' O o O ’-'
^;_;_;^_;T^Tf TfTt^tT}; \ c ^ d i d ' d i d ' ^ : c i r d r i r d
To
ta
l I
m
po
rts 15
.4
0
15
.3
8
14
.7
8 
15
.0
6 
21
.3
5 
21
.9
1 
20
.1
5
18
.9
0
19
.7
0
20
.7
9 
21
.9
4 
20
.6
7 
19
.5
2 
21
.9
6 
19
.2
2
15
.9
1 
16
.7
3
19
.7
0
20
.9
1 
23
.5
6
Ex
po
rts
 o
f N
on
-F
ue
l 
Pr
im
ar
y 
Pr
od
uc
ts d d - ^ w i ' - ' d - d d d o d d ' ü F ' d v d v D d  c
To
ta
l E
xp
or
ts r i  oq in iri ci cl ci t . t  oc ^  «  C l ;  q  h  ^  vq i / i \ f d F 3 0 ,:t Tt |d Tt |d d 4 r i ,t F \ f v C ' d x F
»—H r-H t—H f-H i— 4 i—4 r— 4 r— 4 i— 4 r— 4 i— 4 i— 4 i—4 1— 4 i— 4 i—H *—H i— 4 i— 4 i— 4
Y
ea
r h h h h h h h h h h X M X X X X O O X X XO’nOnÖnOnOnOnOnÖnOnOnOnOnOnOnO'nOnOnOOnO'n
i— 4 r— 4 r1 H 1— 4 1— 4 i—4 »—H r-H *—H r—4 i—i r—4 t— 4 i—H r—1 »——< i— 4 i— 4 i—4 t—H
So
ur
ce
: 
C
al
cu
la
te
d 
fr
om
 T
ab
le
 3
.1
39
Sn
Z
o
o
<u
OJD
5Vou
6
fl4»
s
fl
&
4«
O
4>Wfl
a
"«
JO
•oflfl
A3fl
A
H
00
cu
JS
H
r>
Afl
H
N
et
 D
ire
ct
 In
ve
st
m
en
t S K a p p i B S i S a ^ S S I S g S S S S S g S S g
Ö Ö Ö Ö —' Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö Ö —' Ö Ö Ö —< <N
U
S
 G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
^ r r o n - < o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o
d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d d o
To
ur
is
ts
 I
nc
om
e —, ^ r O c ri>/')
»4 —* —< —< >-« —< <-< —< —< cl r i  r i  cl cl ci m’ cd ^  >/i </S
W
or
ke
rs
'
R
em
itt
an
ce
s
' t M ,t ^ r i t O h c c o 0 ' 0 \ ^ t ^ C ! r i \ c m c i  >—■ —• m <—• so tt <—i —« o  ci ~  ci —1 c-j ci ci —• —1
o d o i n H o d d d d d d d d d d d d d d
Im
po
rt
s 
of
 
P
et
ro
le
um
 P
ro
du
ct
s
x x f H O O m a \ n ^ O N O f f i f i \ o o \ r i O ' .  c m  l^ ^ c c ^ ' n t ^ o c ^ t ^ O \ a \ ^ i r i m a \ ' o q ' n v O r o  
— : r i 'Y ' r } ; Tt: iri-^: i / io c c }d r ' 'O l/ i lO r d r d c i r <d
To
ta
l 
Im
po
rt
s
a \0\oo — \ o r ' r ' t ' a \ r ' O r ' t n r o o \ —'Q ^ - v o ^ r  OO^’ O O ' O O C O O ' C t — '-'OOOsON'—1 Ca 'O O'
U U o d c S c i —^ ö r d c iU o N o d r n w d u d i r i r iU r n v d  _  _  _  r) r l  cl r j r l  r l  C1 r) r l  CI r l  cj o  m m
E
xp
or
ts
 o
f N
on
-F
ue
l 
P
nm
ar
y 
Pr
od
uc
ts
r - x  — o ^ - Q ' o n r ' i n v o r ^  — — ir io c iO N v o  d x ^ ^ r i d ö ^ r i h o o ^ q o \ h ; ' ? i o q o a \  ^ 
ogon’ o — • ' - - —• r i
r—H r—i *—H f—H »—H »—H »—H f—H r—H r—H r-H t—^ *—H »—H r“H f—H t—H
To
ta
l E
xp
or
ts 9.
67
10
.8
9
12
.8
3
14
.1
3
17
.5
6 
14
.6
3 
17
.4
6 
17
.5
2 
16
.9
7 
19
.3
4 
20
.2
2 
20
.0
8 
19
.4
8 
16
.0
6 
18
.0
4 
19
.2
3
21
.5
7 
24
.2
2 
26
.9
3 
29
.1
0
Y
ea
r 0 - i r m ^ T i ’O h X O N O - ' r l M t ,r' v0 ^ x ^Ot>P'r'~r'-r'~C'- 'r '' r ' 'f~'OOooooooQcooooooooood 0 \ 0 \ d 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ 0 \ O 0 \ 0 \ O Ö \ 0 \ 0 N C M > i>
So
ur
ce
: 
C
al
cu
la
te
d 
fr
om
 T
ab
le
 3
.2
40
Third, the amount of workers' remittances was negligible in Thailand but was an 
important source of foreign exchange earnings in the Philippines, especially in the 1980s. 
It is noticeable that in 1972-1974 the amount of workers' remittances in Thailand was 
exceptionally high. The reason is that this entry included unrequited transfers which was 
reported by the Bank of Thailand as being for unknown purposes (Bank of Thailand, 
1977). This came primarily from the neighbouring countries of Indochina which 
presumably was a transfer of capital flight from those countries before the military 
success of the communist regime.
Fourth, tourist income became another significant source of foreign exchange 
earnings in the 1980s for both countries. Tourist income was considerably more in 
Thailand than in the Philippines in recent years and was rising to a level that could offset 
the cost of petroleum imports. Fifth, US government expenditure became less significant 
in both countries, especially in Thailand, after 1975. Finally, net direct investment 
became a significant positive shock during 1988-89, with Thailand enjoying more direct 
investment inflow than the Philippines.
III. Estimation of the Terms of Trade Loss
As was seen in the previous section, the terms of trade deterioration was the 
major adverse shock affecting both the Philippines and Thailand. In this section, an 
estimation of the terms of trade loss is made to ascertain to what extent there has been a 
loss in terms of income in the two countries. The methodology used is simply to 
compare the actual cost of imports to the country and the counterfactual cost of imports 
were the terms of trade (relative prices of exportable to importable goods) unchanged. 
The calculation is done in US dollar at constant prices for both countries.
First, it is noteworthy to compare the trend of the commodity terms of trade in 
both countries. This is shown in Figure 3.1. The commodity terms of trade in both 
countries shows a declining trend over the last two decades, except in 1973 because of a 
brief commodity boom. The major cause of the decline was rising import prices, of 
which the price of oil is the major factor. In the Philippines, the deterioration of the 
commodity terms of trade was more pronounced than in Thailand, because the export 
prices of Philippines' products tended to decline by more. In Thailand, there was a 
successful diversification of export commodities that led to export prices remaining 
buoyant.
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Figure 3.1 Commodity terms of trade index in the Philippines and 
Thailand (1972=100)
ThailandPhilippines
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Source: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
The extent to which the declining terms of trade resulted in loss of income to the 
economy can be measured according to the formula below. 2
Lt = Q"'(P'tn I P t ) -  Q”\P'Ö / K )
= Q?(P? / pt ) ~ Q ?
where
Of = actual imports in year t valued at 1972 prices;
P?y P" = export and import price indices for year t (1972=100); and
F%, Pq = export and import price indices at the base year of 1972,
and Pg = P”1 = 1.
Thus, the term Q™(P™ / P*) is the equivalent amount of exportable goods that
has to be sacrificed to obtain the current amount of import in year t. The term 
Q :\p :  / Pq) -  o :  is the equivalent amount of exportable goods that has to be sacrificed
were the terms of trade remained at the base year. Then, the terms of trade loss can be 
calculated by subtracting the term Q"\P"1 / P;T) with Q"' . The calculations for the
Philippines and Thailand are presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively. Since we are 
interested in the analysis of the trade shock in the 1970s and 1980s, the calculation starts 
from 1973 and extends to 1989.
2 I greatly appreciate Professor M. L. Trcadgold for suggesting this formula.
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A comparison of the terms of trade loss between the Philippines and Thailand will 
be examined shortly in this section. But consider to what proportion this terms of trade 
loss was attributable to the rising prices of oil imports. In Figure 3.2, the trend of the oil 
terms of trade (relative prices of exportable to oil) in both countries is presented. In 
1974, the oil terms of trade in both countries fell drastically by half. The oil terms of 
trade deteriorated further when the second oil price rise occurred in 1979. After 1983, 
when the price of oil started to fall, the oil terms of trade of the two countries improved 
slightly. In the Philippines, the worsening oil terms of trade was more pronounced than 
in Thailand. The reason being the same as in the commodity terms of trade, i.e. the 
export prices of Philippines' products rose relatively less than that of Thailand's.
Figure 3.2 Oil terms of trade index in the Philippines and Thailand:
1970-1989
Philippines Thailand
160 -i-
120 - -
80 --
60 --
40 --
20 - -
c? 7 c > 3 0 ' > ' < r i r > * o r ~ o o o ' 0 ^ < M ( ' o - ' T i r > < o r ^ o o o '  r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- r-- co co co co co co co co co co
CTj CT»
Sources: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook 1991.
Central Bank o f the Philippines, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators 
1989 Yearbook.
Bank of Thailand
The loss in income as a result of the rising import prices of oil can be measured 
by the same methodology as previously. That is,
Lr = QF"'(P r>" I />•*) _  Q P '\P Pm /  pg )
=Qr{ptpm / pt ) - £ T "
where
Qtpm = actual value of oil imports in year t valued at 1972 prices;
Pprn = oil imports price index for year t (1972=100); and
Ppm,P()' = oil imports and export price indices at the base year of 1972,
and Ppm = Pi = 1.
45
The actual real value of oil imports at 1972 prices is the current value of oil 
imports deflated by the oil imports price index. The term Qpm(Ppm / P *) is the equivalent
value of exportable goods that has to be sacrificed to obtain the current value of oil 
imports in year t. The term Qpm(Ppm / P?)) = Qlpm is the counterfactual value of oil
imports, and is equivalent to the amount of exportable goods that has to be sacrificed 
were the oil terms of trade remained at the base year. Thus, the oil terms of trade loss is 
then calculated by subtracting the term Qpm(Ppm / P xt ) with Qpm . The calculations for
both the Philippines and Thailand are presented in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. Table 
3.9 provides a comparison of the total terms of trade loss and the loss due to oil price 
shocks in both absolute value and as proportions of their total real income or GNP.
Table 3.9 shows that the Philippines was marginally affected more by the terms 
of trade loss than Thailand. During 1973-1989 the total terms of trade loss in the 
Philippines amounted to US$ 14.16 billion, as compared to US$ 11.66 billion in 
Thailand. Of this total, the oil terms of trade loss in the Philippines in the same period 
was US$ 7.97 billion, or about 56 per cent of the total. In Thailand, the oil terms of 
trade loss in the same period was US$ 6.35 billion, or about 54 per cent of the total. It is 
also noted that during 1973-1987 the annual terms of trade loss as a percentage of total 
real incomes or GNP in the Philippines was higher than in Thailand.
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IV. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter investigated the nature of the external shocks affecting the 
Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989. The objective was to see whether the 
divergent economic performance of the two countries in that period was a result of an 
unequal magnitude in the external shocks they were facing.
It was found that both countries were exposed to similar external shocks. The 
major adverse shocks affecting them were identified as (1) the oil price rises in 1974 and 
1979-82; (2)the fall in US government expenditure in 1975; and (3) the world recession 
and high interest rates in 1980-82. The major positive shocks were (1) the commodity 
boom in 1973; (2) the fall in the prices of oil during 1983-89; and (3) the increase in 
services income and the investment boom of the 1980s.
The magnitude of those shocks on the balance of payments of both countries was 
compared and found not to be significantly different. As the terms of trade deterioration 
was the major adverse shock affecting both countries, an estimation of the terms of trade 
loss was attempted. Using a simple comparison of the actual real cost of imports to the 
country and the counterfactual real cost of imports were the terms of trade unchanged, the 
loss in terms of income in US dollar at constant prices can be calculated. It was shown 
that the total commodity terms of trade loss in the Philippines was US$ 9.1 billion, as 
compared to US$ 8 billion in Thailand. When the loss due to the oil terms of trade 
change was computed separately, the cost to Thailand was US$ 2.4 billion (30 per cent 
of the total), as compared to only US$ 1.8 billion (20 per cent of the total) in the 
Philippines.
CHAPTER 4
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MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL 
SHOCKS: A SIMPLE MODEL WITH ONE FINAL GOOD
I. Introduction
The previous chapter has indicated that one of the major adverse shocks affecting 
the Philippines and Thailand in the past two decades was the terms of trade deterioration 
especially a rise in the price of oil; and to a lesser extent, the recession in the world 
economy that led to a decline in the demand for exportable goods from the two countries. 
This chapter considers how those shocks affected the economy and the appropriate policy 
responses to those shocks.
The analytical tool is a simple macroeconomic model with one final good. The 
simplicity of this model allows one to clearly see the effects of external shocks on the 
aggregate demand and supply, and the price adjustments in the economy. The shocks 
that are analysed in this chapter are the volume of trade and the terms of trade shocks. 
The volume of trade shock is a shock arising from a fall in demand for the country's 
exportable goods. The terms of trade shock is defined differently from the conventional 
one in which it means a fall in the relative prices of exportable to importable goods. In 
this chapter, the terms of trade shock is defined as a fall in the price of exportable goods 
or home goods relative to the price of imported oil. The reason is that a fall in the relative 
prices of exportable goods to oil is one of the most important terms of trade shocks 
affecting the Philippines and Thailand in the 1970s and early 1980s.
The macroeconomic adjustment in response to external shocks is discussed in 
terms of the desire of the government to restore internal and/or external balances. The 
adjustment to each shock is discussed separately, although it is undeniable that the 
occurrence of the shocks was overlapping and their intrinsic effects were difficult to 
isolate. However, it is desirable to first understand the primary effect of each shock and 
the adjustment of the economy. Having understood the appropriate adjustment to each 
separate shock the evidence of adjustment in the two countries will then be examined.
The remaining discussion is organised into five sections. Section two describes 
the basic model used. Section three analyses the effect of a volume of trade shock. 
Section four turns to the effect of a terms of trade shock. Section five investigates actual 
responses to those shocks in the Philippines and Thailand by tracing a development over 
time of the adjustment towards internal and external balances. The final section 
summarises the analysis and points out the difference in the macroeconomic adjustment in 
the two countries in this framework.
II. The Model
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The analytical framework of this section has some similarities with that of Findlay 
and Rodriguez (1977), Dornbusch (1980) and Bruno and Sachs (1985). The country is 
assumed to completely specialise in the production of home goods (Q) which is also 
exportable goods (X). The production of goods is a function of capital (A3, labour (L), 
and an imported intermediate input called oil (N). Capital and labour are used to produce 
value-added (V). This value-added is then used in a fixed proportion with oil to produce 
final goods. This assumption is used to simplify the analysis that will follow. The 
production function can be described as
Q = Min[V(K,L), 0iV]
Where Q is the gross output. The variable (f> is the amount of home goods output that can 
be produced from one unit of oil. The amount of capital is assumed fixed while labour 
and oil are available with perfectly elastic supply. In effect, the assumptions about factor 
supply confine this study to the short-run analysis. The economy consumes both home 
goods or exportable goods, and imported final goods (M). The system of equations 
representing the structure of the economy is described as follows:
Q=s(wlp,  t) (4.1)
Y = Q - tN (4.2)
T = X( , Y) -  TN (4.3)
Ar
—  = L{Y,r ) (4.4)
P + -
Y = A { Y / )  + G + T
+  —
(4.5)
N = aQ[wfp,r j (4.6)
jt = t L (4.7)
p
*
II (4.8)
P
Where Tis the net output or net income of the economy in unit of home goods. N is the 
amount of oil imported. T is the trade balance or the net exports expressed in unit of 
home goods. The variables w, p, p*, p*N, e and r* are the nominal wage, price of home 
goods, price of imported final goods in units of foreign currency, price of imported oil in 
units of foreign currency, nominal exchange rate (price of foreign currency in units of 
local currency), and foreign interest rate respectively. The variables M \  G, Y* are 
nominal money supply, net government spending on home goods, and foreign income. 
The terms k and x are the relative prices of foreign goods (the real exchange rate) and the 
real cost of oil (the inverse of the oil terms of trade). We assume all prices are unity 
initially by choice of units so that cIjt= de + dp* -  dp and dr -  de +  dp*N- dp.
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Equation (4.1) shows the aggregate supply of home goods which is a function of 
the real wage and the real cost of oil. Equation (4.2) is the net output or income of the 
economy. It is defined as the gross output less the real cost of oil imported. Equation 
(4.3) is the balance of trade expressed in unit of home goods. It is defined as a difference 
between exports and imports including both final goods and oil input. The quantity of 
export in unit of home goods (X) is assumed to be a function of the relative prices of 
foreign final goods and foreign income while the quantity of final goods imported (M) is 
a function of the relative prices of foreign final goods and domestic income.
Equation (4.4) is the equilibrium in the money market. We assume perfect capital 
mobility and static expectation about the exchange rate so that domestic interest rate is 
equal to foreign interest rate. Equation (4.5) is the aggregate demand for home goods. 
The demand for home goods consists of domestic private absorption on home goods (A), 
net government spending on home goods (G) and net exports (T). Private domestic 
absorption on home goods is a function of domestic income and the foreign interest rate. 
With usual assumptions about the behaviour of each function, the signs underneath 
variables indicate the direction of the effect of that variable on the dependent variable. 
Equation (4.6) is the import demand for oil and can be written as a fixed proportion of 
home goods output, where a  is an inverse of 0 -the amount of oil required to produce 
one unit of home goods.
Given all foreign variables, nominal wage, net government spending, and the 
fixed exchange rate regime, the system of equations above can be solved for eight 
endogenous variables namely, Q, Y, T, N, M \  jt, r, and p. As the exchange rate is 
assumed to be exogenously fixed and the domestic interest rates will always be equal to 
foreign interest rates, the money supply will be endogenously determined by the level of 
domestic income and domestic price level. Assuming that the money market will always 
be in equilibrium and hence equation (4.4) can be ignored. Equation (4.5) can also be 
written simply as
Y = A(Y) + G + T (4.5.1)
+
Now we can derive the aggregate demand, aggregate supply and the trade balance 
as a function of two endogenous variables namely, gross output (Q ) and the real 
exchange rate (jt). From equation (4.2) and with a substitution of A from the production 
function, the net output or income can be expressed as
Y = Q -  T/V = Q -  rctQ = (1 -  r a)Q
That is, the net output or income is equal to the unit value-added of home goods when the 
real cost of oil is unity. The derivative of Yor the change in net output is
dY  = (1 -  a)cIQ -  aQclr
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The balance of trade equation can be derived from a total differentiation of 
equation (4.3) and with a substitution of dY, i.e.
-  (r/m + -  aQ( 1 -  m j i ) d r -  | tcc + ( 1  -  a)m jr^dQ + x dY (4.9)
where
n, =
Vm =
dX/X
dji/jz
dM /M
djz/jz
m
x
dM
dY
dX
*
dY
— elasticity of export demand with respect to the real exchange rate 
= elasticity of import demand with respect to the real exchange rate 
= marginal propensity to import 
= foreign marginal propensity to import
For stability, we require the term j  r\x -  ( 7]rn + 1) —— j  to be positive so that an increase in
the real exchange rate w ill tend to improve the trade balance. This condition is equivalent 
to the Marshall-Lemer condition which requires the sum of export and import elasticities 
exceeds unity for the trade balance to improve when there is an exchange rate 
devaluation. Equation (4.9) implies a positive slope of the trade balance schedule with 
respect to Q and jt, i.e.
die
dQ d T =0
roc + (1 -  a)m * jt
X
JT’ {»), -('Jm+D
> 0
The aggregate demand equation can be derived from a total differentiation of 
equation (4.5.1) and with a substitution of dT from equation (4.9)
dQ
1
|( 1 -  a){\ -  a) + roc + (1 -  a)in i r j - \ n x -(nm + 0
jtM  1
X J
\djz
1---------------------- --------------------—A d G + x d Y  -  aO(a -  m Jt)dr]
|(1 -  a \  1 -  a ) + ra  + (1 -  a)m jt^  -*
(4.10)
Where a is the private marginal propensity to absorb home goods ( dA/dY ). Equation 
(4.10) implies a positive slope of the aggregate demand schedule for home goods with 
respect to Q and jt., i.e.
djz
dQ
(1 - a ) {  1 -  ct )+ Ta + (1 -  a ) f n j T
AD = 0 x r— j i -
JT { + 1)
jtM
> 0
Note that the slope o f the aggregate demand schedule is steeper than the slope of the trade 
balance schedule since
(1 - a)(\ -  a ) +  r a  + (1 -  a)m* jz r a  + ( 1 -  a)rri jz
>
X  r jzM- \ n , -O im + 0—
JZ X
Sim ilarly, the aggregate supply schedule can be derived by differentiating 
equation (4.1) totally.
dQ = sxdjz + 5, (dw -  de -  dp ) + s2d r  
ds
(4.11)
5i d(w / p )
<0
ds
.s' = —  < 0 
• d r
where s, and s2 are the partial derivatives o f the aggregate supply with respect to the real 
wage and the real cost o f oil respectively. Equation (4.11) implies the negative slope o f 
the aggregate supply schedule with respect to Q and jl, i.e.
du
~dQ
1
=  —  <0
A S-0
Equilibrium in the home goods market is established when the change in its aggregate 
demand is equal to the change in its aggregate supply, i. e.
bud r  + b\^dG + bn dY* ] 
b^xdx  + h 2(dw - d e  -  dp* )j
A . Oj2 dQ'
a2X a22 djz
where
ax, = (1 -  a)(\ -  a )  + r a  + (1 -  a )m  jz
X f jzM 1
* - - + ! ) — }a <2 = -----JT
a , .  = 1
ü 22 =  ~ s \
bx, = -aQ (a  - m  jz)
hn ~ l 
bt} = x
b2] =  s2
b22 = s.
Zero balance of trade is established when d T -  0 , i. e.
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The equilibrium in the economy can be graphically illustrated in Figure 4.1. The 
horizontal axis shows the quantity of gross domestic output and the vertical axis is the 
relative prices of foreign goods or the real exchange rate. The TT schedule is the balance 
of trade schedule. It shows the level of aggregate output and the relative prices that will 
maintain a zero trade balance. It is upward sloping because a rise in the relative prices of 
foreign goods will switch demand from imports towards home goods and thus tend to 
improve the trade balance. 1 To maintain a zero trade balance, there must be an increase 
in income that will encourage imports and reduce the trade surplus. This is achieved 
when there is an increase in gross domestic output. An exogenous increase in the real 
cost of oil will cause a shift in the TT schedule to the left while an increase in foreign 
income will work in the opposite direction.
Figure 4.1
The equilibrium in the home goods market and balance of trade
The DD schedule is the aggregate demand in the economy. It represents the 
relationship between the aggregate quantity demanded of home goods and the relative 
prices which will clear the home goods market. It is upward sloping because, for given 
foreign prices and the exchange rate, a rise in the relative prices (a fall in the price of 
home goods) will have an effect in switching demand from imports towards home goods 
and thus require an increase in domestic output to maintain an equilibrium in the goods 
market. An exogenous increase in fiscal spending and export demand will result in an 
increase in aggregate output, and thus a shift in the DD schedule to the right. A rise in the 
real cost of oil will lead to a fall in income and gross domestic output and thus, a shift of 
the DD schedule to the left. Note that the DD schedule is steeper than the TT schedule 
because as the real exchange rate increases, gross domestic output will rise through the 
trade surplus. This, in turn, will lead to an increase in net income. However, the rise in 
net income will be less than the increase in gross output because part of it will go to more
1 This requires the stability condition similar to the Marshall-Lcrner condition as shown in equation 
( 4 .9 ) .
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imports of final goods as well as oil. Hence, the increase in the aggregate demand for 
home goods will be less.
The SS schedule is the aggregate supply of home goods in the economy. It 
shows the amount of home goods that will be supplied by the producer at given prices of 
all input. It is downward sloping because, given foreign prices and the exchange rate, an 
increase in the relative prices of foreign goods (a fall in the price of home goods) will 
lower the profitability of producers and thus cause a contraction in the employment and 
output level. An exogenous increase in the real wage as well as the real cost of oil will 
lead to a decline in employment and output, and thus will shift the SS schedule to the left.
The intersection between the aggregate demand and supply at point A is the 
equilibrium in the home goods market. The aggregate quantity of domestic output is OQq 
and the relative prices is Jto. It is assumed that at this level of output there is a full 
employment of labour and the economy also has a zero trade balance, thus the economy 
is in a full equilibrium with internal and external balances. This is shown by the 
intersection of TT, DD and SS schedules at point A in Figure 4.1. The next section will 
analyse the effects of external shocks on the internal and external balances of the 
economy and how the government can respond to the shocks.
III. A Volume of Trade Shock
Using the previous model, it is now possible to analyse the effect of the volume 
of trade shock on the level of gross output and the real exchange rate. The effect of a 
change in the export demand comes through the change in foreign income. Thus, there 
will be a change in the trade balance and the aggregate demand for home goods. The 
effect on the trade balance can be determined from equation (4.9), i. e.
= -------- ; l * > 0  (4.12)
<it-o z a  +  (1 -  a ) m  jz
dQ
dY *
djz -x*
d Y * <it-o X  f jzM
JZ I A
< 0 (4.13)
The effect on the aggregate demand for home goods can also be determined from 
equation (4.10), i. e.
dQ
dY
dn
x
ad- 0  (\ -  a)(\ -  a ) + r a  + (\ -  a)m jz
—  >0
dY
- x
A D -  0
u .
/  1 >
JZ  ^ A
< 0
(4 . 14)
(4 . 15)
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The effect of the volume of trade shock on the trade balance and the aggregate 
demand for home goods can be illustrated in Figure 4.2. Suppose there is a fall in 
foreign demand for exportable goods or home goods, other things being equal, the trade 
balance will go into a deficit. To maintain a zero trade balance there must be a fall in 
gross output and income or a rise in the real exchange rate. Thus, the TT schedule will 
shift to the left as shown by TT' schedule. At the same time, a fall in foreign demand 
will also cause the aggregate demand for home goods to contract. Thus, the aggregate 
demand schedule will have to shift to the left. Alternatively, if the level of aggregate 
demand does not change, there must be a rise in the real exchange rate (or a fall in the 
domestic price of home goods) to clear the home goods market. Thus, the new aggregate 
demand schedule will shift to the left as shown by D'D' schedule and intersects the TT' 
schedule at point B. This point is vertically above point A. 2
Figure 4.2
The effect of a volume of trade shock on trade balance and 
aggregate demand for home goods
As there is no change in the nominal wage and the real cost of oil, the aggregate 
supply schedule remains unaffected. Therefore, when the domestic price of home goods 
falls following the volume of trade shock, the real wage will rise and there will be a 
reduction in employment and production of home goods. The equilibrium in the home 
goods market will be established at the intersection between the D'D' and SS at point C. 
The equilibrium level of home goods output will fall to OQ2 and the real exchange rate 
will rise to H 2 . Also, as point C is located below the TT' schedule, there will be a trade 
deficit.
-  This is because if gross output remains fixed, a volume of trade shock will lead to a depreciation of the 
real exchange rate by the same magnitude that will maintain equilibrium in home goods market and a zero 
trade balance (sec equations 4.13 and 4.15).
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In summary, the volume of trade shock will lead to a contraction in the net exports 
and the aggregate demand for home goods. As a result, the price of home goods will fall 
(or the real exchange rate rises). This raises the real wage and causes a contraction in the 
supply of home goods. The equilibrium in the home goods market will be established 
with a lower level of home goods output and employment. Also, there will be a trade 
deficit because the equilibrium real exchange rate is lower than the level required to 
maintain a zero trade balance.
When there is a fall in the level of home goods output or a rise in unemployment, 
and the trade deficit, what is the appropriate government policy response? Within this 
model, there are two broad targets or objectives. The first is to maintain the level of 
output of home goods that will guarantee a certain level of employment. This objective 
may be called the internal balance objective. The second is to maintain the level of trade 
and current account deficit and this may be called the external balance objective. There 
are also two policy instruments: fiscal policy and exchange rate policy. The role of 
monetary policy is only to maintain the equilibrium in the money market through income 
and price adjustments. Thus, we can characterise possible policy responses into four 
categories.
1. The neutral response
This is when the government chooses to do nothing and accepts the equilibrium 
outcome at point C. With this response, private absorption will fall as their income falls. 
Private investment may also fall or remain unchanged depending upon whether private 
sector expects the shock to be temporary or permanent. If the fall in private absorption is 
less than the fall in their income, there will be dissaving in the private sector. On the 
government's part, as there is a fall in domestic output tax revenue collection will decline. 
If the government maintains its public expenditure at the same level as in the absence of 
the shock, the budget deficit will grow. This deficit combined with an excess of private 
spending over income results in a trade and current account deficit.3 Thus, there will be 
external as well as internal imbalances as the current account deficit increases and 
employment and output of home goods fall from the original level. This is precisely the 
equilibrium result at point C that has been shown in Figure 4.2 above.
2. The response to restore internal balance
The government may have as an objective to maintain a certain level of home 
goods output that will guarantee a target level of employment. Thus, it can respond to the 
shock with an expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate output. The expansion of net 
government spending on home goods will increase the aggregate demand and cause the
3 If wc assume that there is no net transfer and other factor payments, the trade balance is also equal to 
the current account balance.
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D'D' schedule to shift back to the right. If the objective is to offset completely the 
adverse effect on home goods output, the aggregate demand schedule D'D' must shift 
back until it reaches point A. In this case, the government insulates the effect of the 
volume of trade shock by running a budget deficit. At the same time, the trade balance 
deficit will increase as point A is now becoming further below the zero trade balance 
schedule T T . The end result is that the level of home goods output can be maintained at 
the expense of an external imbalance.
The exchange rate policy to stimulate the aggregate demand for home goods can 
possibly be used but with some conditions. In a single goods model with no imported 
intermediate input, an exchange rate devaluation is likely to produce a positive switching 
effect on production and negative effect on consumption of home goods, providing the 
Marshall-Lemer condition is satisfied. This is a standard textbook result. However, it is 
also possible that an exchange rate devaluation may instead result in a fall in home goods 
output when (i) initially there is a large deficit of the trade balance; (ii) devaluation gives 
windfall profits to export and import-competing industries which have high marginal 
propensity to save; or (iii) there are ad valorem taxes on exports or imports that a 
devaluation effectively redistributes income from private to government sectors which 
may save rather than spend (Krugman and Taylor, 1978). In the present framework, the 
indeterminable effect of the exchange rate devaluation on output is further compounded 
by an additional effect of exchange rate change on the real cost of imported intermediate 
input. This outcome is similarly analysed by van Wijnbergen (1986).
We know that exchange rate adjustment will affect not only the trade balance and 
the aggregate demand schedules but also the aggregate supply of home goods. That is, 
while exchange rate devaluation will lead to an expansion of the net exports of home 
goods, it will also cause an increase in the real cost of oil. Thus, the net effect of a 
devaluation on the trade balance depends upon the strength of these two opposing forces. 
From equation (4.9) the net effect of the exchange rate change on the trade balance is
dQ
de
. .  . jzM  , ,  ,
— { >h - ( >L + 1)—  t -  « ö ( l  - m i t )
d T =0 r a  + (1 -  a ) m  jt
<
- 0
>
(4.16)
Thus, in a country where the share of the oil imported in the production of home goods is 
close to zero, the net effect of a devaluation on the trade balance will depend upon the 
assumption about the Marshall-Lemer condition. If the Marshall-Lemer condition holds, 
exchange rate devaluation will cause the trade balance schedule T'T' to shift back to the 
right while exchange rate revaluation will cause the trade balance schedule TT ' to shift to 
the left.
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Further, the net effect of the exchange rate change on the trade balance will also 
lead to a second round effect on the aggregate demand for home goods in the same 
direction.
dQ
de ,4D = 0
Ä V + 1 ) ^ 1  - a Q ( a  - m n )
------------------------------------------- :-------  - 0
(1 - a \ \ - a )+  ra  + (1 -  a)m x  >
(4.17)
That is, in the same situation as assumed above, the exchange rate devaluation will also 
have the effect of stimulating the aggregate demand for home goods, and thus cause the 
D'D' schedule to shift to the right. Note that the magnitude of the effect of the exchange 
rate change on aggregate demand will be smaller than that on the trade balance schedule 
because the denominator in equation (4.17) is larger than the denominator in equation 
(4.16).
Finally, the exchange rate change will also affect the real cost of oil imports. The 
extent of a shift in the aggregate supply is dependent upon the partial effect of a rise in the 
real cost of oil on the supply of home goods, i. e.
= < 0 (4.18)
.45=0
Thus, exchange rate devaluation will cause the aggregate supply of home goods to 
fall and the S'S' schedule will shift to the left. The use of exchange rate adjustment to 
achieve the above objective is therefore conditional upon the net effect of the exchange 
rate change on the trade balance and also the net effect of the exchange rate change on 
aggregate supply and demand. There are four possible cases where exchange rate 
devaluation or revaluation may be required. These can be explained as follows:
1. When the net effect on the trade balance is positive, and the net effect on the 
aggregate demand is greater than that on aggregate supply. In this case, exchange rate 
devaluation will cause the trade balance and the aggregate demand schedules to shift to 
the right. This leads to an improvement in the trade balance as well as an increase in the 
aggregate demand for home goods. However, it will also raise the real cost of oil 
imports and thus cause the aggregate supply of home goods to fall. As the net effect of 
exchange rate devaluation on aggregate demand is greater than that on aggregate supply, 
there will be a net increase in the output of home goods. Thus, exchange rate devaluation 
can be used to achieve the objective on the target of output and employment. 
Furthermore, the trade balance deficit may be reduced as the trade balance and the 
aggregate demand schedules shift to the right. With this adjustment, the domestic price 
of home goods will rise as the real exchange rate appreciates.
ctQ
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On the other hand, exchange rate revaluation will cause the trade balance and the 
aggregate demand schedules to shift to the left. At the same time, the aggregate supply 
will shift to the right as the real cost of oil imports falls. As the net effect of exchange 
rate revaluation on aggregate demand is greater than that on aggregate supply, there will 
be a net fall in the output of home goods. Thus, the policy to revalue the exchange rate 
will not only fail to achieve the objective above but will also cause the trade deficit to 
deteriorate further.
2. When the net effect on the trade balance is positive, and the net effect on the 
aggregate demand is less than that on aggregate supply. In this case, exchange rate 
devaluation will lead to an improvement in the trade balance as well as an increase in the 
aggregate demand for home goods as mentioned above. However, as the net effect of 
exchange rate devaluation on aggregate demand is less than that on aggregate supply, the 
aggregate supply will shift by much more and the net effect on output of home goods is a 
contraction. Also, the domestic price of home goods will rise as the real exchange rate 
appreciates. This price adjustment is similar to the first case above. Thus, exchange rate 
devaluation cannot be used to achieve the objective on the target level of output and 
employment although it may help to improve the external balance.
On the other hand, exchange rate revaluation will cause the trade balance and the 
aggregate demand schedules to shift to the left. But as the aggregate supply will shift to 
the right and the net effect of the exchange rate revaluation on aggregate demand is less 
than that on aggregate supply, there will be a net increase in the output of home goods. 
Thus, the policy to revalue the exchange rate can be used to achieve the objective on the 
target of output above. However, as the trade balance and the aggregate demand 
schedules shift to the left, there will be a deterioration in the trade deficit. At the same 
time, the domestic price of home goods will fall as the real exchange rate depreciates.
3. When the net effect on the trade balance is negative, and the net effect on 
aggregate demand is greater than that on aggregate supply. In this case, exchange rate 
devaluation will cause the trade balance and the aggregate demand for home goods to 
shift to the left. At the same time, it will also raise the real cost of oil imports and thus 
cause the aggregate supply of home goods to shift to the left. This negative effect will 
cause a further fall in the output of home goods and a worsening trade deficit. As the real 
exchange rate may depreciate or appreciate, the domestic price of home goods may also 
rise or fall. In this case, the exchange rate devaluation will not only fail to achieve the 
internal balance objective, but it will lead to a deteriorating external balance.
On the other hand, exchange rate revaluation will cause the trade balance and the 
aggregate demand schedules to shift to the right. At the same time, the aggregate supply 
will also shift to the right as the real cost of oil imports falls. This positive effect will lead 
to a net increase in the output of home goods. At the same time, as the trade balance and
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aggregate demand schedules shift to the right, the trade balance will improve. And 
similar to the above case, as real exchange rate may depreciate or appreciate, and 
therefore the domestic price of home goods may rise or fall. Thus, the policy to revalue 
the exchange rate not only helps to achieve the internal balance objective but also 
improves the external balance.
4. When the net effect on the trade balance is negative, and the net effect on 
aggregate demand is less than that on aggregate supply. In this case, the exchange rate 
devaluation will cause the trade balance and aggregate demand for home goods to shift to 
the left as mentioned above. At the same time, aggregate supply will also shift to the left. 
Therefore, there will be a net fall in the output of home goods and a worsening of the 
trade balance. The domestic price of home goods may rise or fall depending on the 
adjustment of the real exchange rate. In this case, the result is similar to the third case 
when we have the exchange rate devaluation.
On the other hand, exchange rate revaluation will cause the trade balance and the 
aggregate demand schedules to shift to the right. Also, as the aggregate supply will shift 
to the right when the real cost of oil imports declines, this will further support the 
increase in the output of home goods. The domestic price of home goods may rise or fall 
depending on the adjustment of the real exchange rate. Thus, the policy to revalue the 
exchange rate can be used to achieve the objective on the target level of output above. 
And since the trade balance and the aggregate demand schedules shift to the right, the 
same policy also helps to improve the external balance.
3. The response to restore external balance
In this case, the government may be more concerned with a worsening of the 
current account balance and decide to restore external balance. Thus, it can respond to 
the volume of trade shock by having a contractionary fiscal policy to reduce domestic 
absorption in line with a fall in income. If there is still an excess of private spending over 
income, the government will have to run a budget surplus. This will cause the aggregate 
demand schedule to shift upwards until it intersects the T'T' schedule at D. In this case 
the economy will be able to achieve an external balance but at the cost of a reduction in 
the level of home goods output. In addition, the domestic price of home goods will fall 
further as the real exchange rate depreciates.
Alternatively, exchange rate policy can be similarly applied to achieve the external 
balance. Nevertheless, whether the government should employ exchange rate 
devaluation or revaluation depends upon the same conditions as discussed earlier. 
Without a repetition of the same results, the appropriate policy options to achieve this 
objective as well as the previous objective on the target level of output can summarised in 
Table 4.1 below. The expression in the parentheses are also given to show the effect of
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such policy on the domestic price of home goods or the inflationary effect on the 
economy.
Table 4.1 The appropriate policy options in response to the volume of 
trade shock.
T o  m a i n t a i n  i n t e r n a l T o  m a i n t a i n  e x t e r n a l
b a l a n c e b a l a n c e
F i s c a l  p o l i c y Expansionary policy Contractionary policy
E x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l i c y
Case I. Devaluation Devaluation
(with domestic price inflation) (with domestic price inflation)
Case II. Revaluation
(with domestic price deflation)
Devaluation
(with domestic price inflation)
Case III. Revaluation
(domestic price may rise or fall)
Revaluation
(domestic price may rise or fall)
Case IV. Revaluation
(domestic pnce may rise or fall)
Revaluation
(domestic price may rise or fall)
Note:
Case I is when dQ
de dT=0
> 0 ,  and
~  I ~(n,n + 1 -  aQ(a -  m n)
Case II is when
dQ
> 0 , and
dT-o
(1 -  a)( 1 -  a )  + r a  + (1 -  a ) m  jt
X [  jtM
—  j *L ~ Qlm + D—  [ ~ a Q ( a  -  m  jt)
Case III is when
Case IV is when
dQ
de
dQ
de
< 0 , and
dT=0
(1 -  <3)(1 -  a )  + r a  + (1 -  a ) m  jt
X  r jtM
— - Q l m + 1)— }- -  aQ(a - m  jt)
hi
hi
dT=0
< 0 , and
(1 - dt)(l -  a )+  r a  + (1 -  a ) m  jt
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4. The response to restore internal and external balance 
simultaneously
From Table 4.1 it is also possible for the government to achieve both internal and 
external balances simultaneously with the two instruments available, or even with one 
instrument of nominal exchange rate policy.
That is, if the effect of the exchange rate could be characterised as in case I, 
exchange rate devaluation can lead to the attainment of both internal and external 
balances. On the other hand, if the effect of the exchange rate change is characterised as 
in cases III and IV, then a policy of nominal exchange rate revaluation will achieve both 
internal and external balances. However, even though the use of exchange rate policy in 
these circumstances may lead to the result explained above, it may have little impact on 
output and perhaps require a larger magnitude of devaluation/revaluation. Hence, fiscal 
policy could also be used to supplement the output effect. In this situation, the 
prerequisite condition is that expansionary fiscal policy be used with a devaluation of 
exchange rate (case I), or the expansionary fiscal policy be used with a revaluation of 
exchange rate (cases III and IV).
With these four possible responses, what should be the most appropriate option 
for government? The first thing may be that the government does not know what to do 
when the shock arises unexpectedly. Thus, it may have a neutral policy response 
following the shock. As a result, there will be a fall in the level of output and 
employment and a worsening trade balance. This kind of response may be plausible in 
the short-run, but not in the long-run. Eventually, the government has to decide whether 
to restore internal or external balance, or both. Or even to be somewhere in between the 
two extremes of objective. The decision will depend upon the desire of the government 
and its perception of the shock, i. e. whether it is considered to be a temporary or 
permanent phenomenon. The desire of the government can only be explained by the 
rationality of its leadership. The perception of the shock is very much related to the 
country's previous experience with similar shock. If the country has been repeatedly 
exposed to shock, the lessons of the success or failure of previous responses to the 
previous shock is likely to dictate adjustment to the present shock.
The answer to the above question is therefore dependent upon various factors. 
However, if the nature of the shock is exactly known, the appropriate policy response 
can be assigned without difficulty. For example, if the volume of trade shock is 
temporary, the T'T' schedule will shift downward in the future. A policy to maintain the 
initial level of output and employment after the shock is thus appropriate. The first best 
policy is fiscal expansion to shift the aggregate demand to its original level. Thus, there 
will be no change in the level of output and domestic price. However, until the T'T'
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schedule shifts back, there will be a temporary trade deficit. This is not a matter for 
concern as it will be offset by running a trade surplus in the future when foreign demand 
resumes. The appropriate government response is to allow private absorption to be 
unaffected from any temporary shock that arises.
The use of exchange rate policy is conditional upon the net effect of the exchange 
rate change on the trade balance, and on the aggregate supply and demand. For example, 
exchange rate devaluation can only be used when the net effect of the exchange rate on 
the trade balance is positive, and the net effect of the exchange rate change on the 
aggregate demand is greater than that on the aggregate supply (case I). If this is not the 
case, exchange rate revaluation will be an alternative. Nevertheless, the exchange rate 
policy will also have an effect on aggregate supply and there may be a permanent change 
in the real exchange rate and the domestic price level. Thus, it can be considered the 
second best policy in this case.
On the other hand, if the shock is permanent, the T'T' schedule will stay put. 
Therefore, the appropriate policy response is to restore external balance. Similarly, the 
first best policy is fiscal contraction. This will reduce aggregate spending in line with a 
permanent fall in income. If there is still an excess of private spending over income, the 
government will have to run a budget surplus. Exchange rate devaluation can only be 
applied if the net effect of the exchange rate change on the trade balance is positive (cases 
I and II). On the other hand, if the net effect of the exchange rate change on the trade 
balance is negative, then exchange rate revaluation is needed. Again, it has to be 
weighted against a fall in the aggregate supply and a rise in the domestic price level.
IV. A Terms of Trade Shock
This section considers a special case of the terms of trade shock in which the price 
of an imported intermediate input, oil, rises relative to all other inputs or final goods. As 
oil is used in the production process of final goods, an increase in its price not only 
affects the aggregate demand via income effect but also the aggregate supply via the cost- 
push effect. Thus, the effect on the economy will be different from the case of the 
volume of trade shock and this requires a different analysis. The effect of a rise in the 
real cost of oil on the trade balance can be determined from equation (4.9), i. e.
dQ
dx
dn
dr
-aQ (\  -  m jt)  ^
dT~° r a  + (1 -  a  )m j t
dT=0
aQ( 1 - t n  jt)
x r ttM ]
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The effect on the aggregate demand for home goods can be determined from equation 
(4.10), i. e.
dQ
d r AD  -  0
-a (X a  -  rn j i)
(1 -  tf)(l -  a ) + ra  + (1 -  a)m ji
< 0
djz
dr. A D - 0
aQ(a -  m j i)
- H - ( ' ?»  + ')JT
jtM ' i
>0
(4.21)
(4.22)
Similarly, the effect on the aggregate supply can be determined from equation (4.11) as
dQ
dr AS =0
s2 < 0 (4.23)
dir s2 .
—  =  <  0
d r as*  5,
(4.24)
The effect of the oil price shock can be illustrated in Figure 4.3. When the price 
of oil rises relative to the price of home goods, the trade balance w ill go into deficit. To 
maintain a zero trade balance there must be a fall in income or a rise in the real exchange 
rate. Thus, the TT schedule w ill shift to the left as shown by T T  schedule. At the same 
time, the oil price shock affects both the aggregate demand and supply in the economy. 
On the aggregate demand side, there is an income effect as a result o f the terms of trade 
deterioration. Thus, domestic absorption as well as imports of final goods w ill fall. The 
aggregate demand schedule w ill shift to the left as shown by D'D' schedule.
On the aggregate supply, as the real cost of oil increases it affects the profitability 
of the producers. Thus, the aggregate supply w ill fa ll and the SS schedule shifts 
downward to S'S'. A fall in supply depends upon the partial effect of a rise in the real 
cost of oil on the supply of home goods (s2). The equilibrium in the domestic economy 
w ill be at point C where the new aggregate demand and supply intersects. The output of 
home goods w ill fall but the real exchange rate may rise or fall depending upon the net 
effect of the adverse oil terms of trade on the aggregate demand and supply schedules. 
This can be shown from the internal balance solution on page 53 that
djz
d r Internal
Balance
>
The real exchange rate w ill rise only if  the product of a] ,/?0| is larger than a,,/?,, , 
and will fall i f  the product of anb2X is smaller than a,,/?,,. In Figure 4.3, we suppose that 
the effect of the terms of trade on the aggregate supply is larger and hence the aggregate 
supply shifts downward by much more. This is the most likely case, at least in the short- 
run, when the cost-push effect o f the oil price rise dominates the income effect on the
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aggregate demand. Consequently, the real exchange rate will fall or the domestic price of 
home goods will rise.
In response to the adverse terms of trade shock, the government can make four 
possible responses as outlined in the previous section. The process of adjustment goes 
along a similar line. First, the government may have a neutral response. Thus, the 
equilibrium in the economy will be at point C. In this case there will be a fall in the level 
of domestic output and the trade balance will be worsened. Also, in this case the real 
exchange rate will fall and the domestic price of home goods will rise.
Figure 4.3
The effect of a terms of trade shock on trade balance, 
aggregate demand and supply
Second, if the government wants to maintain the level of domestic output at OQo, 
it can employ expansionary fiscal policy or exchange rate policy. The former will 
stimulate aggregate demand for home goods and thus cause the aggregate demand 
schedule D'D' to shift back to the right. However, by so doing the trade deficit will 
increase. Also, the domestic price of home goods will rise. The use of exchange rate 
policy depends upon the net effect of the exchange rate change on the trade balance as 
explained in the case of the volume of trade shock earlier. For example, if the net effect 
of the exchange rate change on the trade balance is positive, and the effect of the 
exchange rate change on the aggregate demand is greater than that on the aggregate 
supply, exchange rate devaluation can be used to achieve this objective. The trade 
balance and the aggregate demand schedules will shift to the right. At the same time, the 
aggregate supply will shift to the left but its negative effect on output will be smaller than 
the positive effect from aggregate demand. Thus, there will be a net increase in the level
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of output. But again, in this case, devaluation of the exchange rate will cause the 
domestic price to rise as the aggregate supply shifts downward.
Third, if the government is more concerned with the external balance, it can 
respond to the terms of trade shock by applying a contractionary fiscal policy. This 
works in a similar fashion as in the case of the volume of trade shock. The use of the 
exchange rate policy also depends upon the net effect of the exchange rate on the trade 
balance and the effect of the exchange rate change on the aggregate supply and demand. 
Finally, if the government wants to restore both internal and external balances 
simultaneously, certain prerequisites must be met. This is similar to the case of the 
volume of trade shock explained in the previous section.
A summary of the appropriate policy options in response to the terms of trade 
shock are shown in Table 4.2 The expressions in parentheses are given to show the 
effect of such policy on the domestic price of home goods or the inflationary effect on the 
economy.
Table 4.2 The appropriate policy options in response to the terms of 
trade shock.
T o  m a i n t a i n  i n t e r n a l  
b a l a n c e
T o  m a i n t a i n  e x t e r n a l  
b a l a n c e
F i s c a l  p o l i c y Expansionary policy Contractionary policy
(with domestic price inflation) (with domestic price deflation)
E x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l i c y
Case I. Devaluation Devaluation
(with domestic price in(lation) (with domestic price inflation)
Case II. Revaluation Devaluation
(domestic price may rise or fall) (domestic price may rise or fall)
Case III. Revaluation Revaluation
(domestic price may rise or fall) (domestic price may rise or fall)
Case IV. Revaluation Revaluation
(domestic price may nse or fall) (domestic price may nse or fall)
Note:
Case 1 is when dQ
de d T - 0
> 0 , and
x r jtM—\n,  -(*/,» + 1)—JT [ A -  aQ(a - m u )
(1  - a)(  1 -  a )  +  r a  +  (1  -  a ) m  jt
>  bo
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Case II is when dQ
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Similar to the volume of trade shock, appropriate government policy responses 
will again depend upon its objective and the expectation of the nature of the shock. If the 
nature of the shock is known, the appropriate policy response can be assigned. For 
example, if the shock is temporary, the T 'T  schedule will shift downward in the future 
and, therefore, it is appropriate for the government to respond with Fiscal expansion. 
Exchange rate devaluation can be used to restore internal balance only when the net effect 
of exchange rate devaluation on the trade balance is positive, and the net effect of the 
exchange rate change on the aggregate demand is greater than that on the aggregate 
supply (case I). In this case, there will be a trade-off with higher domestic prices of 
home goods. Alternatively, if the terms of trade shock is permanent, it is appropriate for 
the government to restore external balance by using contractionary fiscal policy. 
Exchange rate devaluation can only be used when its net effect on the trade balance is 
positive.
V. The Evidence in the Philippines and Thailand
The previous section demonstrates how a country can theoretically respond to the 
volume of trade and the terms of trade shocks. This section investigates the actual 
responses to those shocks in the Philippines and Thailand during 1972-1989 by tracing a 
development over time of the adjustments towards internal and external balances. First, it 
is appropriate to investigate the movements of two endogenous variables namely, the real 
output or GDP and the real exchange rate in the two countries.
The movement of the real output is presented by the growth rates of real GDP in 
Figure 4.4. It is shown that growth rate of real GDP in the two countries before the first 
oil price shock did not differ markedly. After the first oil price shock their growth rates 
were still similar until 1976 when the growth rate in the Philippines constantly declined. 
In 1984-85 the Philippine economy was further affected by its own internal shock and the 
country experienced its first negative growth rates since the second World War. In
Thailand, despite the external shocks, the GDP growth rate was never below 4 per cent. 
After 1987, the country enjoyed double digit growth rate.
Figure 4.4 Growth rates or real GDP in the Philippines and Thailand
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Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
various issues.
Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
National Income of Thailand, various issues.
The movement of the real exchange rate in the Philippines and Thailand is 
presented in Figure 4.5. This real exchange rate is defined as the relative prices of 
foreign goods in unit of home goods (an index of foreign inflation times the nominal 
effective exchange rate and divided by an index of home inflation, CPI). The data for 
both countries were obtained from the Selected Philippine Economic Indicators 1989 
Yearbook, published by the Central Bank of the Philippines. It is shown that there was 
an appreciation of the real exchange rates in both countries in 1974. This was because of 
rising domestic inflation imported into the country by the first oil price shock. During 
1979-1980 the real exchange rate again appreciated because of the second oil price shock 
that induced domestic inflation. In 1983 and 1984, the Philippine government devalued 
the exchange rate by as much as 28 per cent and hence the real exchange rate depreciated 
noticeably. However, the real depreciation was short-lived and the government floated 
the currency in 1986 which effectively allowed the peso to depreciate continuously. In 
Thailand, the real exchange rate showed an appreciating trend in 1974 and 1979-82. 
After 1982, the real exchange rate showed a depreciating trend. This was achieved 
mainly because of a policy to maintain low domestic inflation relative to foreign inflation. 
Although in 1981 and 1985 there were two devaluations of the baht that helped increase 
the competitiveness of the real exchange rate, they were small compared to what 
happened in the Philippines.
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Figure 4.5 Real effective exchange rate index in the 
Philippines and Thailand (December 1980=100)
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Source Central Bank of the Philippines, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators:
1989 Yearbook.
A development over time in terms of the adjustments towards internal and external 
balances in the Philippines and Thailand is presented in Figures 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. 
The internal balance condition can be interpreted as meaning that the demand for domestic 
goods and services is sufficient to ensure full employment of resources at a constant price
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level. The external balance condition is reflected by the change in the current account 
deficit, often measured as a percentage of the country's GDP.
The diagram on top is a kind of Phillips-type diagram which shows the inflation 
and growth trade-off. In the conventional Phillips curve, the variation in the 
unemployment rates and domestic price levels are used to reflect the change in the internal 
balance condition. However, as the measurement of unemployment rates in the 
Philippines and Thailand is not a good indicator of the real unemployment situation, the 
deviation of the actual growth rate of real GDP has been chosen as a proxy to reflect the 
change in the internal balance condition. This implicitly means the government has the 
objective to maintain the country's growth rate along its long-term trend, rather than 
controlling unemployment at a certain level. The difference between the actual growth 
rate in any year and the trend therefore reflects the deviation of the economy from its 
long-term growth. This is shown on the horizontal axis. A positive deviation reflects an 
above-the-trend growth performance while a negative deviation means the opposite.4
The long-term growth rate in the Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989 is 
estimated to be 3.85 and 6.62 per cent per annum respectively. This is estimated by 
regressing the logarithm of real GDP on time trend for the period of 1970-1989. The 
specification of the equation and the estimation results are presented in Appendix 4.A of 
this chapter. The diagram at the bottom maps out the development over time of the 
economy's internal (the deviation from growth trend) and external balances (the current 
account deficit/GDP).
4 The main objective of an analysis in chapter 4 is to investigate how the Philippine and Thai economy 
responded to the external shocks in the 1970s and 1980s in terms of an adjustment to restore internal and 
external balances. 1 took the view that the government in both countries will try to restore internal 
balance by maintaining growth in line with the country's long-term trend. This trend could partly be 
determined by the country's potentiality given resource endowments and international economic situation. 
Thus, the government will try to stimulate the economy if the actual growth rate falls below the long­
term trend. However, to continue stimulating growth higher than the long-term trend will also be 
undesirable for it will induce domestic inllation or raise expectation of future inflation. The question is 
what should be the long-term trend that the two governments consider as consistent with their economy's 
potentiality? In the case of a relatively stable economy like Thailand, the estimation of the long-term 
growth trend for a period of two decades can possibly reflect the country's potentiality. In the case of the 
Philippines, there was a period of instability from 1983 onwards that will certainly affect the estimation 
of the long-term growth trend. I have realised this and attempted to reestimate the long-term growth trend 
by adding a dummy variable for the period of 1983-1989. The results of estimation are then used to 
reconstruct the Phillips-type diagram similar to the one in Figure 4.6 but is not presented. Nonetheless, 
the picture is generally similar to the one shown earlier on page 73 and it does not affect the conclusion I 
put forward in the following discussion.
Figure 4.6
The internal and external balances in the Philippines
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Figure 4.7
The internal and external balances in Thailand
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An initial comparison of the two countries suggests two interesting points. First, 
during the period of 1970-1989 the Thai authorities were comparatively successful in 
restoring the internal balance. The deviations of real GDP growth from the trend were 
much less than the Philippines and inflation rates were modest.5 Second, the usual 
Phillips curve suggests that there is a positive relationship between economic activity and 
the inflation rate. That is, as the economy grows faster, the inflation rate also tends to 
rise. Thus, the Phillips curve should have a negative slope and run across the south-east 
to north-west direction in this diagram. When there is a negative income shock the 
Phillips curve will shift to the right but the relationship between the deviation in output 
and the inflation rate remains unchanged.
A comparison of the two countries shows that the so-called Phillips curve that 
runs across the south-east to north-west direction is observable in Thailand, but not in the 
Philippines. For example, when the Thai economy grew above the trend growth rate in 
1972-73 there was inflationary pressure. The two negative oil price shocks caused both 
price inflation and a decline in economic activity. This can be seen by a rightward shift in 
1974 and 1979. When the economy grew below the trend growth rate in 1983-1984, the 
inflation rate recessed. This phenomenon was not obvious in the Philippines. 6 Instead, 
a remarkable anomaly was shown during 1986-1989 when the economic growth rate 
declined but the inflation rate increased.
Apart from the two features above, was there any difference in the adjustment of 
the Philippines and Thailand? Broadly, the way they were expecting and responding to 
the shocks was similar, but there were significant differences in the strategy they adopted 
which shall be investigated in the following section. The investigation concentrates on 
adjustments to the four major shocks comprising two episodes of the volume of trade 
shock and two episodes of the terms of trade shock.
The adjustment to the commodity boom: 1973
As suggested by the analysis in section III, a commodity boom will lead to an 
increase in aggregate demand and a favourable trade balance. The economy should be 
moving toward excess demand for home goods and the domestic price level should also 
increase as a result of strong export demand. From Figure 4.6 and 4.7 this did happen in
5 The deviation of real GDP growth from the trend can be seen in Appendix 4.A. The standard error of 
estimation of the time trend variable is 0.(X)15 for Thailand and 0.(X)53 for the Philippines. The average 
inflation rate for the same period is 7.0 per cent (with standard deviation of 6.3) for Thailand, and 148 per 
cent (with standard deviation of 10.8) for the Philippines.
6 The positive relationship between economic activity and the inflation rate in the Philippines can be 
observed in the 1970s but clearly not after 1983. When we consider this relationship for the whole 
period, it can be said that this relationship is not obvious. In fact, if we calculate the coefficient of 
correlation between this two variables it shows that there is a negative correlation in the Philippines (- 
0.738), but a positive correlation in Thailand (0.026).
76
the two countries. The commodity boom enabled both countries to grow faster than their 
long-term trend. There was also an improvement in the trade and current account 
balances. However, inflation pressure differed in the two countries. There was an 
increase in inflation in Thailand from 4.8 per cent in 1972 to 15.6 per cent in 1973. In 
the Philippines, inflation was maintained at around 16 per cent in 1972-73.
Since the commodity boom is now known to have been temporary, the 
appropriate response should have been to restore internal balance. However, from the 
evidence in Figures 4.6 and 4.7, it cannot be concluded that either country pursued the 
objective above. As the boom was unexpected, and favourable to both countries, there 
seems to have been a neutral response. The boom resulted in above-the-trend growth. 
Also, the government budget was in surplus in both countries. However, inflation 
pressure was different. In Thailand, inflationary pressure was more pronounced because 
the commodities whose international prices had increased were also largely consumed in 
the country. These commodities include, for example, rice which is sometime considered 
as "wage goods". In the Philippines, the boom occurred in exportable commodities such 
as coconut and sugar which do not have a large share in the consumption expenditure of 
the country.
The adjustment to the first oil price rise: 1974
The discussion in section IV showed that the effect of an oil price rise is to cause a 
contraction in aggregate demand and a deterioration in the trade balance. Domestic 
inflation is also certain to rise because of the cost-push inflation effect. This effect is 
again observed in Figures 4.6 - 4.7. There was a sharp decline in the real growth rate of 
both countries below the trend level. The inflation rate also rose to the high level of 24 
per cent in Thailand and 34 per cent in the Philippines. The current account also 
worsened as shown in the lower diagram.
In retrospect, it is now known that the first oil price shock was actually a 
permanent event, at least for the five-year period during 1974-78 when the price of oil 
remained high. Thus, both countries should have responded to the oil price rise with a 
policy to restore external balances. The evidence from Figures 4.6 and 4.7 shows th a t, 
instead, both countries attempted to restore internal balance after the oil price shock. 
During 1975-1978 growth rates in both countries were maintained at a level higher than 
the trend while the current account deficit worsened to about 4-5 per cent. This was 
achieved by an increase in government budget deficit in both countries and a rise in 
foreign borrowing. As the international prices of oil continued to rise after 1974 the 
expansionary fiscal policy and the increase in import cost of oil led to a worsening current
account.
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With an expansionary fiscal policy to stimulate growth, inflation is expected to 
rise further, but the evidence shows that the inflation rate fell in both countries. This 
occurred mainly because of government price control on basic consumption foods and a 
subsidy on retail prices of petroleum. This is particularly evidenced in 1975 when 
inflation was quickly brought down significantly in both countries. However, as the 
expansionary policy continued, the inflation rate started to rise again and the current 
account deficit grew further.
The adjustment to the second oil price rise: 1979
The second oil price rise caused a contraction in aggregate demand and a 
worsening trade balance. The inflation rate also rose but not as high as when the price of 
oil rose in 1974. In 1980, the inflation rate increased to 18 per cent in Thailand, and 19 
per cent in the Philippines.
Again, as it is now known that the price of oil actually declined in 1983, and with 
the benefit of hindsight, it can now be seen that the appropriate response should have 
been to restore internal balance. In this respect, it was shown in Figures 4.6 - 4.7 that 
both countries responded to the second oil price rise in that manner. During 1980-83 
both were trying to maintain growth rate while the current account deficit further 
deteriorated. There was an increase in government budget deficit in both countries. 
However, in 1983 when the current account deficit reached its highest level, there was a 
significant shift in the objective of both governments to restore external balance. Since 
then there was an attempt to reduce the government budget deficit. There was also an 
exchange rate devaluation in both countries. The cost of restoring external balance was a 
sharp contraction in growth rate below the trend. In Thailand, the contraction in growth 
continued until 1985 when the economy began to recover. This was possible because of 
three favourable factors: the increase in non-merchandise income from tourism, the 
unprecedented influx of foreign investment, and a significant substitution of imported 
energy with domestic source. In the Philippines, the sharp contraction in growth rate 
continued and deteriorated further as the internal shock erupted. In August 1983, 
political turmoil arose when Senator Benigno Aquino Jr. was assassinated. In 1984, the 
Philippine economy experienced its first negative real growth rate since the second World 
War and inflation rose to an unprecedented level of 50 per cent. In 1985 the economy 
was stimulated, but this was because the Marcos Administration increased spending on 
the election campaign. In February 1986, the Marcos administration was overthrown and 
President Aquino came to power. Because of the over-spending of the past few years, 
the government had exhausted its resources. There was also a rising current account 
deficit as a result of capital flight after the domestic political crisis and a growing debt 
burden. Therefore, the government had no alternative but continued a contractionary 
policy despite a recession that arose in that period.
The adjustment to the fa ll in export demand in 1981-83
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The effect of the world recession in 1981-1983 led to a fall in the export demand 
from both countries. Thus, a reduction in output and a fall in the price of home goods 
plus a worsening of the current account would be expected. However, this was not 
clearly shown in Figures 4.6 - 4.7, as both countries were already undergoing adjustment 
in response to the second oil price shock.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter analysed the effects of external shocks and possible policy responses 
in the economy by using a simple model of one good. The external shocks considered 
here were the volume of trade and the terms of trade shocks. The volume of trade shock 
was the case of a fall in foreign income that leads to a fall in export demand while the 
terms of trade shock was the case of a rise in the price of oil imported relative to the price 
of home goods. The model analysed the effects of both the volume of trade and the terms 
of trade shocks on gross output, the real exchange rate (the relative prices of foreign 
goods to home goods) and the current account.
In general, a negative external shock would lead to a fall in home goods output 
and employment (internal imbalance) as well as a trade deficit (external imbalance) in the 
economy. In the case of the volume of trade shock, the model predicted that there will be 
a fall in the level of gross output and a rise in the real exchange rate (a fall in the price of 
home goods). In the case of the terms of trade shock, the level of gross output will fall 
but the real exchange rate may rise or fall depending upon the net effect of the terms of 
trade change on the trade balance.
The policy in response to both shocks could be of four kinds. First, the 
government may have a neutral response to the shock. Therefore, there is no change in 
government fiscal and monetary policy and the economy will be in both internal as well 
as external imbalances. Second, the government may want to restore internal balance 
thereby maintaining initial level of output that guarantees full employment of labour. In 
this case, the external balance or the current account will deteriorate. Third, the 
government may want to restore external balance, and this is achieved at the expense of a 
worsening internal balance. The level of gross output will fall and employment situation 
further aggravated. Lastly, the government may want to restore both internal and external 
balances. This may be possible only under certain circumstances.
Whether the government should respond to the shock by attempting to restore 
internal or external balances is dependent upon the nature of the shock. In the first place, 
a neutral response could be applied, and this is often the case. But in the long run the 
government must decide whether to restore internal or external balances. The decision
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rests upon whether the shock is temporary or permanent. If the shock is temporary, the 
appropriate adjustment is to restore internal balance. If the shock is permanent, the 
appropriate adjustment is to restore external balance.
Based upon the information on the development over time of the adjustment 
towards internal and external balances in the Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989, 
the actual responses to external shocks were investigated and found to be similar. The 
adjustment to the commodity boom was characterised as a neutral response. The 
adjustment to the first oil price shock in 1974 was to restore internal balance. This was 
inappropriate as the rise in the prices of oil stayed permanently until 1978. The 
adjustment to the second oil price shock in 1979-80 was first to restore internal balance. 
Then the policy shifted to restore external balance, by early 1983 in Thailand, and late 
1985 in the Philippines. The adjustment to a fall in export demand in 1981-83 was not 
clearly seen as the two countries were still adjusting to the second oil price shock.
Although the two countries generally responded to the volume of trade and the 
terms of trade shocks in a similar way, the relative economic performance between the 
two countries showed two different outcome. First, the Thai authorities were 
comparatively successful in stabilising the internal balance and to lesser degree the 
external balance. The deviations of real GDP growth from the trend were much less than 
that in the Philippines and inflation rates were also lower and less fluctuated. Second, the 
poorer economic performance in the Philippines after 1983 was further compounded by 
the internal shock that led to more difficulty in macroeconomic adjustment. In Thailand, 
the economy recovered quickly after 1985 because of three favourable factors: the 
increase in non-merchandise income from tourism, the unprecedented influx of foreign 
investment, and a significant substitution of imported energy with domestic source.
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Appendix 4.A Estimation of the long-term growth trend in the Philippines 
and Thailand
The estimation of the long-term growth trend for the two countries during 1970-1989 
adopted a simple specification as follows:
Log Y = a + b T
where Y and T  are real GDP in local currency and time trend. The coefficients a and b 
are constant term and the predicted long-term growth rate respectively. The Ordinary 
Least Squares technique was first employed to estimate the coefficient b but there are 
auto correlation in the estimation. Thus, the problem is corrected by using the 
autoregressive estimation. The results for Thailand and the Philippines are
Philippines
log Y = 10.8871 + 0.0385 T  
(0.0639) (0.0053)
\o(R, )2 = 0.9915 DW-statistics = 1.8492
U = 1.6169 Uhl - 0.779 Uh2 + V
( t=  11.531) (t =-5.5552)
Thailand
log Y = 11.8683 + 0.0662 T 
(0.018) (0.0015)
\o(R, )2 = 0.9973 DW-statistics = 1.9139
U =  1.05 (Jt.i
(t = 6.1828)
0.6505 Ut.2 + V 
(t =-3.8304)
The numbers in parentheses are the standard error.
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CHAPTER 5
MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT IN RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL 
SHOCKS: THE AUSTRALIAN MODEL OF 
TRADED/NON-TRADED GOODS
I. Introduction
Although a model of one final good used in the previous chapter provides a useful 
analysis of the effects of external shocks and policy responses, it leaves out the 
interesting issue that the shocks may have different impact on different sectors, 
particularly the traded and non-traded sectors. Therefore, this chapter applies the 
Australian model of traded/non-traded goods to investigate the effect of the oil price 
shock on the traded and non-traded goods markets, and the price adjustment in terms of 
the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods. 1 The model is then applied to the case 
of the Philippines and Thailand to see whether the difference in their relative economic 
performance, at least in the traded sector can be partly attributable to the different 
adjustment in the real exchange rate as defined here by the relative prices of traded to non- 
traded goods.
There are already many studies of this kind. However, the analysis faces two 
difficult tasks. First, the effect of the terms of trade shock on output and the real 
exchange rate as analysed by the earlier models (e.g. Pitchford, 1986; McKenzie, 1986; 
Dwyer and O'Mara, 1988; Edwards, 1988 and 1989; and Dornbusch, 1989) are 
inconclusive and depend upon the different assumptions they used. The ambiguity of the 
results has already been spelt out in Edwards and Van Wijnbergen (1987) and Martin and 
Nguyen (1989). Second, the concept of the real exchange rate is unambiguous in 
theoretical models in which there is a single traded good and a single non-traded good, 
but it is less clear cut in the real world of many goods. This leads to a measurement 
problem for the real exchange rate. In this chapter, an attempt is made to develop a 
specific model to explain the relationship between the real exchange rate and the oil price 
shock which we are particularly interested.
It was shown in the previous chapter that the increase in the price of imported oil 
reduced the level of income and employment, and both countries were responding to this
1 The terms of trade (oil price) shock is investigated in this chapter because it appeared to have the most 
significant effect on the two economies (in percentage of GNP) as shown in Tables 3.3-3.4. It ignores 
the volume of trade shock because this involves only the change in the total quantity demanded for 
tradeable goods, and not the change in the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods. Thus, it will have 
no structural effect on the market of non-traded goods. The adjustment of the economy to the volume of 
trade shock is only the change in the current account.
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deflationary effect by applying an expansionary fiscal policy though at different degrees. 
This chapter will also analyse the effect of fiscal policy on the real exchange rate (relative 
prices of traded to non-traded goods) to see whether it is another factor that explains the 
different in economic performance.
The chapter is organised into six sections. The following section provides a 
formulation of the model. Section three analyses the effects on the real exchange rate and 
the current account of the oil price shock in terms of a fall in the relative prices of traded 
goods to imported oil. It also looks at the effect of government spending on the real 
exchange rate. Section four examines the movements of the real exchange rate and the 
relative prices of traded goods to oil in the two countries in the last two decades. Section 
five gives an estimation of the relationship between the real exchange rate and the 
exogenous variables comprising the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil and the 
fiscal policy variable in both countries. The last section concludes the findings and offers 
an explanation as to why the traded sector in the Philippines has been unable to perform 
as well as that in Thailand in the last two decades.
II. The Model
The one-sector economy model has clarified the macroeconomic response to the 
intermediate input price shock in terms of the demand side adjustment but it did not 
adequately represent the supply side effect of the oil price shock on the allocation of 
resources between sectors. This effect is recognised as the "Dutch disease" in the 
analysis of an oil price shock on the oil-exporting countries.2 This chapter applies the 
dependent economy model of traded/non-traded goods or the so-called Australian model 
expounded by Salter (1959), Swan (1960) and Dornbusch (1980) to incorporate the 
resource allocation effect that takes place in the adjustment of the aggregate supply 
following a fall in the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil. The model 
disaggregates the economy into 2 sectors producing traded (QT) and non-traded (QN) 
goods from two domestically endowed inputs: capital (K ) and labour (L), and an 
imported intermediate input called oil (QXf). The real exchange rate is defined as the 
relative prices of traded to non-traded goods. The macroeconomic response to the oil 
price shock (a fall in the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil) is also 
accomplished by expenditure switching and expenditure reducing policies. These 
adjustments are similar to the ones analysed in the preceding chapter. The expenditure 
reducing policy is done by adjusting the absorption level of the economy. The 
expenditure switching policy requires change in the real exchange rate. This type of 
model has been used to analyse the effect of an oil price shock earlier by Corden (1985) 
and empirically by Nandakumar (1988).
2 Literature on the Dutch disease effect are such as Corden and Neary (1982), Bruno and Sachs (1982), 
Bui ter and Purvis (1983), Corden (1984) and Cassing and Warn (1985).
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The supply Side
The production function for both traded and non-traded goods is represented by
Q ^ f i K ^ Q J  I = t . n  (5.1)
The net revenue or the nominal GDP of the economy is defined as
Y =  max PtQt + PS.QN -  PMQM (5.2)
Qt .Qn .Q m
subject to the production function of traded and non-traded goods.
Assuming profit maximisation and full employment of capital and labour, the nominal 
GDP function can be described as a function of prices of final goods and the intermediate 
inputs in local currency, and a vector of fixed factors.3
Y = Y (PT, PN, PM ,K,L)  (5.3)
The partial derivatives of this GDP function with respect to the prices of each final goods 
are the supply functions of final goods and the partial derivative of the GDP function with 
respect to the price of oil is the import demand for oil.
QT - ^  = YT(PT,PN,PM) 
o rT
Qn - j ~ - Y N( P r , P „ P M)
Qm ------  Yu ( PT’P n ’Pu )
dPM
The responsiveness of the supplies of traded and non-traded goods with respect to the 
changes in output and input prices can be shown by totally differentiating the supply 
functions above.
dQj = Yn dPr + Y^dPs + YTMdPM (5.4.1)
dQN-  Y ^ P ,  * ) ,,<//', + YNUdPM(5.4.2)
Similarly, the responsiveness of the import demand for oil with respect to the changes in 
output and input prices is
4Qm -  -  YwdPr -  Y .^ P ,  -  YuudPu (5.4.3)
3 Pm is the price of oil in local currency. It is the product of nominal exchange rate times the 
international price of oil (E*P x/).
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The coefficient is the partial effect of the change in the price of traded goods on its 
own supply. Given our earlier assumption of price taking profit maximisation by 
producers it has a positive sign. An increase in the price of traded goods will lead to 
more supply of those goods. TiViV is the partial effect of the change in the price of non- 
traded goods on its own supply. Likewise, it has a positive sign. Ymi is the partial 
effect of the change in the price of oil on the demand for oil imported. It is assumed that 
this imported oil is normal goods and hence an increase in its price will lead to a decline 
in its import demand. Thus, the term YMMhas a negative sign. The term Ym is the partial 
effect of the change in the price of non-traded goods on the supply of traded goods. 
Given unchanged prices of all inputs, if the price of non-traded goods rises relative to the 
price of traded goods, resources will flow from the latter to the former sector. The 
production and supply of non-traded goods will rise and production and supply of traded 
goods fall. Thus, this term has a positive sign. The term Ym  is the partial effect of the 
change in the price of oil on the supply of traded goods. As an imported oil is a normal 
input, the rise in its price will lead to less oil being used, and given other things being 
equal, the output of final goods will fall. Thus, it has a negative sign. Similarly, the 
term QNM is the partial effect of the change in the price of oil on the supply of non-traded 
goods and is likewise negative. Note that the term Ym is equal to Yyj, Yni is equal to 
Yyrr, and TiVM is equal to YX1N (Young's Theorem).
The homogeneity of degree one of the nominal GDP in all prices also ensures that 
the outputs of traded and non-traded goods, and the import of oil will not change if the 
prices of all goods change by the same proportion. Thus, we have the follow ing 
relations:
 ^7T + V^.Y + ^ T M  ~  0 
fV7 + .^Y.V + Y NM = 0
Y + y  + Y = 01 M T T 1 U N  T 1 M U  J
Equation (5.4.1) can be written as
dQr = Yn dPT + Y ^dP N + YTMdPM -  ( Y7T + Ym  + YTM)dPT 
= ~Ym (dP7 -  dPN) -  YTM{dPT -  dPM)
Let the real exchange rate be defined as the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods, 
i.e. p -  PT/  Py, and the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil be t = P, /  PM. 
With all prices normalised to unity, the derivatives of the real exchange rate and the 
relative prices of traded goods to imported oil are
dll = dPT -  dPy
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dr  = dP, -  dPKl
Thus, equation (5.4.1) can be written as
dQr = -  Yrxdjz -  YTMdr (5.5.1)
Similarly equation (5.4.2) - (5.4.3) can be written as
dQN — YNNdjr Ymflr (5.5.2)
dQu =  Y S,Nd j l + Y MMd r (5.5.3)
The demand Side
We assume that this economy consists of identical consumers so that maximising 
the individual consumer's utility is equivalent to maximising the economy's welfare. The 
one-period utility of the representative consumer is assumed to be a function of the 
quantity of traded and non-traded goods consumed:
where the function U possesses all the usual regularity properties. The consumer 
maximises his utility subject to a given level of income in that period. At the equilibrium 
level of consumption, this amount of spending is equivalent to the minimum expenditure 
that has to be spent to achieve the given level of utility. Thus, by the duality approach 
(Dixit and Norman, 1980), this utility maximisation problem is equivalent to the 
minimisation of expenditure by consumer subject to a given level of utility, i.e.
The first-order conditions of the minimisation problem give the compensated demands for 
traded and non-traded goods as a function of output prices and utility level.
U = U{Qt ,Qn ) (5.6)
subject to U ( Qt , Qn ) > V (5.7)
(5.8)
—  = CS(PT,P V,U)
dPN
(5.9)
dE 1 
dU /1
(5.10)
where m is the marginal utility of money and is normalised at unity by choice of units.
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The responsiveness of the compensated demands for traded and non-traded goods 
with respect to the change in all prices are
dCT = C jjdP j + CmdP v + CTVdU (5.11)
dCN = CSTdPT + CmdPs + CsudU  (5.12)
The coefficient Cjj is the own-price elasticity of demand for traded goods. The property 
of the compensated demand function ensures that it has a negative sign. Similarly, Cm  is 
the own-price elasticity of demand for non-traded goods and is negative. The term Cw is 
the cross-price elasticity o f substitution between traded and non-traded goods 
consumption. Note that Cm = CST. (Young's Theorem). The term Cn, can be written as
dCT dE dC, 1
CT„  = -----------= ---------- = a
TV dE 3U dE ft
where a is the marginal propensity to spend on traded goods. Similarly, the term CNU 
can be written as
dCs dE dCs 1
NV dE dU dE n
and l-  a is the marginal propensity to spend on non-traded goods. The homogeneity of 
degree zero in the demand function ensures that
C r r  "i" f  'y 0
C v r  +  -v.v =  0
and hence
C = -C  = -C  = CY.Y
From equation (5.11) and (5.12) we can rewrite them as a function of the real exchange 
rate and utility level.
dCT = CKSd ji + a dU  (5.13)
dCN = -C ssdir + (1 -  a)dU (5.14)
Given our earlier assumption that the marginal utility of money is unity the change 
in the one-period utility of individual consumer is equal to the change in his consumption 
expenditure, i.e. dU = dE. This consumption expenditure is the amount o f real 
disposable income not being saved. Thus, the change in the consumption expenditure is
dE = (1 -  s)dZ
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where s is the marginal propensity to save. The saving behaviour of individuals is 
dependent upon their utility pattern and the expected income stream. There are three 
possible values that s can assume:
Case I A permanent expectation response: Sidrauski's case ( s = 0)
This is the case when the marginal propensity to save is zero. Any change to the 
real disposable income is perceived by the consumer as being permanent. Thus, he will 
adjust his consumption expenditure according to the new income level instantaneously. 
This type of response is consistent with Sidrauski's result whereby the consumer's rate 
of time preference equal to the market rate of interest (Sidrauski, 1967). Thus, when real 
disposable income increases he is indifferent in either spending this extra income on 
consumption now or saving for consumption in the next period. This is because a dollar 
of money that is spent on consumption now gives him the same marginal utility as when 
that dollar is saved and earns interest that will enable him to increase consumption in the 
next period.
Case II A permanent expectation response: Obstfeld's case ( s < 0 )
This is the extreme case where the marginal propensity to save is negative. It is 
consistent with Obstfeld's intertemporal optimisation model in which an individual 
responds to a temporary fall in his real disposable income by perm anently  
increasing his saving or building up foreign assets with a view to eventually restoring the 
infinite standard of living (Obstfeld, 1980). Thus, consumption expenditure falls by 
more than the fall in the real disposable income.
Case HI A transitory expectation response ( 0< s < 1 )
This is the standard Keynesian case where the marginal propensity to save lies 
between zero and one. It is also consistent with the permanent income hypothesis in 
which the adjustment in consumption expenditure follows the perceived permanent 
income level rather than the actual income level. Any change in the real disposable 
income is perceived by the consumer as being temporary. He will not fully adjust his 
consumption expenditure according to the new income level but will run down his 
reserves (or build up if there is a rise in income). This is to smooth out the effects of a 
temporary change in income on the time path of consumption. The closer the value of s 
to one the higher the transitory expectation that the individual holds.
Let the change in the real disposable income of individual consumer in the present 
period, dZ, consist of the change in the internal terms of trade gain (defined as the change 
in the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil in local currency) in that period and 
the change in the present value of taxes.
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JZ  = Q„dr -  dTn
The term Qx, dt is the gain from the change in the relative prices of traded goods to 
imported oil. The term T ,n is the present value of taxes which also consists of the 
present tax rate and the future tax liabilities that has to be raised if there are bonds sold in 
the present period to finance the current government expenditure. Thus,
where T  is the real taxes in the present period and B is the bonds sold to the individual 
consumer. The coefficient b is the degree of bond illusion. If b is equal to zero, there is 
no bond illusion: a rise in B increases the present value of real taxes and reduces real 
disposable income as future tax liabilities are fully anticipated by the individual consumer. 
This is the so-called 'Ricadian Equivalent' hypothesis. However, if b is equal to one, 
there is a full bond illusion. The consumer does not anticipate that the present value of 
real taxes will increase if bonds are sold in the present period to finance any public 
expenditure program. Finally, the change in the one-period utility can now be written as
The government budget balance condition in the present period requires that the 
change in government consumption on traded and non-traded goods be equal to the 
changes in tax revenue and bonds selling.
dGT + JG V =dT +dB
Thus, incorporating the budget constraint into the change in utility of the individual 
consumer gives
The Equilibrium in the Non-traded Goods Market
The excess supply of non-traded goods is defined as a difference between the 
supply of and demand for non-traded goods which comprises private (C,v) and 
government (Gv) demands. Assume that the market for non-traded goods must always 
clear and so there is no excess supply of non-traded goods.
d T n  = [dT + (1 -
dU  = (1 - s){Qudr - \ d T  + (1 -  b)dB\\ (5 . 15)
(5.15.1)
dX v = dQ s -  dCv -  dGw -  0 (5.16)
Equations (5.5.2), (5.14) and (5.15.1) are substituted into (5.16) and the excess supply 
of non-traded goods becomes
dXN = ( CNN -  Ynn) cI jt  - \ Y nm + (1 -  a i l  -  s)Qu]dT 
+(1 -  a)(\ -  .v)[ dGr -  b dB \ -  [a + (1 -  a)s]dGN = 0 (5.17)
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The Equilibrium in the Traded Goods Market
The excess supply of traded goods is similarly defined as a difference between the 
supply of and demand for traded goods which comprises private (Cr) and government 
(G t) demands, and the import cost of oil. Given that traded goods is chosen as a 
numeraire and all good prices are normalised to one, the excess supply of traded goods 
can be written as
x T =Qt ~ c T ~ gt —  qm
T
The change in the excess supply of traded goods is
dXT = dQr -  dCT -  dGT -  dQM + QMd r  (5.18)
By substituting equations (5.5.1), (5.5.3), (5.13) and (5.15.1) into (5.18) we have
dX7 = (Ynn -  Cm )djt + [Ynm + [1 -  a{\ -  s))QM}dr
+ a{\ -  s)[dGN -  b dB\ -  [1 -  a (l -  s)]dGT (T>A9)
The Equilibrium in Income and Expenditure
The equilibrium in the national economy requires that national income is equal to 
national expenditure (Walras' law). The excess of national income over national 
expenditure is defined as a difference between the net revenue or nominal GDP and the 
consumption expenditure of both goods by private and public sectors. By definition this 
is equal to the current account surplus which is expressed as
CA = Y -  E = PtQt + Pvß v -  PmQm ~ pA Cr + Gt ) -  Pn(Cn + Gn )
With the traded goods as a numeraire, this current account surplus can be represented by 
F, the amount of foreign assets held by individuals
^ CA ( Y - E )  „  I 1 1
F Qt + Qn Qm Cj Gj (G^ , + Gs,) (5.20)
P T P T JZ T  JT
Differentiating F  totally and we have the change in the foreign assets holding as
dF = sQXjdr -  s\dG, + dGx | -  (1 -  s)b dB (5.21)
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It is readily seen that the effect of an oil price shock (a fall in the relative prices of 
traded goods to imported oil) on the current account is dependent upon the sign of the 
marginal propensity to save (s) and the initial amount of oil imported. Under Sidrauski's 
case (case I; s = 0 ), the oil price shock does not affect the current account as the 
economy will instantaneously adjust to the new income and consumption levels. With 
Obstfeld's case (case II; s < 0 ), the oil price shock will lead to a current account surplus, 
and with a permanent income hypothesis (case III; 0 < s < 1 ), the oil price shock will 
unambiguously lead to a deterioration in the current account.
A graphical illustration of the three market equilibria above can be shown in 
Figure 5.1 below. With the traded goods being chosen as a numeraire, the vertical axis 
represents the excess supply of non-traded goods and the excess of income over 
expenditure or the current account. The horizontal axis is the real exchange rate.
Figure 5.1
Equilibrium condition in the economy
Real exchange rate
(Pr /PN )
q  (Excess of 
income over 
expendihire)
(Excess supply o f  non-traded g(xxls)
The NN schedule represents the excess supply of non-traded goods. It has a 
negative slope with respect to the real exchange rate because the own-price elasticity of 
demand for non-traded goods is negative and the partial effect of the change in the price 
of non-traded goods on its own supply is positive (equation 5.17). A condition for 
equilibrium, at given levels of output and input prices, is that the market for non-traded 
goods must clear (Xn = ()). In Figure 5.1 this implies an equilibrium real exchange rate 
of p(> In the diagram it is assumed that the country has a current account deficit initially 
equal to the distance 'ab'. Thus, at the real exchange rate po which clears the non-traded 
goods market, there is an excess of income over expenditure which is represented by the 
CC schedule. This CC schedule is horizontal because the change in F (the amount of
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foreign assets held by individuals) is independent of the change in the real exchange rate 
(equation 5.21).4 This deficit is also equal to the excess demand of traded goods.
III. The Effects of an Oil Price Shock
It is now possible to analyse the effects of an oil price shock on the real exchange 
rate and the current account. Suppose there is a rise in the price of oil relative to the price 
of traded goods (a fall in t ). The effect on the equilibrium real exchange rate will depend 
on whether the NN schedule shifts up or down. This is dependent upon the outcome of 
two opposing forces. First, there will be a fall in real income because of the adverse 
terms of trade effect. Consequently the consumption of traded and non-traded goods will 
fall (the income effect). Second, the increase in the price of imported oil will lead to a fall 
in the supply of final tradeable and non-tradeable goods, providing oil is a normal input. 
The extent of the fall in supply is dependent upon the partial effects of an oil price change 
on the supplies of traded (Yrxf) and non-traded goods ( YNM -the input substitution 
effect). At unchanged prices of traded and non-traded goods, if the input substitution 
effect dominates the income effect in the non-traded goods sector, there will be an excess 
demand for non-traded goods and its price will rise. The NN schedule will shift 
downward. To restore equilibrium in the non-traded goods market the real exchange rate 
must appreciate. This is shown in Figure 5.2 (A) by a fall in the real exchange rate from 
po to pj. At the same time, the current account will unambiguously worsen by the 
amount of a Q^dt  (assuming that case III holds). This is shown by the distance 'be' at 
the real exchange rate of pj.
However, if the income effect dominates the input substitution effect, there will 
be an excess supply of non-traded goods and the NN schedule will shift upward. To 
restore equilibrium in the non-traded goods market the real exchange rate must depreciate. 
This is shown in Figure 5.2 (B) by a rise in the real exchange rate from po to pj. At the 
real exchange rate of pi the current account worsens by the amount of s Q ^ t .  Note that 
in both cases the change in the current account balance depends upon the type of marginal 
propensity to save of the individual consumer (the sign and magnitude of s) and the initial 
level of oil imported.
4 The reason is that Figure 5.1 uses the insight of the absorption approach to the balance of payments 
by plotting separately the excess supply of non-traded goods and the excess of income over expenditure. 
In the absorption approach the current account surplus is the excess of the national supply of all goods 
(traded plus non-traded goods) over the national demand of those goods, i.e. CA = XN + XT . A condition 
for equilibrium is that XN = 0, and so CA -  XT . Therefore, when Xv equal to zero at point 'a' the current 
account is equal to XT (distance 'ab'), and this docs not depend on the real exchange rate whereas XN does. 
This insight of the absorption approach is used to simplify the analysis.
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Figure 5.2
Effect of an oil price shock on the real exchange rate
(A) (B)
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The movement of the real exchange rate following the oil price shock is an 
adjustment to regain an equilibrium in the economy. Whether it will depreciate or 
appreciate should not be a problem in itself. However, it does have an implication on the 
level of current account in the long-run. In the case of the real exchange rate depreciation 
the traded goods sector will expand and the non-traded goods sector contract. The rising 
import cost of oil input on the current account can be offset by an increase in production 
and a decline in consumption of traded goods. Hence, the current account may 
deteriorate but in the long-run it will ultimately improve by itself. On the other hand, if 
the real exchange rate appreciates it will lead to a contraction in production and an 
increase in consumption of traded goods. Consequently, the current account will further 
deteriorate until the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil is reversed or the 
import of oil is cut down.
The adjustment of the real exchange rate also has an important implication for the 
use of fiscal policy. An increase in the price of oil imported also reduces the present level 
of income and affects employment. This deflationary effect is usually dealt with by an 
expansionary fiscal policy. If the real exchange rate appreciates following an oil price 
shock, the use of an expansionary fiscal policy which involves an increase in the 
government spending on non-traded goods will cause the real exchange rate to appreciate 
further. The current account will also continue to worsen. In this case, the use of an 
expansionary fiscal policy to achieve the internal balance also worsens the external 
balance. On the other hand, if the real exchange rate depreciates following the oil price 
shock, the use of an expansionary fiscal policy to achieve the internal balance may be 
possible to some degree without further worsening the external balance.
IV. The Movements of the Real Exchange Rate and the Relative Prices 
of Traded Goods to Imported Oil in the Philippines and Thailand
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The concept of the real exchange rate is unambiguous in theoretical models in 
which there is a single traded good and a single non-traded good, but is less clear cut in 
the real world of many goods. Discussions on the real exchange rate measurement can be 
found in Edwards (1988), Harberger (1989) and Dornbusch (1989). The debate in the 
literature is whether the price series derived from the consumer and wholesale price 
indices or that derived from the value-added deflators are the best proxies for the prices of 
traded and non-traded goods. While the issue is still equivocal both the price series and 
the value-added deflators were found in various empirical works including the ones on 
the Philippines and Thailand. For example, Daquila (1987) used the value-added 
deflators to construct the real exchange rate for the Philippines from 1967-1984. Dohner 
and Intal (1988) also used the value-added deflators to construct the real exchange rate for 
the Philippines from 1967-1987. On the other hand, Warr and Nidhiprabha (1988) used 
the price index derived from the monthly CPI and WPI to construct the real exchange rate 
for Thailand from 1968-1987.
Nonetheless, the two measurements measure different things. The Warr and 
Nidhiprabha approach measures the relative prices of final goods which will affect the 
consumers' choices of commodity consumed. The Daquila and Dohner and Intal 
approach, however, measure the relative value-added deflators which affect the 
producers' choices of commodities produced. The literature on the theory of protection 
(Corden, 1971) suggests that the change in the relative value-added deflators between 
sectors is the factor that determines the movement of resources rather than the change in 
the relative prices of final goods. A rise in the relative prices of traded to non-traded 
goods may not lead to an increase in the production of traded goods if the value-added 
accruing to the traded goods sector remains unchanged. The relationships between the 
changes in the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods and the changes in the relative 
value-added deflators can be seen in the Appendix 5.A of this chapter. In general, if the 
share of the intermediate inputs in the production of traded and non-traded goods is very 
small the movement of the relative deflators will closely follow the movement of the real 
exchange rate derived from the price series measurement.
Empirically, there are also a number of advantages in using the relative value- 
added deflators as the real exchange rate index. First, it is mentioned earlier that the 
relative value-added between sectors is the factor that determines the movement of 
resources, we would expect that an appreciation of this real exchange rate is associated 
with the expansion of the non-traded goods sector relative to the traded goods sector. 
This provides a consistency check between the theoretical concept of the real exchange 
rate and the empirical evidence. Second, although the relative prices measurement
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derived from the CPI and WPI represents the market prices of goods which are truly 
tradeable or non-tradeable, the accuracy of this measurement is dependent upon the level 
of disaggregation in the basket of the CPI and WPI. The relative prices measured in this 
way may not be comparable across countries due to the differences in the basket of 
consumer and producer goods. By using the relative value-added deflators, the 
classification of the traded and non-traded goods sectors can be made comparable. Third, 
since the weights assigned to each commodity in the CPI and WPI come from the 
household and producer survey which will not change until the next survey, the weights 
are therefore unchanged even though there may be a dramatic change in the relative prices 
of some other goods, e.g. oil. Thus, if the changes in the relative prices of some other 
goods are very large and last for several months, or years, the presence of the unadjusted 
weights is likely to bias the calculation of the traded and non-traded goods prices. 
However, for a short-run calculation of the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods 
this may not be a major problem. For a time series calculation, it is more appropriate to 
use the value-added deflators measurement as the weights come from the share of each 
good in the GDP which varies from year to year. This, in turn, is also a limitation of the 
value-added deflators measurement. Because, the data are usually available on an annual 
basis, it may have a significant lag in showing the actual movement of the real exchange 
rate.
As there are problems with inconsistency in the basket of consumer and producer 
goods in the Philippines and Thailand, and with the availability of data for the same 
period of study, it is not possible to derive the relative prices of traded to non-traded 
goods by using Warr and Nidhiprabha’s approach. Instead, the value-added deflators are 
used to represent the real exchange rate as has been done by Daquila, Dohner and Intal. 
We first disaggregate the production sectors in the National Income Account to the level 
that the data are available. The classification of traded sector is made on the criterion that 
it produces goods that are the major exportables or importables for the country. The rest 
of the sectors are then grouped as the non-traded sector. The list of traded and non- 
traded sectors under this classification is shown in Appendix 5.B of this chapter.
The value-added deflator of each subsector in the traded goods sector is multiplied 
with its share to the total value-added originated from the traded goods sector and 
summing up to obtain the traded goods deflator index in a particular year. The calculation 
of the non-traded goods deflator index is performed in a similar wayA The real 
exchange rate index in then obtained by dividing the traded goods deflator index (Vt) with 
the non-traded goods deflator index (Vn). The index of the relative prices of traded 
goods to imported oil is also calculated by dividing the traded goods deflator index with 
the index of the price of imported petroleum products in local currency (Pm). These data 
for the Philippines and Thailand are shown in Appendix 5.C of this chapter.
5 For a detail of calculation see Daquila (1987), pp. 96-97.
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The index of the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil in the Philippines 
and Thailand for the period of 1970-90 are shown in Figure 5.3. It can be seen that the 
first oil shock affected both the Philippines and Thailand to almost the same degree. 
However, after the second oil shock in 1979-80 the relative prices of traded goods to 
imported oil in the Philippines slightly improved compared with Thailand.
Figure 5.3 Relative prices of traded goods to imported oil (Vt/Pm)
(1972=100)
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Figure 5.4 shows the real exchange rate index (as represented by the relative 
valued-added deflators of traded to non-traded sectors) of the Philippines and Thailand. 
The real exchange rate index of Thailand had three peak periods in 1973-74, 1980-81 and 
1988. The peak in 1973-74 was a direct result of the commodity boom and the peak in 
1980-81 was the result of its strong export growth before the world economy plunged 
into recession in 1981-82. The peak in 1988 also came about as export sector growth 
surged and that led to a year of an unusually high growth at 13.2 per cent in real terms. 
It is noted that during 1970-90 Thailand devalued its currency -baht- twice in 1981 (9.7 
%) and in 1984 (15%) but this seems to have had a minor effect on the real exchange 
rate.
The real exchange rate index in the Philippines also had three peak periods in 
1973, 1980 and 1984. The peak in 1973 was a direct result of the commodity boom. 
However, it was quickly dissipated thereafter and the real exchange rate fell much more 
than in Thailand. The peak in 1980 was only slight, due to the strong export 
performance of the mineral sector, but a slump in the export of traditional commodities 
like coconut. The peak in 1984 occurred largely due to a series of devaluation of the peso 
in 1983 and 1984 that raised traded goods prices dramatically. In 1983 the peso was 
devalued by 22.2 per cent in June and another 27.3 per cent in October. In 1984 the peso 
was devalued by a further 28.6 per cent in June and another 11.1 per cent in October.
96
Figure 5.4 Relative value-added deflators index (Vt/Vn) (1972=100)
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Figure 5.4 also shows two interesting phenomena. First, the commodity boom in 
1973 caused the real exchange rate in both countries to depreciate by almost 10 percent. 
However, when the price of oil rose in 1974 the real exchange rate in the Philippines 
appreciated markedly compared with that in Thailand. After the second oil price rise in 
1980 the real exchange rates of both countries again appreciated, with one year lagged in 
Thailand. Second, since the base year of 1972 Thailand has maintained its real exchange 
rate whereas the Philippines could not. This also implies that since 1972 the traded sector 
in Thailand could have been expanding relative to the non-traded sector and the reverse 
should be observed in the Philippines. This phenomenon will be investigated later in this 
section.
Apart from the effect of the first oil price rise, the real exchange rate in the 
Philippines appreciated by much more after 1973 because of expansionary Fiscal policy. 
During 197S78 the Philippines embarked upon a massive industrialisation program. The 
financing of this investment came from budgetary expenditure and government 
borrowing. Since a large proportion of total government expenditure usually goes to 
non-traded sector, it may seem reasonable to conclude that the increase in government 
spending caused an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Appreciation of the real 
exchange rate continued until 1983 when the balance of payments crisis emerged. Since 
then the exchange rate policy was excessively used to overcome the balance of payments 
problem. Manuel F. Montes, a Philipino economist, has stated that the economic crises 
in the Philippines in the 1980s was a consequence of sluggishness in the government's 
response to the external shocks in the 1970s. For example, the import liberalisation 
program in the 1970s had not been fast enough and exchange rate policy failed to correct 
the balance of payments problem in earlier years because it lost the support of the ruling 
classes. He asserted that these economic structural adjustments should have commenced 
after the second oil shock in 1980 in response to the looming domestic financial crisis that
97
laid bare the inappropriateness of the previous investment strategy (Montes; 1987, pp. 
50-51).
The current account balance of the two countries is presented in Figure 5.5. The 
Philippines' current account was in surplus in 1973 as a result of the commodity boom 
but after the first oil price shock the current account deteriorated sharply. It improved in 
1977 but then deteriorated again until 1983. The current account of Thailand also 
deteriorated after the first oil price shock. However, it seems that the Thai authorities 
quickly envisaged the sudden current account deficit as a problem and tried to correct the 
deficit quickly. This is why a current account deficit that occurred in any year would be 
quickly improved in the following year, even though the improvement was short-lived. 
The current accounts of both countries improved after 1983 when the imported price of 
oil declined and a tightening of fiscal and monetary policies was in placed in both 
countries.
Figure 5.5 Current account balance (percentage of GDP)
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Sources Central Bank of the Philippines, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators: 
1989 Yearbook.
Bank of Thailand.
As mentioned earlier the real exchange rate derived from value-added deflators 
affects the resource flow between the two sectors. It is appropriate to investigate this 
issue here. Figure 5.6 shows the percentage share of non-traded goods output to real 
GDP in both countries. It can be seen that the share of non-traded goods output in the 
Philippines was about 10 per cent less than that of Thailand. However, this could be due 
to the effect of incongruous mapping of the traded and non-traded goods sectors 
classification of both countries.
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Figure 5.6 Share of non-traded goods output to GDP
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A cursory look at the relationship between the real exchange rate measured by the 
relative value-added deflators in Figure 5.4 and the share of non-traded goods output to 
real GDP in Figure 5.6 shows that a generally appreciating trend of the real exchange rate 
in the Philippines is associated with an increasing share of non-traded goods output to 
real GDP, particularly after 1974. This seems to be consistent with the theoretical 
concept of the real exchange rate explained earlier. In the case of Thailand, there was a 
fall in the share of non-traded output to GDP, although this is less noticeable after 1982. 
The movements of the real exchange rate in both countries is found to be negatively 
correlated to the change in the share of non-traded goods output to real GDP, with the 
correlation coefficients of -0.56 for the Philippines and -0.16 for Thailand.
V. Estimation of the Effects of an Oil Price Shock and Government 
Spending on the Real Exchange Rate
With the theoretical setting described in section II, this section attempts to estimate 
the relationship between the real exchange rate and exogenous variables comprising the 
relative prices of traded goods to imported oil and government expenditure on non-traded 
goods. This is the relationship shown in equation (5.17) and can be written at time t as
Ln Pi = a  + b Ln tr + g G, + ut
The dependent variable is the natural log of the real exchange rate (the relative value- 
added deflators of traded to non-traded sector. The coefficient a  is a constant term. The 
exogenous variable Ln t, is the natural log of the relative prices of traded goods to 
imported oil. From the theoretical model it is predicted that in the non-traded sector, if 
the input substitution effect dominates the income effect, the elasticity b will be positive. 
That is, the oil price shock will lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. On the
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other hand, if the income effect dominates the input substitution effect, the elasticity b is 
negative. The variable G, is the share of current government expenditure expressed as a 
percentage to GDP. Since the actual data on government expenditure on non-traded 
goods is not available the share of current government expenditure to GDP (including net 
lending to state enterprises) is used as a proxy. It can be reasonably expected that a large 
proportion of current government expenditure usually goes to non-traded sectors, such as 
the employment of public servants and other domestic services. Thus, this variable could 
well reflect the government consumption on non-traded goods to a considerable degree. 
In any case it is expected that the coefficient g will be negative. Finally, the term ut is the 
error terms which captures other unexplained variables. The estimation of this simple 
relationship for the Philippines and Thailand between 1972-1989 are presented below.
Philippines
L n p  -  03196  + 0.0765 L n t  - 1.7521 Gt
(2.89) (3.89) (-2.63)
R2 = 0.5461 (R-BAR)2 = 0.4856
S.E. of Regression = 0.01417 F-statistics (2,15) = 9.03
DW-statistic = 1.3141
No. of observation = 18
The number shown in parentheses is T-ratio
Thailand
L np  = 0.1985 - 0.0466 L n t  - 0.9558 Gt
(2.79) (-2.46) (-2.04)
R2 = 0.2963 (R-BAR)2 = 0.2024
S.E. of Regression = 0.0349 F-statistics (2,15) = 3.16
DW-statistic = 1.29
No. of observation = 18
The number shown in parentheses is T-ratio
The results for the Philippines shows that the oil price shock causes an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate (measured as the relative deflators of traded to non- 
traded sectors). A fall in the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil by one per 
cent led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate by 0.076 per cent. Although this 
effect is small, it implies that the input substitution effect dominates the income effect in
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the non-traded sector in the Philippines. In other words, when there is an oil price shock 
there will be an excess demand for non-traded goods and the NN schedule will shift to 
the left (Figure 5.2 (A)). Government expenditure in the Philippines also shows a strong 
effect on the real exchange rate. A one per cent increase in the share of current 
government expenditure to GDP led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate by 1.75 
per cent.
For Thailand, the effect of the oil price shock on the real exchange rate ( b  ) was 
opposite to that in the Philippines. Although, this coefficient is small, it indicates a 
different structural behaviour for Thailand insofar as the response to the oil price shock is 
concerned. That is, the income effect dominates the input substitution effect. From 
equation (5.17) there are two reasons why this will arise. First, on the supply side, it is 
possible that an increase in the price of oil input will not affect the supply of non-traded 
goods very much, i.e. Y ^ m  is very small. This can happen if the share of imported oil in 
the production of non-traded goods is small or has been substituted by a domestic source. 
The latter is probably true for Thailand, as there has been significant substitution of 
imported oil with a domestic energy source such as natural gas from the Gulf of Thailand 
since 1980.3 Secondly, on the demand side, the consumption of non-traded goods has 
fallen significantly when there is a negative income shock. This can happen when the 
marginal propensity to spend on non-traded goods is very small and/or the marginal 
propensity to save is also very small. Although it is not possible to substantiate these two 
effects, it can be concluded that the response of the Thai economy toward the change in 
income as a result of the oil price shock led to a fall in consumption of non-traded goods 
relatively more than the fall in output. It is also noted that the government expenditure in 
Thailand shows a smaller effect on the real exchange rate. A one per cent increase in the 
share of current government expenditure to GDP led to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate by only 0.96 per cent.
The estimation results above reveal two important differences between the 
Philippines and Thailand, insofar as the response of the economy toward an oil price 
shock is concerned. First, the oil price shock led to a depreciation of the real exchange 
rate in Thailand and an appreciation of the real exchange rate in the Philippines. This has 
two important implications for the external balance of both countries. In the case of 
Thailand, the external balance may worsen in the short-run because of a rising import 
cost of oil. In the long-run, the external balance will be improved as the real exchange 
rate depreciation reduces consumption of traded goods and, at the same time , attracts 
resources into the traded sector. In the case of the Philippines, the external balance will 
continue to worsen after the oil price shock. Second, the effectiveness of an
3 In 1973 the import dependency ratio of energy (the ratio of energy imported to domestic consumption) 
was 94.7 per cent in Thailand and 95.3 per cent in the Philippines. However, in 1987 it was reduced to 
55.7 per cent in Thailand whereas it was 73.9 per cent in the Philippines (Tables 2.3 and 2.6).
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expansionary fiscal policy to offset the deflationary effect of oil price shock on income 
and employment is more limited for the Philippines than Thailand as fiscal expansion 
leads to a further appreciation of the real exchange rate.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter analysed macroeconomic adjustment in response to external shocks 
in the framework of the Australian model of traded and non-traded goods. It departed 
from the analytical framework in chapter 4  in that the different effects on the oil price 
shock on different sectors were properly addressed. In the present framework, the oil 
price shock (a fall in the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil) could lead to an 
appreciation or a depreciation of the real exchange rate. This depends upon the 
adjustment in the non-traded goods sector in terms of the income and input substitution 
effects. If the input substitution effect dominates the income effect, there will be an 
excess demand for non-traded goods. The price of non-traded goods will rise or the real 
exchange rate appreciate. On the other hand, if the income effect dominates the input 
substitution effect, there will be an excess supply of non-traded goods. Subsequently, 
the price of non-traded goods will rise or the real exchange rate depreciate.
The direction of the real exchange rate changes has two important implications for 
the future of the current account balance and the use of fiscal policy. First, if an increase 
in the price of oil causes the real exchange rate to depreciate, the external balance may 
worsen in the short-run because of the rising import cost of oil but it will ultimately 
improve in the long-run. A depreciation of the real exchange rate following the oil price 
shock will reduce consumption of traded goods and, at the same time, induce resources 
to move into the traded sector. Second, the use of expansionary fiscal policy to counter 
the deflationary effects of the oil price shock on income and employment in the first place 
may be possible to a certain degree without further worsening the external balance. On 
the other hand, if an increase in the price of oil causes the real exchange rate to appreciate 
the external account will deteriorate further. In this case, the use of expansionary fiscal 
policy to counter the deflationary effects of an oil price shock will lead to a further 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and a worsening of the external balance.
The chapter also examined the trend of the real exchange rate in the Philippines 
and Thailand in the last two decades. Using the relative value-added deflators of traded 
to non-traded sectors as a proxy of the real exchange rate, it was found that after 1973 the 
real exchange rate in the Philippines appreciated markedly. During 1982-1986, the 
Philippines’ real exchange rate improved but temporary. In contrast, the real exchange 
rate in Thailand had maintained its depreciative trend over the same period.
An empirical test was performed to determine whether the oil price shock has led 
to an appreciation or depreciation of the real exchange rate for the period of 1972-1989.
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It was revealed that the oil price shock led to an appreciation of the real exchange rate in 
the Philippines, but a depreciation in Thailand. It was also shown that fiscal expansion 
led to more appreciation of the real exchange rate in the Philippines than in Thailand.
The relatively poor performance of the traded sector in the Philippines could be 
explained by a combination of the appreciative effect of the oil price shock on the real 
exchange rate and the relatively stronger effect of the fiscal expansion on the real 
exchange rate. The outcome is that following the first oil price shock in 1973 the real 
exchange rate in the Philippines appreciated markedly. As it was shown in chapter four 
that both the Philippines and Thailand also responded to the first oil shock by increasing 
fiscal spending to restore internal balance, the real exchange rate appreciation was further 
intensified in the Philippines because of stronger effect of the fiscal expansion on the real 
exchange rate. This had an effect in increasing consumption of traded goods while the 
production of traded goods contracted as resource moved out of the traded sector. 
Subsequently, the share of non-traded goods output to the total GDP increased and the 
trade deficit remained worsened. In Thailand, a depreciative trend in the real exchange 
rate was maintained because of two factors: a depreciative effect of the oil price shock on 
the real exchange rate and smaller of fiscal expansion on real exchange rate appreciation.
As a result, there was less pressure for resources to move out of the traded sector and the 
share of non-traded goods output to the total GDP remained more or less stable for the 
period of 1972-1989.
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Appendix 5.A The relationship between the relative prices of traded to
non-traded goods and the relative value-added deflators of 
traded to non-traded sectors
The unit price of traded goods output can be written as 
PT = VT + oij-jPj + ciNTPN + cl MTPM
where
VT is the unit value-added of traded goods which incorporates the returns
to labour and capital employed in the production of one unit of traded 
goods.
PT, Py and Pu are the unit prices of traded, non-traded goods and oil respectively.
cifr is the amount of input ith required to produce one unit of output ]th
where i = T, N and M.
In the text we assume that traded and non-traded goods are produced from two 
domestically endowed inputs, namely capital and labour, and an imported intermediate 
input called oil. There is no transaction in traded and non-traded goods as an intermediate 
input. Thus, the unit price of traded goods becomes
p  = V  + a P1 T y T  T  M
In percentage change, it can be written as
(^ Pj _  7 _  a  MI  ^ M  J \
P, V T VT T
Similarly, the unit price of non-traded goods is 
P = V + a  P1 N  Y N  ~  M N 1 M
and in percentage change it is
dP dV a  P ( dP dP \ a  P drU I  N u v  N  A-/.V1 M  U I  T N  ^ MX'1 M U 1
P ~ V V \ P P V t
1 N  y N  v N \  1 T  1 N  /  v  ,V 1
Subtracting (1) from (2) gives
dPT dPx > dVT dVN) VN ( a PM T 1 M CL P \^MN1 M  1
\ P[ Py >
-
Py { Vt Vy j Py { Vt
1
<
(2)
(3 )
fhe change in the relative prices of traded to non-traded goods is related to the change in 
the relative value-added deflators of traded to non-traded sectors by a fraction of the share 
of value-added in the non-traded goods sector to the price of non-traded goods, and to the 
change in the relative prices of traded goods to imported oil by the shares of intermediate
104
inputs in the production of both goods times the share of value-added in the non-traded 
goods sector to the price of non-traded goods. If the share of the intermediate inputs in 
the production of traded and non-traded goods is very small the movement of the relative 
value-added deflators will closely follow the movement of the real exchange rate derived 
from the price series measurement. This is also consistent with Daquila's result (Daquila; 
1987, pp. 102).
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Appendix 5.B The classification of traded and non-traded sectors from 
the National Income Account Data of the Philippines 
and Thailand
I. Tradeable Sector
Thailand Philippines
1.1 Agriculture
Paddy
Sugarcane
Cora
Cassava
Cotton
Kenaf (hemp)
Jute
Kapok
T obacco( Vergi ni a)
Tobacco(Berley)
Tobacco(Turkish)
Sorghum 
Mungbean 
Soybean 
Castor Bean 
Black Pepper 
Cocoa Bean 
Coffee Bean 
Tea Leaf 
Rubber
Dairy Products 
Marine Fish 
Teak Wood
1.2 Mining and Quarrying
Tin
Tungsten
Antimony
Lead
Iron
Manganese 
Gypsum 
Fluorite 
Lignite 
Natural Gas 
Crude Oil
All Other Mineral Resources
Pal ay 
Sugarcane 
Com 
Banana
Coconut including copra
Copper
Gold
Chromium 
Nickel 
Other Metal
106
I. Tradeable Sector (continued)
Thailand Philippines
I. 3 Manufactures
F o o d
B ev erag es
T o b acco
T ex tiles
W earin g  A ppare l ex c ep t F o o tw ear
L ea th er, L e a th e r P ro d u c ts  and  F o o tw e a r
W o o d  and  W o o d  P ro d u c ts
F u rn itu re  an d  F ix tu res
P ap er an d  P a p e r P ro d u c ts
P rin tin g , P u b lish in g  an d  A llie d  In d u s tr ie s
C h em ica ls  and  C h em ica l P ro d u c ts
P e tro leu m  R efin e rie s  an d  P e tro leu m  P ro d u c ts
R u b b er an d  P la stic  P ro d u c ts
N o n -m eta llic  M inera l P ro d u c ts
B asic M etal In d u stries
F ab rica ted  P ro d u c ts
M achinery
E lectrical M ach in e ry  an d  S u p p lie s
T ra n sp o rt E q u ip m en t
O th er M an u fac tu rin g  In d u stries
II. Non-Tradeable Sector
F ood  M an u fac tu re s  
B e v e ra g e s  In d u s tr ie s  
T o b a c c o  M an u fac tu re s  
T e x tile s  M an u fac tu re s  
L e a th e r an d  L e a th e r P ro d u c ts  
F o o tw e a r W e a rin g  A p p a re l 
W o o d  an d  C o rk  P ro d u c ts  
F u rn itu re  an d  F ix tu re s  
P a p e r  an d  P a p e r  P ro d u c ts  
P u b lish in g  an d  P rin tin g  
C h e m ic a ls  an d  C h em ica l P ro d u c ts  
P ro d u c ts  o f  P e tro le u m  and  C o al 
R u b b e r  P ro d u c ts  
N o n -m e ta llic  M in era l P ro d u c ts  
B asic  M eta l In d u stries  
M eta l In d u stries  
M ach in e ry  excep t E lec trical 
E lec trical M ach inery  
T ra n sp o rt E q u ip m en t 
M isce llan e o u s  M an u fac tu re s
Thailand Philippines
II. 1 Agriculture
T o b ac co  (N a tive )
S esam e
G ro u n d n u t
G arlic
Chilli
B ird  P ep p e r
Shallo t
V egetab les
F ru its
P ineapp le
W ate r M elon
C o co n u t
Palm  K ernel
O rchid
F lo w ers
O ther
O th e r  C ro p s
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II. Non-Tradeable Sector (continued)
Thailand Philipp ines
II.1 Agriculture
Cattle 
Buffalo 
Swine 
Hens 
Ducks 
Hens' Egg 
Ducks' Egg 
Other Poultry 
Silk worm 
Others
Fresh Water Fish
Livestock
Poultry
Fishery
Yang, a species of hard wood Forestry
Teng and Rung, a species of hard wood
Takien, a species of hard wood
Daeng, a species of hard wood
Pluang, a species of hard wood
Tabek, a species of hard wood
All Other Timbers
Charcoal and Firewood
Other Forest Products
Total Value Added in Agricultural Services
Total Value Added in Simple Agricultural Processing Products
11.2 Mining and Quarrying
Salt 
Marl
All Other Non-metallic 
Natural Abrasive Stone
11.3 Non-tradeable Services
Construction 
Electricity and Water 
Transport and communication 
Storage
Wholesales and Retail Trade 
Banking, insurance and Real Estate 
Ownership of Dwellings, Public Administration
and Defence 
Services Other Services
Thailand Philippines
Total subsector 104 42
-Traded 104 30
-Non-traded 49 12
Stone Quarrying, and Sand Pits 
Other non-metallic
Construction
Electricity, Gas and Water 
Transport, Communication and
Finance and housing
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Appendix 5.C The value-added deflators indices of traded and non-traded 
sectors and price index of imported petroleum (in US$) in 
the Philippines and Thailand
Philippines
Year V  T % Change VCv % C hange P m % C hange
1970 80.59 - 83.51 - 76.19 -
1971 93.94 16.6 93.66 12.2 93.08 oo o
1972 100.00 6.5 100.00 6.8 100.00 7.4
1973 124.41 24.4 113.67 13.7 125.96 26.0
1974 158.55 27.4 152.52 34.2 389.12 208.9
1975 167.03 5.3 168.42 10.4 449.09 15.4
1976 178.18 6.7 186.40 10.7 484.58 7.9
1977 186.27 4.5 201.77 8.2 520.41 7.4
1978 202.60 8.8 221.20 9.6 526.76 1.2
1979 235.05 16.0 254.42 15.0 715.42 35.8
1980 271.68 15.6 290.74 14.3 1221.32 70.7
1981 295.17 8.6 326.31 12.2 1396.03 14.3
1982 315.23 6.8 354.76 8.7 1358.05 -2.7
1983 364.11 15.5 387.74 9.3 1211.22 -10.8
1984 579.61 59.2 559.30 44.2 1152.27 -4.9
1985 666.99 15.1 663. (X) 18.5 1133.79 -1.6
1986 636.47 -4.6 709.76 7.1 638.78 -43.7
1987 699.88 10.0 759.78 7.0 706.24 10.6
1988 769.17 9.9 825.22 8.6 588.32 -16.7
1989 859.45 11.7 908.92 10.1 668.93 13.7
Source: V t  und V n are calculated from the data obtained from the National Statistical Coordination 
Board of the Philippines.
P  m is calculated from the data 
1989 Yearbook.
in the Selected Philippine Economic Indicators:
Thailand
Year V  T % C hange V n %  C hange
*
P  m %  C hange
1970 92.24 - 95.75 - 84.38 -
1971 87.84 -4.8 96.73 1.0 96.87 14.8
1972 100.00 13.8 lOO.(X) 3.4 100.00 3.2
1973 127.20 27.2 114.82 14.8 125.00 25.0
1974 153.38 20.6 138.16 20.3 406.25 225.0
1975 155.60 1.4 144.90 4.9 450. (X) 10.8
1976 160.68 3.3 152.12 5.0 490.62 9.0
1977 170.05 5.8 161.34 6.1 531.25 8.3
1978 188.32 10.7 175.66 8.9 531.25 0.0
1979 210.51 11.8 188.15 7.1 715.62 34.7
1980 238.81 13.4 211.02 12.2 1246.87 74.2
1981 259.62 8.7 228.80 8.4 1537.50 23.3
1982 255.24 -1.7 243.83 6.6 1637.50 6.5
1983 268.30 5.1 250.32 2.7 1428.12 -12.8
1984 267.50 -0.3 250.13 -0.1 1375.(X) -3.7
1985 270.88 1.3 251.26 0.5 1506.25 9.5
1986 281.91 4.1 257.05 2.3 812.50 -46.1
1987 302.24 7.2 265.42 3.3 915.62 12.7
1988 327.33 8.3 278.33 4.9 765.62 -16.4
1989 336.24 2.7 296.37 6.5 846.87 10.6
1990 340.82 1.4 317.12 7.0 1078.12 27.3
Source: V /  and V N  are calculated from the data in the National Income o f  Thailand, 1970-1991. 
P*m is calculated from the data obtained from the Bank of Thailand.
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MACROECONOMIC RESPONSES WITH THE TEMPORARY AND 
PERMANENT EXPECTATION HYPOTHESES
I. Introduction
The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 has provided the possible macroeconomic 
responses in a static framework. The responses are based on the fact that the nature of 
the shock is certain. Subsequently, the appropriate policy adjustment could be assigned 
in response to the shock. In reality, the nature of the shock is not known for some time. 
Thus, the adjustment strategy of the country has to depend on its expectation of the nature 
of the shock. If the expectation of the shock is correct, the policy responses as 
prescribed earlier are appropriate. However, if the expectation proves to be incorrect, the 
economy will be in a disequilibrium and will have to revise its expectation and policy 
response accordingly. Hence, there will an additional cost to the economy if a mistake in 
expectation is made.
This chapter introduces a simple two-period model to explain the dynamic 
adjustment of the economy. First, the adjustment to a fully anticipated shock is analysed. 
This will concentrate on the case of the oil price shock and the interest rate shock as they 
are more relevant in explaining the different adjustments in the Philippines and Thailand 
than the volume of trade shock. Then it investigates what will happen if an incorrect 
expectation is made. In general, there will be a cost associated with a mistake in 
expecting the shock to be a temporary (permanent) event when it is actually permanent 
(temporary). The cost incurred to the economy is a fall in total output and welfare. This 
result is not new but it has not been expounded in detail elsewhere.
A theoretical discussion above will provide the grounds for an investigation into 
whether the Philippines and Thailand anticipated the event of the shock correctly. As 
mentioned in the preceding chapters that the Philippines had undertaken massive 
investment program in the 1970s, this chapter also considers whether that decision was 
justified. The approach is to calculate the efficiency of investment and the net gain from 
investment decisions in the past.
The chapter is organised into six sections. The next section introduces a simple 
two-period model of adjustments. The third section is an analysis of the adjustment to a 
fully anticipated shock. The adjustment to an unanticipated shock is considered in section 
four. In section five, the evidence of adjustments in the Philippines and Thailand is 
discussed. The last section concludes the findings.
II. The Model
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The framework for analysing the economic responses to the terms of trade shock 
in the context of a dynamic analysis followed the works of Harberger (1950) and Laursen 
and Metzler (1950). These two classic articles showed that a terms of trade deterioration 
will reduce real income when measured in terms of exportable goods. As real income 
falls and given unchanged investment and a government budget deficit, savings will fall 
and this is equal to a decline in the current account surplus of a country. This is the so- 
called "Harberger-Laursen-Metzler" effect which played an important role in the 
discussion of the validity of the elasticity and absorption approaches to the effects of a 
devaluation on the trade and balance of payments.
Subsequent works attempted to further clarify this Harberger-Laursen-Metzler 
effect, but conclusions varied depending on the assumptions underlining the models. For 
example, Svensson and Razin (1983) showed that a temporary (future) terms of trade 
deterioration implies a deterioration (improvement) of the trade balance, whereas a 
permanent terms of trade deterioration has an ambiguous effect, depending on the rate of 
time preference. Obstfeld (1980) argued that when a country has a floating exchange rate 
and endogenous terms of trade, in which savings depends on residents'(variable) rate of 
time preference, the terms of trade deterioration may lead to an appreciation of the 
exchange rate and a likely increase in the current account surplus.
In the following model we adopt the framework of analysis by Svensson (1984), 
Marion and Svensson (1984a and 1984b) and Frenkel and Razin (1989). The 
contribution of this chapter is to extend the analysis into the case when there is a mistake 
involving the expectation about temporary and permanent nature of the shock. Consider 
a small open economy with two periods of adjustment, indexed as t = 1 and 2. It may be 
called the present and future. The economy produces a single final tradeable good (x) 
with three inputs: capital, labour and an intermediate input which we call oil. Labour and 
oil are available with perfectly elastic supply; the latter through importation from world 
market. Given that wage rate is determined as an equilibrium outcome in the labour 
market, the effect of the change in the terms of trade on labour wages can be ignored and 
the effect of return to capital is concentrated on. The economy can borrow and lend from 
abroad at given world interest rates. The production function for the final good at any 
period is expressed as:
x‘ = F(kl, z t) r = l a n d 2  (6.1)
where k r is the capital stock and z' is the intermediate input (oil). The production 
function is assumed to be strictly concave in both arguments. This production function 
implicitly assumes that labour is abundant in each period and hence the production 
function is determined by only k  and Z-
The GDP function can be derived as:
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Y‘(p  ,q , k ‘)= maxj/?V - g V }  (6.2)
subject to = F(k‘, z )
Where pl and ql are prices of final goods and oil respectively. The output supply 
function can be derived from the partial derivative the GDP function with respect to final 
good price, i.e. dYl/dpl = xl (pkqkkf). The input demand for oil is the partial derivative 
of the GDP function with respect to the price of oil, i.e. dYl/dql = - 7} (ptyqkk1). Let p l 
be normalised to 1 for all periods t so that ql becomes the relative price of imported 
intermediate input to final good (an inverse of the terms of trade).
Assuming that capital stock in period 1 is given and is completely used up in that 
period. Hence the amount of capital to work within the next period has to come from 
investment (/) in units of final goods in the previous period, i.e. k2 = I k  The investment 
function is determined by the investor maximising the net profit or the difference between 
the total value of GDP; discounted into present value, and the cost of the present 
investment. Let 0 be the discount rate which is equal to an inverse of the world rate of 
interest ( (f)= 1/(1 +Ö)). The maximising condition for the investor is
m axjT’O ,^1, /:')+  0}/_(l,<y~, / ' ) - / ' }  (6.3)
The first order conditions of equation (3) are
Y
dY
j { \ , q ,  k ' )= 0
dY 2 ,
(pY;2 - \ = (p— { i q - j ' ) - \ = o
ol
(6.4)
(6.5)
Equation (6.4) shows that in period 1 when the amount of capital is fixed, the economy 
will utilise capital until the marginal productivity of capital is zero. Equation (6.5) 
stipulates that in period 1 capital will be invested to the level where its marginal 
productivity equals the rate of return (l+<5). Thus, from equation (6.5) the investment 
function in period 1 can be written as a function of the price of oil in the next period and 
the discount rate, i. e.
/' = l \ \ ,q~ y(f>) (6.6)
Two properties of the investment function can be derived from equation (6.6). 
First, the effect of the next period oil price change on the current investment is obtained 
from a differentiation of equation (6.5) with respect to q2
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dl' _ _^ W
*<f = ”  Yk> >
(6.7)
• OThe denominator Y k2k2 is the rate of change of the marginal productivity of capital and 
is negative. The numerator Y"k2q 2 is the effect of the oil price change on the marginal 
productivity of capital. Its sign depends upon the assumption about the relationship 
between capital and oil in the production process in the next period. Usually, it is 
assumed that there is less degree of substitutability between oil and capital at least in the 
short run. Therefore, when the price of oil rises the amount of oil input used will decline 
and so does the amount of capital used. The total output will fall and as some of the 
capital input is left idle the marginal productivity of capital will decline. We may refer to 
this case as when capital and oil are com plementary input, and hence, Y2k2q 2 is 
negative. Although it is an empirical matter to be tested, let us assume for the moment 
that this is the case. This is for the purpose of a simple illustration that will follow. 
Thus, in this case d!Vdq2< 0. A rise in oil price will lower the marginal productivity of 
capital and accordingly lead to lower profitability, and a fall in investment level.
Second, the effect of the change in discount factor on the current investment level 
is obtained from a differentiation of equation (6.5) with respect to 0
<?0
( 6 .8 )
In this case, an increase in the discount factor (or a fall in the world interest rate) will lead 
to a higher profitability of capital and hence induce more investment.
The consumption side of the economy is modelled using the expenditure function
as:
E (p \ p2 ,(f>,u) = minj/Zc1 + (j>p~c~\ (6.9.A)
c ,c 2 >
J O
subject to u{c , c") > u
Normalising prices in each period equals to one yields the expenditure function as a 
function of one, discount rate, and utility level.
E(\,(p,u) = m injc1 + 0c~} (6.9.B)
subject to u(c , c~) > u
Note that the compensated demand in period 1 is dE/ dp l= c 1 (1, 0 , u) and the 
compensated demand in period 2 is d£7d0/?2 = c2 ( 1 , 0 ,  u). The intertemporal budget 
constraint is expressed in period 1 as:
E(1,<M)+ / W , 0 )  -  Y \ l q \ k l)+<t>Y\l,q2, l \ l , q 2 ,<f>)) (6.10)
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III. The Adjustment to a Fully Anticipated Shock
With the model prescribed above, we can now analyse the effects of the changes 
in the exogenous variables, i.e. the price of oil (or the terms of trade) and the discount 
rate on output, welfare, consumption, and the trade balance. The effects on output can be 
determined from the GDP function. The total GDP (lF) is
= Y'(l,q',k')+ 4>Y2(l,q2 ,<l>)) (6.11)
A differentiation of this equation gives the total effect on the economy output as
Y \ , Y \
M 1 = - z d q  -  fyz dq- -  <j)Y2t, - p - dq2 -  Y2, —£— d<p+ Y2d<f> (6.12)
’ k'-k2 Y k V
The output effect consists of three components. The first two terms are the static 
terms of trade effect. The third term is the investment effect, and the last two terms are 
the substitution effect or the intertemporal terms of trade effect. It can be seen that the 
effect of a temporary oil price rise, i.e. dq[ > 0; dq2 = 0, is to lower the total output by 
the value equal to the extra oil import expenditure ( - z ld q l ). On the other hand, the 
effect of a permanent oil price rise, i.e. dq1 > 0; dq2 > 0 , is
Y2^
cEY = -z ' dq' -  (f>z~dq~ -  <pY*2 -y1 - < 0
Y k 2k 2
In this case, the total output falls by the value equal to the extra oil import expenditure in 
both periods plus the negative investment effect which is a result of the falling marginal 
productivity of capital.
On the other hand, a rise in the discount rate (or a fall in the interest rate) will give 
rise to a higher total GDP which is equal to the increase in the investment return and the 
output level in the next period (the last two terms in equation (6.12)). The effect on 
welfare can be determined by a total differentiation of equation (6.10).
dE dE , dE . dl'
----d(b +---- du + — zdq~ +  dd)
d(p du dq~ d(p
dY' , , dY2 J ,
-dq + (p ——7 dq-
dq' dq-
dY2 dl' , , dY2 d l1 , l/2 7
+ </>——— rdq~ + (f)—— —— d(f) + Y d<p
dl dq' dl d(p
(6.13)
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Rearrange the above equation to obtain the total effect on welfare as
dE . dE , d lx
-----du -- --------- dip + -----
du dip dip
I ' B Y 2 ,, BY , . BY-lip ---------- ----  -  1 \d(p + ----------- -dq + (p-----------T dq-
\  d t  ) dq dq~
dq <P-
dY \
(6.14)
- r - \ \ d q  +  Y~d<p
a i '  )
The terms in parentheses are equal to zero according to the maximising conditions of the 
investment in equation (6.5) and, hence, we have
dE
—  du = -z 'dq ' -  (pz2dq2 + Y2d(p -  c2d(p 
du
= - z'dq1 -  (pz~dq~ + T~d<p
(6.15)
where dE/du is an inverse of the marginal utility of income, and T 2 is the trade balance 
in period 2. The welfare effect also consists of two components. The first two terms on 
the right hand side are the static terms of trade effect. It follows that an increase in the 
price of oil relative to that of final goods (or a deterioration in the country's terms of 
trade) in any period will unambiguously reduce the economy's welfare. The last term is 
the intertemporal terms of trade effect. A rise in the discount factor (or a fall in the 
interest rate) will raise the present value of future income and with other things being 
equal will also raise the economy's welfare.
The effect on present consumption can be determined by a total differentiation of 
the consumption function in period 1, i.e.
, . dcx , dcx ,dc = ---- dip + -----du
d(p du
dc
dc qu dE
= — -d<p + ^ - — du (6.16)
d(p db ßu
du
dc
= ---- dip + c'w(-z'dq ' -  (pz2dq2 + T 2d(p)
dip
Where c^  is the marginal propensity to consume in period 1 and is positive if the final 
good (a ) is normal at both dates.
It can be seen that a temporary oil price rise will reduce the present consumption 
by c'l z^dq1. Note that this is a share of consumption expenditure that has to be reduced
when total income falls. On the other hand, a permanent oil price rise will cause present 
consumption to fall much more as shown by -(cf z ldq l +c^ipz~dq2). Finally, a rise in
the discount rate will increase the present consumption by consumption substitution effect 
(dc]/d<t>) and the intertemporal terms of trade effect (c  7’“c/0).
The effect on the trade balance in period 1 can be determined using the definition 
of the trade balance. The trade balance in period 1 is the difference between income and 
absorption or between savings and investment.
T l = Y \ \ , q \  k' ) - c ' ( l , 0 ,w ) -  l \ \ , q 2 ,$) = S' -  /'
Total differentiation of this equation yields
d l x = [-(1 - c \ ) z d q  + cw((fz2dq2 - — d ty - c wT 2d t y \ - ^ - ; d ( f  ~ —  d({)
d(f) dq~ d(f>
From this equation the effect on the trade balance also consists of 2 components: the static 
terms of trade effect and the intertemporal terms of trade effect. The static terms of trade 
effect is
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-(1 -  cw )zdq  + [ cl<pz2 -   ^dq2
and the intertemporal terms of trade effect is
d c1 
d(p
i dl
+  C...T +
d<t>)
d(p
The effect of a temporary oil price rise on the trade balance in period one is when 
dqx> 0 and dq2 = 0 , i. e.
d t  = -(1 - c j z d q  < 0
A temporary oil price rise causes GDP in the present period to fall. As income falls 
savings will also fall. But as investment decisions are unaffected by a temporary oil price 
rise, the fall in savings leads to the deterioration in the trade balance. On the other hand, 
the effect of a permanent oil price rise is when dqx> 0 and also dq2> 0 , i. e.
d T ] = [-(1 -  Cw )zd q  + cw(pz2dq2 \ -  —l—dq2
dq~
In this case, the oil price rise in period 1 causes savings to fall as mentioned earlier. As 
the consumer knows the price of oil will rise permanently, and so his permanent income 
will fall, consumption in the next period will have to be reduced. He saves more in the 
present period, and the net savings effect is therefore ambiguous. The last term on the 
right hand side is the effect of the oil price rise in the next period on the present 
investment level. If we assume that investment will fall when price of oil input rises the
term (dl l/dq2) has a negative sign. Therefore, the net effect on the trade balance is 
ambiguous and depends upon the net savings effect.
Finally, the effect of the interest rate shock on the trade balance, given that the 
price of oil in both periods does not change, is
dT' = I-  T -  d<p -  c J 2d(f> ] -  d(p < 0
0 < p  o ( p
In this case, a rise in the interest rate (or a fall in the discount rate) will unambiguously 
lead to a trade surplus in the present period. This is because the opportunity cost of 
consumption in the present period will increase while the return to savings rises. Thus, 
net savings or the current account surplus of the economy will rise.
Adjustment to the Oil Price Shock
The analysis above can be explained in simple terms in Figure 6.1. The 
horizontal axis shows the aggregate amount of output and consumption in the present 
period: period one, and the vertical axis is the aggregate amount of output and 
consumption in the future: period two, respectively.
Figure 6.1
The adjustment to a temporary and permanent oil price rise
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The economy has a fixed endowment of resources that can generate output equal 
to OY() in the first period and OY“  in the second period. This is the endowment point R.
In the absence of borrowing and lending activities the equilibrium consumption must be
equal to the output level at point R. However, when borrowing and lending are possible, 
the economy can sacrifice the present consumption and invest to augment future 
consumption and thereby raise the economy's total welfare. The trade off between the 
present and future output is shown by the intertemporal transformation function (ITC) 
below;
OY2x = OYq + / ( / ' )
Where OY~ is the maximum amount of output that can be obtained in period two. I1 is
the investment in units of goods that is not consumed in period one. It is assumed that 
the investment function is strictly concave and hence the curve RN is concave toward the 
origin. Given the rate of interest Ö, the intertemporal budget line will be PP, with its 
slope equal to -(1+6). The profit maximising economy will choose to produce at point K 
where the ITC is tangent to the intertemporal budget line. To maximise the life-time 
utility subject to the intertemporal budget constraint, the economy will also choose to 
consume at point C.
In period one, the difference between cj and y | is the amount of dissaving; of 
which y J}-y [ goes to investment and cJ-Y ^ goes to increasing consumption. The 
difference between total consumption plus investment over domestic production, cJ-Y J,
is the amount of borrowing. 1 With no initial debt this is the current account deficit in 
period one. In period two, the investment in period one ( Yq-y | ) will give the output of
2 o o o 2 9Y"Y“ ; of which Y“-C“ goes to debt repayment and the amount of C“-Y“ goes to 
augmenting future consumption.
The diagram above shows that given the opportunity to borrow from abroad the 
economy can achieve the highest possible welfare by running a current account deficit in 
the present period. And by also investing part of the endowment it will be able to obtain 
higher output in the future; which can be used to repay the debt and raise future 
consumption.
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1 In the light of this analysis, the national accounting identity for period one is 
R = C+ I  + ( X - M)
where R is the amount of endowment. This is the total amount of output or GDP that the economy 
possess in period one. Thus, the current account deficit which is the excess of consumption plus 
investment over income is
CA = M  - X -  (C + I )  - R
In Figure 6.1 (p. 116) the current account deficit in period one is
CA = C (distance O c j ) + I (distance FqF^  ) - R (distance ()fj* ) = distance Cj* -Y^
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Now the effect of the oil price rise on the economy is analysed. The departure of 
the economy from this initial equilibrium to a new one following the oil price rise will 
show the adjustment the economy has to pursue if it wants to maximise welfare. This 
adjustment depends upon the nature of the oil price rise. In general, if the oil price rise is 
temporary, the appropriate adjustment is to maintain domestic investment. The current 
account deficit in the present period may increase but that should not be a matter of 
concern. This current account deficit will be offset by an increase in the current account 
surplus in the future.
When the oil price rise is temporary, the endowment point will move from point R 
to J. Since the price of oil and hence the level of output in the next period is unaffected, 
the ITC will contract to the left as shown by JM. The horizontal distance between the old 
and the new ITC is everywhere equal to JR. Given also that the interest rate does not 
change the economy will move to a new production point at L. With a fall in income, the 
utility maximising consumer will reduce consumption in both periods. The equilibrium 
consumption will move along the income consumption path to point D.
In this case the current account deficit in period one will be ci,-Y^. This
represents a worsening current account deficit because output falls more than 
consumption. The new investment level in period one will be y !,-Y^ and is the same as
in the absence of the shock. The reason is that the decision to invest in the present period 
depends on the future oil price and interest rates. When these two factors are not affected 
the investment level remains unchanged.
In period two as the price of oil is assumed to return to normal, the amount of 
investment in period one will give the total output of OY“ in period two. The current
account surplus in period two is larger because the new consumption level in period two 
is now less than before. The increase in current account surplus in this period is to offset 
a rising current account deficit in the previous period as a result of a sudden fall in output 
in period one.
On the other hand, if the oil price rise is permanent, the appropriate adjustment is 
to reduce domestic investment and consumption in the present period. And because 
potential output in the future will be affected, the current account deficit in the present 
period should also be reduced. From Figure 6.1, the endowment point will move from 
point R to I. This represents an equally proportional fall in endowment in both periods 
(the distance JR = JI). The ITC will contract to the left as shown by the curve IP.
Note that the shape of a new intertemporal transformation curve IP now depends 
on the assumption about how the increase in oil price affects the marginal productivity of 
capital. To illustrate this, if oil and capital are independent inputs in the sense that the
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cross partial derivative between capital input and oil is zero, the change in the price of oil 
will not affect the marginal productivity of capital. The investment function will not be 
affected and the intertemporal transformation curve will shift to the south-west direction 
with the distance along the 45 degree axis everywhere equal to IR. Thus, if there is an 
investment of Y^-Y^, the total output in period two will be at point S (and the distance
along a 45 degree line between K and S equals that between I and R). However, if the 
marginal productivity of capital is affected by a rise in the price of oil input, the total 
output in period two will fall by more than the case when capital and oil are independent 
input. Thus, with the same amount of investment the total output in period 2 will have to 
fall to point T on the transformation curve IP.
Given unchanged interest rates, the new equilibrium production will move from 
point K to Q. And with a fall in income, consumption will fall from point C to E. The 
investment in period one will also fall, as measured by y \-Y ^. The current account
deficit in period one is equal to the distance of C’!, -Y^. This current account deficit may 
be larger or smaller than the pre-shock situation (cj-Y}) depending on the shape of the
new ITC and the income consumption path. That is, it depends upon production 
technology and the utility function of the economy.
Adjustment to Interest Rate Shock
The adjustment to a rise in the interest rate can be analysed using the same 2- 
period Fisherian Diagram as shown in the above case. When there is an increase in the 
interest rate, the intertemporal budget line will become steeper. This is shown by a shift 
in PP to QQ line in Figure 6.2. At a given ITC, the equilibrium production point will 
move from point K to K'. Investment will fall to Y^-y | as the opportunity cost of
lending increases.
Because of a rise in the interest rate, the present value of the total income or wealth 
will also decline. Thus, the equilibrium consumption point will move from point C to G.
A movement from point C to F is a result of the direct wealth effect and a movement from 
point F to G is the consumption substitution effect. The current account deficit in period 
one will be smaller as both consumption and investment falls.
F igure 6.2
The effect o f an increase in the international interest rate
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IV. The Adjustment to an U nanticipated Shock
The previous section has analysed the adjustment of the economy in response to a 
fully anticipated shock. Now adjustment to a shock whose nature is uncertain is 
investigated. The adjustment therefore has to depend upon the expectation of whether it 
is temporary or permanent. This section begins with the case of an oil price shock and 
then proceeds to the case of an interest rate shock which requires the same analogy. In 
general, the possible responses of the economy according to how the expectation is 
matched with actuality can be presented in a matrix below:
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Actuality
Temporary shock Permanent shock
Expectation
Temporary shock
A correct response 
to a temporary shock
A response with 
type I error
Permanent shock
A response with 
type II error
A correct response 
to a permanent shock
When it is correctly expected that the shock will be temporary or permanent, the 
policy adjustment that has been analysed in the previous section is therefore suitably 
applied. Hence, the economy will be in an equilibrium and there is no need for further 
adjustment. However, when it is incorrectly expected that the shock will be temporary or 
permanent, the same policy adjustment above will not be appropriate. The economy will 
be in a disequilibrium in the next period and will have to revise its expectation and 
accordingly readjust to the correct situation. Mistake in making an incorrect expectation 
about a future shock will incur two types of error:
- Type I error This is when it is expected that the shock will be temporary and 
that it will return to normal in the near future. However, as time passes the effect of the 
shock remains. For example, the oil price remains at least the same, or higher, and tends 
to be permanent. Therefore, the adjustment of the economy to the situation of a 
temporary price shock will not be the correct response. The result of choosing the wrong 
policy response is that the economy will be in disequilibrium in the next period and will 
have to readjust to the actuality with the input price shock being permanent. As a result, 
there will be a cost in having to make another adjustment in the next period.
- Type II error This is when it is expected that the shock will be permanent. 
However, in the next period if everything returns to normal, the response of the economy 
was not correct either. The economy will have to readjust and this also incurs a cost in 
making another adjustment in an opposite direction in the next period. The following 
section analyses the cost of making type I and type II errors that are relevant for the case 
of the oil price shock and the interest rate shock.
IV.1 The Adjustment to the Unanticipated Oil Price Shock
There can be two types of mistake in making an incorrect expectation which we 
may call in this analysis: type I and type II.
a) Oil Price Shock; Type I error
This is when it is expected that the state of the oil price rise will be only temporary 
and will return to normal in the near future. However, as time lapses and the price of oil 
remains at least the same or higher and tends to stay permanently the adjustment of the 
economy to the situation of a temporary price shock was not the appropriate response. 
The result of choosing the wrong policy response is that the economy will be in 
disequilibrium in the next period. This presents another kind of unexpected shock that 
will cost the economy in making yet another adjustment in the next period. We can 
illustrate this kind of adjustment using Figure 6.3 This is a reproduction of Figure 6.1 
with some modifications.
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Figure 6.3
The oil price shock: type I and type II errors
Y ,C
When the price of oil unexpectedly rises and the economy anticipates that this will 
be only temporary, it will perceive that the ITC would contract to JM but not IP. It will 
choose to produce at point L and consume at point D. Because the import cost of oil now
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increases and given the price of output unchanged, the net output or GDP in the economy 
will fall. Hence, both output and consumption in period one will fall, with output falling 
by much more than consumption. The current account deficit in period one is C^-Y^.
This is larger than in the absence of the oil price shock (the horizontal distance between C 
and K). At the same time, the investment level is not affected and is equal to Y^-Y^.
In the next period, because the oil price rise actually becomes permanent the actual 
ITC is IP and total output in period two is at point T. The investment in period one ( 
y !,-Y^ ) will give rise to the amount of output in period two equals to the vertical distance
between I and T. If the consumption level in this period is still at point D there will be an 
excess of consumption over output . This becomes another unexpected shock arising 
from the incorrect expectation in the previous period. At this point, the two-period model 
cannot explain how the economy will adjust in period two and after. But if all the 
adjustments in the economy were to be complete by period two, it can be seen that this 
mistake will incur a cost in terms of lowering welfare further than it would have been. 
The cost to the economy is ascertained in the following.
When a response is made with a type I error, the actual production point will be at 
point T, when, for a complete adjustment to take place, the consumption point must be at 
point D'. This point corresponds to the intersection between the utility level of U4 and 
the intertemporal budget line that passes through point T (but is not shown in the 
diagram). If the expectation had been corrected, the production and consumption points 
would have been at Q and E respectively. There is therefore an over-investment in period 
one. Subsequently, the current account deficit in period one (c!, -Y ^ ) is larger than in the
current account deficit when the economy made a correct expectation (C^-Y^). The
consumption point D' yields lower utility than in the event of the correct expectation and 
the cost of making type I error is the difference in the utility level between U3 and U4.
b) Oil Price Shock; Type II error
This is when the oil price rise is expected to be permanent and is responded to 
with that expectation, but the price of oil falls in the next period. Therefore the response 
earlier is not correct and readjustment must take place in the next period. This also incurs 
the cost of making a further adjustment.
We can illustrate this kind of adjustment in Figure 6.2 earlier. When the oil price 
rise is expected to be permanent the economy will perceive the ITC to contract to IP but 
not JM. The economy will respond by choosing to produce at point Q and consume at 
point E. Production of output in period one falls slightly from Oy ] to OY^ but
consumption falls by much more, from point C to E. Investment in period one will also
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decline to y !,-Y^. The current account deficit in period one is C^-Y^ and is smaller than 
when the oil price rise is expected to be temporary (c!, -Y^).
In period two, as the price of oil falls to its pre-shock level, the economy will find 
that the actual ITC is JM and the total output in period two is at point V. The investment 
in period one ( Y^-Y^ ) will give rise to the amount of output in period two equal to the
vertical distance between J and V. Thus, if the economy maintains its consumption in 
period two at point E there will be an excess of output over consumption. On the other 
hand, it can be seen that if a type II error is made, the actual production will be at point V. 
And for a complete adjustment to take place the consumption point must be at point E\ 
This point corresponds to the intersection between the utility level of U2 and intertemporal 
budget line that passes through point V (but is not shown in the diagram). When this 
equilibrium is compared with the one when the economy would have adjusted had it made 
a correct expectation, there is under investment in period one. Subsequently, the current 
account deficit in period one ( C^-Y^ ) is smaller than the current account deficit when the
economy made a correct expectation ( ci, -Y  ^ ). The consumption point E' also yields
lower utility than in the event of the correct expectation, and the cost of making a type II 
error is the difference in utility between Ui and IK
Analytically, the cost of making a type I error (U3-U4 ) needs not be the same as 
the cost of making a type II error (U 1-U2). This depends upon how the permanent oil 
price rise will affect the intertemporal transformation curve. If it happens that after the 
permanent oil price rise the marginal productivity of capital significantly declines, then the 
ITC will contract more. Subsequently, the cost of making a type I error will be greater 
than the cost of making a type II error.
IV.2 The Adjustment to the Unanticipated Interest Rate Shock
The response to an unanticipated interest rate shock can also considered in the 
context of the temporary and permanent expectation hypothesis above. That is, if the 
expectation of the future course of interest rates is correct, the policy response as 
prescribed in section III is appropriate. However, if the expectation turns out to be 
incorrect, the policy response that was applied will lead to a disequilibrium in the 
economy. There must then be a revision of expectation and of the policy response. The 
mistake in making an incorrect expectation here similarly incurs two types of error.
a) Interest Rate Shock; Type I error
This is when it is perceived that the interest rate will rise temporarily but in fact the 
rise is permanent. The analysis is similar to the case of the oil price shock. In Figure 
6.4, as the interest rate is anticipated to be temporary, production and consumption
patterns are not adjusted. Production remains at point K and consumption remains at 
point C. Nevertheless, as the rise in interest rate is in fact a permanent phenomenon, the 
optimal response would have been to move the production point to K' and consumption 
point to G. Instead, by maintaining production at point K, the economy will eventually 
be able to consume at point G'. This consumption point yields lower utility than could 
have been attained had the expectation been made correctly, i.e. U3 is lower than IK
Figure 6.4
The interest rate shock: type I and type II errors
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b) Interest Rate Shock; Type II error
This is the opposite case where the rise in the interest rate is expected to be 
permanent but in fact is temporary. The economy adjusts its production and consumption 
patterns in response to the rising opportunity cost of borrowing. The production point 
will move to K' and the consumption point to G. However, as the rise in the interest rate 
is actually temporary, the optimal response would have been to maintain the production 
point at K and the consumption point at C. By moving the production to point K', the 
economy will eventually be able to consume at point C'. This consumption point also 
yields lower utility than what could have been attained had the expectation been made 
correctly, i.e. Ui is lower than Uq.
Again, the cost of making a type I error (U2-U3) needs not be the same as the cost 
of making a type II error (Uo-Uj). This depends upon production technology (the shape 
of the ITC) and the utility function of the economy.
V. The Evidence in the Philippines and Thailand
The theoretical discussion in the previous sections has provided a good 
understanding on the optimal adjustment of the economy in response to a temporary or a 
permanent shock. It has also raised the issue of the cost involved in making a type I or II 
error. However, the empirical application is not an easy task. First, It is not known 
whether the shock will be temporary or permanent, and so an expectation has to be made. 
The empirical test whether the country reacts to the unanticipated shock as if it was 
temporary and permanent involves some kind of an expectation model. Second, even 
though it is later possible to conclude that certain shock is temporary or permanent by 
judging from its historical evolution, a projection has to be made on the optimal course of 
adjustment of the country. This requires some form of a general equilibrium model of the 
economy. Then, a simulation of the effects of external shock can be performed to provide 
a counterfactual path of adjustment that can be compared with the actual path of 
adjustment. This is a useful exercise however, but due to a time limit it cannot be 
attempted in this thesis. 2
The alternative is to investigate the actual responses in the two countries by 
looking at the investment and savings behaviour. The investment-savings gaps as a 
percentage of GNP in the Philippines and Thailand are reproduced in Figure 6.5 and 6.6 
respectively. From Figure 6.5, it is noted that the investment and savings ratios in the 
Philippines exhibited a temporary uplift during 1973-1983. Prior to 1973, both ratios 
were about 20 per cent of GNP. Then, the investment and savings ratios increased to 30 
and 25 per cent of GNP respectively. After 1983, both ratios fell to a level slightly below 
the pre-1973 ratios.
Moreover, in the period when the two oil price shocks occurred (1974-1983), 
investment increased more than savings in the Philippines. However, from the earlier 
theoretical discussion, it was shown that a country should maintain (reduce) investment in 
the wake of a temporary (permanent) oil price shock. Indeed, in all cases here, the 
country should not increase its investment. An increase in investment in the Philippines 
during that period was therefore totally opposite to the optimal response prescribed by the 
theory. Why did that happen?
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2 The reader who is interested in the general equilibrium study on this issue ean see, for example, a study 
on the Dynamic-Optimisation Model of Foreign Borrowing by Kharas and Shishido (1986 and 1987).
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Figure 6.5 Investment-savings gap in the Philippines
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Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook,
various issues.
Figure 6.6 Investment-savings gap in Thailand
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Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
National Income of Thailand, various issues.
One possible answer is that investment decisions in the Philippines were 
influenced by another kind of positive shock namely, the fall in international interest rates 
that occurred during the same period. In 1974-1979, real international interest rates was 
low or even negative. It has been shown in the previous section also that if the fall in 
interest rates is permanent (temporary), a country should respond by increasing 
(maintaining) investment. However, as it is now known that the period of low or 
negative real interest rates in the 1970s was temporary, the optimal response to the interest 
rate shock should have been to maintain the level of investment. It is likely that the 
Philippine economy could have treated the interest rate shock as a permanent event and so 
increased its investment substantially. This investment decision, based on an expectation
that the fall in interest rates was permanent, could have influenced the decision of 
maintaining investment even when there were permanent oil price shocks during 1974- 
1978.
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In Thailand, the invariable ratio of investment relative to GNP does not suggest 
that the oil price shocks were treated as to be permanent, or that the fall in international 
interest rates was expected be permanent either. The investment ratio in Thailand was 
maintained at about 23-25 per cent of GNP until 1988 when it started rising due to foreign 
investment inflow.
The investment and savings gaps illustrated in Figure 6.5-6.6 explain only the 
aggregate behaviour. It is also not clear whether private and public sectors will responded 
similarly to the oil price shock and the interest rate shock. Therefore, it is more 
appropriate to consider the investment and savings behaviour of the private and public 
sectors separately. Unfortunately, from the National Income Account data of the 
Philippines and Thailand there were no distinction in the statistics pertaining to the private 
and public sector's investment and savings. The compositions of gross domestic 
investment and savings in the two countries are shown below.
Philippines
Domestic investment = Private construction
+ Public construction 
+ Durable equipment 
+ Increase in stocks
Domestic savings = Net personal savings
-I- Net corporate savings 
+ Public sector savings 
+ Consumption of 
capital allowance
Thailand
= Private construction 
+ Private equipment expenditure 
+ Public construction 
+ Public equipment expenditure 
+ Change in inventories
= Savings of households and 
private non-profit institution 
+ Savings of corporations and 
government enterprises 
+ Savings of general government 
+ Provision for consumption of 
fixed capital
Therefore, disaggregation of the domestic investment and domestic savings into private 
and public investment-savings gap cannot be done accurately without some form of 
assumption about the change in stock and depreciation. There has been a discussion on 
how to disaggregate the gross investment component in the Philippines in Daquila (1987). 
He used information from the Flow-of-fund account to derive the proportion of private 
and public shares in the change in stock. Nevertheless, there was no attempt to
disaggregate the durable equipment component. This led to his estimates of private and 
public sector's investment being incomplete. On domestic savings, there was no attempt 
to disaggregate the depreciation either. The savings of the private sector is calculated 
residually from the net of the current account minus public savings (government income 
minus government consumption expenditure).
The difficulty in disaggregating the private and public investment-savings gap 
increases when it has to be done for both countries for a time series data from 1970-1989. 
There were also problems of availability and consistency of flow-of-fund estimates. 
Besides, different definition and coverage of the change in stock and durable equipment 
may not satisfactorily yield a comparable estimate. Therefore, it was decided to present 
the compositions of gross domestic investment and savings in the two countries as they 
were reported in the National Income Account data. The composition of gross domestic 
investment and savings in the Philippines and Thailand are presented in Figure 6.7 -6.10 
below.
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Figure 6.7 Composition of gross domestic investment in the Philippines 
(percentage of GNP)
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Figure 6.8 C om position of dom estic savings in the Philippines 
(percentage of GNP)
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook,
various issues.
Figure 6.9 Com position of gross dom estic investm ent in Thailand 
(percentage of GNP)
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Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, 
National Income of Thailand, various issues.
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Figure 6.10 Composition of domestic savings in Thailand 
(percentage of GNP)
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Source: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
National Income of Thailand, various issues.
Philippines
It is noted that the increase in the investment level during 1974-1983 was the result 
of an increase in both private and public sector investment. The component of durable 
equipment shows a relatively larger share of GNP, and it was slightly increased in the 
same period. This was observed in the change in stock as well. After 1983, there was a 
decline in all components of investment, with a larger fall in the change in stock and 
public investment.
On domestic savings, there was a noticeable increase in personal savings from 
1970 to the peak in 1977. Then it sharply declined and in 1983 the share of personal 
savings to GNP was almost nil. Corporate savings exhibited a gradual increase in its 
share until it reached a peak in 1981. The share then declined and became negative in 
1984. Note that in the same period when there was an increase in investment (1974- 
1983), there was also an increase in domestic savings. The latter was financed largely by 
personal savings and to a lesser degree by the corporate and public sector.
Thailand
In general, the percentage share of private investment to GNP was unchanged 
until 1986. On the other hand, the share of public investment to GNP exhibited a gradual 
increase until 1986 when it started to fall. The share of inventories to GNP showed the 
most fluctuation.
On domestic savings, the share of public savings was surprising higher than the 
share of personal and corporate savings combined. This phenomenon was reversed only 
after 1988. The share of all components moved in a similar way, reflecting a similar
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behaviour of savings in both private and public sectors. During 1970-1972 there was a 
sharp decline in the share of private savings but a compensating increase in public 
savings. During the commodity boom in 1973 there was a noticeable increase in private 
and public savings but this was only temporary. The first oil price shock caused personal 
savings and the depreciation component to decline in 1974 and 1975. Corporate savings 
and public sector savings fell only after 1975.
The behaviour of private investment and savings was dependent upon change in 
the level of income. The level of personal savings in Thailand was particularly dependent 
upon the level of farm income. The latter was, in turn, influenced by the fluctuation in the 
commodity terms of trade (Jansen, 1990). The behaviour of public investment and 
savings was more or less the same as in the private sector. There was no upsurge in the 
share of public investment that significantly dominated savings as appeared to be the case 
of the Philippines.
V.l Efficiency of Investment: the Incremental Capital Output Ratio
The increase in investment in the Philippines during 1974-1983 should not be a 
matter of concern if it increases the level of output in the future. To determine whether it 
did actually contribute to an increase in future output can be argued by considering one 
simple indicator -the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR). This is computed by 
dividing the change in gross fixed capital formation with the change in GDP, both are 
measured in constant 1972 prices. The smaller the ICOR the more efficient past 
investment has been to raise output. A comparison of the ICOR in the Philippines and 
Thailand is shown in Table 6.1 The evidence from Table 6.1 shows that during the 
investment boom (1974-1983) the ICOR in the Philippines did not fall substantially. In 
fact, the ICOR increased sharply in the last years of the investment boom. This may 
imply that the upsurge in investment in the Philippines has not resulted in a noticeable 
increase in the output level over earlier years. In 1984-85, the economy experienced a 
negative growth rate and so the ICOR became negative. After 1987 the ICOR dropped to 
the lower level below 3. This could be interpreted that the efficiency of investment had 
improved but actually this was the result of the increase in durable equipment (see Figure 
6.7), and of rebounding from the very low output of 1985.
As one can see that the ICOR, when measured on an annual basis, can fluctuate 
widely, especially in the Philippines. Thus, the average ICORs for three periods are also 
presented in the last three row s of Table 6.1. These average ICORs are computed by 
aggregating the Gross fixed capital formation for the period concerned and dividing by the 
aggregation of the change in real GDP in the same period. It is shown that the ICOR in 
the Philippines was rising from an average of 3.07 for the period of 1971-75 to 10.3 for 
the period of 1981-89. In contrast, the ICOR in Thailand was falling from an average of
133
4.18 for the period of 1971-75 to 3.06 for the period of 1981-89. The rising average 
ICOR in the Philippines suggests quite strongly that during the last two decades, the 
efficiency of investment in the country declined significantly.
It is well known that in the 1970s and early 1980s there were extensive investment 
programs in the Philippines that may have yielded social returns but contributed either 
small or nil economic returns. For example, the construction of the Cultural Centre 
Complex and tourism related facilities, the People's Livelihood Program (Kilusang 
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran; KKK), etc. (Hill and Jayasuriya;1985). Some of these 
investments were also projects with a long gestation period, and therefore the returns 
from investment may be small in the short-run. However, one of the biggest and 
controversial investments was the Bataan nuclear power plant. The plant was constructed 
in the late 1970s at a cost of about US$ 2.2 billion but has never been opened (Dumaine, 
1986). This project alone could have contributed substantially to a rising ICOR as shown 
in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1 A comparison of the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) 
in the Philippines and Thailand
Philippines * Thailand -
Change in real Gross fixed ICOR Change in real Gross fixed ICOR
GDP capital formation GDP capital formation
(million peso) (million peso) (million baht) (million baht)
1971 2903 9118 3.14 7726 38262 4.95
1972 2807 9231 3.29 6656 38631 5.80
1973 4788 9545 1.99 16769 42490 2.53
1974 3061 11382 3.72 8134 42417 5.21
1975 4124 14974 3.63 9449 42060 4.45
1976 5485 17224 3.14 19166 47557 2.48
1977 4545 17553 3.86 22133 58964 2.66
1978 4317 19035 4.41 25651 65524 2.55
1979 5178 21270 4.11 14419 68107 4.72
1980 4606 22737 4.94 13675 70573 5.16
1981 3639 23542 6.47 18967 73811 3.89
1982 2792 23687 8.48 12941 72358 5.59
1983 922 23102 25.06 24028 81659 3.40
1984 -5994 15594 -2.60 25330 90592 3.58
1985 -4023 11826 -2.94 13375 85775 6.41
1986 1276 10057 7.88 19376 82523 4.26
1987 4191 12017 2.87 39146 95228 2.43
1988 6079 13874 2.28 59832 116001 1.94
1989 5693 16863 2.96 61728 141474 2.29
Average of 3 penods
71-75 17683 54250 3.07 48734 203860 4.18
76-80 24131 97819 4.05 95044 310725 3.27
81-89 14575 150562 10.30 274723 839421 3.06
Sources: (1) National Statistical Coordination Board, NEDA.
(2) National Economic and Social Development Board of Thailand.
VI. Summary and Conclusions
Because adjustment in response to a shock involves an expectation as to whether 
the shock will be temporary or permanent, this chapter investigated what would happen if 
an incorrect expectation is made. Two types of error can be involved. A type I error 
arises when a shock is expected to be temporary but is in fact a permanent shock. A type
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II error arises when a shock is expected to be permanent but is only temporary. The 
result of making an incorrect expectation is that the economy has to revise its policy 
response. This imposes a welfare cost that could have been avoided had the correct 
expectation been made. In the case of an oil price shock, if a permanent oil price rise 
causes the marginal productivity of capital to fall significantly, it is likely that the cost of 
making a type I error will be greater than the cost of making a type II error. The policy 
implication is that if the nature of the shock is uncertain, it may be appropriate to respond 
conservatively. That is, to treat the shock as if it is permanent and respond with the 
policy to reduce consumption and investment. If this expectation turns out to be incorrect 
the cost of this mistake is likely to be less than the opposite choice.
A comparison between the Philippines and Thailand showed during 1974-1983, 
and despite the oil price shock (but also the low international interest rates), the 
Philippines increased investment noticeably and by much more than savings. This was 
as if the Philippines believed that interest rates would be permanently low. On the other 
hand, in Thailand there was no indication that either low interest rates or the oil price 
shock was perceived to be permanent. Investment and savings ratios in Thailand 
remained largely unchanged.
To evaluate whether the Philippines benefited from its decisions to invest heavily 
during 1974-1983, the efficiency of investment in terms of the incremental capital output 
ratio (ICOR) was used. It was shown that during the investment boom (1974-1983) the 
ICOR in the Philippines actually increased. This means there was no commensurable 
increase in output even though more investment was made. In comparison, the ICOR in 
Thailand generally declined even though the investment ratio to GNP was constant.
CHAPTER 7
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EXTERNAL SHOCKS AND DOMESTIC MACROECONOMIC 
ADJUSTMENT: A DECOMPOSITION APPROACH
I. Introduction
In the early 1980s there was another approach that attempted to analyse the effect 
of external shocks and a country's policy responses. This approach was pioneered by 
Bela Balassa and refined further by Edmar Bacha. Basically, the approach is to 
decompose the current account into the volume of trade effect, the terms of trade effect, 
etc.. These effects are then responded to by various policies such as export promotion, 
import substitution, external financing, etc. This approach is an ad-hoc analytical tool to 
explain the relationship between external shocks and policy responses. It lacks the basis 
of the theory that has been expounded in chapters 4-6. For example, it cannot explain 
why an export promotion policy was adopted. In this chapter, an attempt is made to 
modify the decomposition formula by utilising the understanding of the theory of 
macroeconomic adjustment in response to external shocks in the previous chapters.
The chapter is organised into five sections. The next section begins with a review 
of the method developed by Balassa and Bacha. Then, the pros and cons of both 
methods are discussed. Section three proposes a new decomposition method, taking into 
account the analysis of a country's adjustments in terms of consumption, investment and 
savings decisions. Section four is the application of the new method to the case of the 
Philippines and Thailand. The last section concludes the study and suggests further 
evidence of the difference in adjustment strategy between the Philippines and Thailand.
II. Review of a Decomposition of the Current Account and Policy 
Responses
Hitherto, there were two methods of decomposition of the effect of external 
shocks on the balance of payments. The first method was pioneered by Balassa (1983, 
1984 and 1986) to estimate the effect of the oil price shock on the balance of payments of 
various developing countries in the 1970s. The second approach was developed by 
Bacha (1986) to estimate the effect of the oil price shock and the interest rate shock on the 
balance of payments of developing countries in the early 1980s. This section reviews the 
methodology used in the Balassa and Bacha approaches and highlights the pros and cons 
of both methods.
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II. 1 Balassa Method
Balassa expressed the balance of payments in terms of a resource gap which 
consists of two components: the deficit between merchandise imports and exports, and 
the balance of the non-factor services account including net private transfers. This is 
expressed for the year 0 as:
R0 =( M0 - X 0) - S 0 (7.1)
where
R -  resource gap in year 0;
M -  merchandise imports in year 0;
X ( = merchandise exports in year 0; and
S -  balance of non-factor services account including private transfers.
The amount of the trade deficit that is not offset by an excess in the balance of non-factor
services including net private transfers implies an inflow of resources to the domestic 
economy ( Rf> 0). Likewise, the resource gap in year 1 can be expressed as:
R, = [ m ,(1 + O  -  X,(l + o ]  -  5, (7.2)
Where P" and represent the percentage changes in import and export prices between 
year 0 and 1. The effects of the external shocks on the resource gap in year 1 can be 
estimated by calculating the changes in the actual resource gap in year 1 and the would-be 
trend of the resource gap in that year had there been no external shocks. The details of 
his decomposition can be seen in Balassa (1983). In this section we shall instead offer a 
simpler graphical illustration of his decomposition method is offered.
The amount of resource gap, imports, and exports are shown in Figure 7.1 on the 
vertical axis, with time on the horizontal axis. In year 0 the resource gap plus the balance 
of non-factor services account is equal to the difference between imports and exports.
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Figure 7.1
Graphical interpretation o f the Balassa decomposition method
R, M, X
Now the question is asked: what would have been the trend of the resource gap in 
year 1 had there been no external shocks ? Thus, the trend values of imports and exports 
in year 1 need to be established. The trend value of imports in year 1 is calculated by 
assuming that the income elasticity of demand for imports of the country is unchanged 
and the economy's GNP growth remains the same as if there were no external shocks. 
This can be shown as equal to at point A. Similarly, the trend value of exports in 
year 1 is calculated by assuming that market share of the country's exports to the world 
remains unchanged and that the foreign demand for its exports is the same as if there 
were no external shocks. This can be shown as equal to X\ at point D. The trend of the 
resource gap plus the balance of non-factor services account in year 1 is the difference 
between M' and X \ , or the distance AD.
Because the shocks will cause the income of a country to fall, GNP growth will 
decline. If there is no policy to affect the income elasticity of demand for imports, the 
hypothetical level of imports would be lower than the trend level. This is shown as equal 
to M* at point B. The difference between M[ and M * , or the distance AB, is the 
reduction in imports due to falling GNP growth. However, if a government policy is to
reduce the income elasticity of demand for imports, the actual level of imports would be 
lower than the hypothetical level. This is shown as equal to A/ at point C. The success
of this import-substitution policy is the difference between M* and M  , or the distance 
BC.
On the export side, the shock will also affect the rest of the world and cause 
foreign demand for the country's exports to fall. If there is no policy to increase its
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market share of its exports to the world, the hypothetical level of exports would be lower 
than the trend level. This can be shown as equal to X* at point F. 1 The difference 
between X[ and X*, or the distance DF, is a fall in exports due to the volume of trade 
effect. Similarly, if there is a government policy to increase the market share of its 
exports to the world, the actual level of exports would be higher than the hypothetical
level. This can be shown as equal to X, at point E. 2 The success of this export 
promotion policy is the difference between X and X*, or the distance EF.
Subsequently, the actual resource gap plus the balance of non-factor services 
account in year 1 is the difference between M  and X or the distance CE. Because of the
adverse effects of external shocks the economy may need additional financing from 
abroad. This is represented by the difference between the actual resource gap and the 
trend resource gap in year 1. That is
(K, -« ,')  = (C M  *>)-(*< -X ,')-(S , - $ )  (7.3)
According to Balassa, the trend value of the balance of the non-factor services account in 
year 1, S[ , is assumed to be the same as the balance of the non-factor services account in 
the base year, S , when there were no shocks. If it is assumed that there is no change in
this balance of non-factor services account from year 0 even though the shocks may 
affect the balance of merchandise account, the term S will be equal to S . The last term
on the right hand side of equation (7.3) is thus equal to zero and can be omitted.
From Figure 7.1 the term (M/ - X;) , or the distance CE, is equal to CD + DF - 
EF. The term ( M' -  X ') , or the distance AD, is equal to AB 4- BC + CD. Thus, 
rearranging equation (7.3) the Balassa's decomposition is obtained as
(/?,-/?;) + (M\ -  M \ ) + (M\ -  Mx) + (Xt -  X*) = (P'lMx -  K &  ) + ( * ! -  K ) (7.4)
This expression shows that the effect of external shocks can be decomposed on the right- 
hand side as the terms-of-trade effect (P^V/, -P*X,) and the export volume effects
( X' -  X*). On the left hand side, there are four policy responses: an increase in resource 
flow or external financing ( ) ;  a reduction in imports as a result of falling GNP 
growth rate ( M‘ -  M*)\ an increase in import substitution (M* -  M]); and the promotion 
of exports ( X, -  X*).
The Balassa method has been widely used in many studies on external shocks and 
policy responses in developing countries in the early 1980s. For example, Mitra (1983)
1 It can be argued that the tall in domestic income as a result of the adverse shocks may also lead to a 
decline in consumption of exportable goods. Thus, exports could rise even when there is no policy
change and subsequently X* could be above X[. Nevertheless, this does not affect a decomposition 
formula here.
2 Again, the actual level of exports could be even higher than the trend value of exports and this will not 
affect a decomposition formula.
used this method to estimate the effects of the oil price shocks on the balance of payments 
of semi-industrial countries. Naya (1984) applied it to the case of the Asian developing 
countries including the Philippines and Thailand. In the case of the Philippines, he 
estimated that the terms-of-trade effect constitutes about 75.1 per cent and the export 
volume effect 24.9 per cent of the total effects for the period between 1974-1982. For 
Thailand, the terms-of-trade effect and the export volume effect during the same period 
was 90.1 and 9.9 per cent respectively. In terms of the policy responses, Thailand was 
found to have favourable policy responses; with more export promotion and import 
substitution, and less external financing than the Philippines.
A specific study on Thailand was also done by Uathavikul, Patmasiriwat and 
Kamheangpatiyooth (1987) for the period of 1973-1987. They found that the terms-of- 
trade effect was dominant during the first oil price shock period (1973-1978) while the 
export volume effect became increasingly significant after the second oil price rise in 
1979. In terms of policy responses, export promotion played a leading role in offsetting 
the effect of the shocks. A response by external financing was found to be significant 
only in the years that oil prices drastically increased (1974-75 and 1980-81) but less so 
after that.
11.2. Bacha Method
The second approach was developed by Bacha (1986) to estimate the effects of 
the oil price shock and the interest rate shock on the balance of payments of developing 
countries in the early 1980s. He expressed the balance of payments in terms of the 
current account deficit and decomposed it in a similar fashion to that of Balassa. 
According to Bacha, the current account deficit for year t can be expressed as
Dt = Mkl + M]t + Vt -  Et -  Rt - T t (7.5)
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where
M = dollar value of capital goods imports;
AT = dollar value of non-capital goods imports, including imports of non-factor 
services not accounted for in M. ;kt
V = dollar value of net payments for factor services (excluding workers' 
remittances);
E -  dollar value of exports of goods and non-factor services;
R -  dollar value of net worker's remittances; and 
T -  net unrequited transfers from abroad in dollar value.
The current dollar value of imports (M  ^and M ) is defined as a product of the 
real value of imports at base year prices (J^ and J () times dollar price index with base 
year equal to unity of respective goods (Pf t and P ), i.e.
(7 .6 . 1)
(7 .6 .2)
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J k t P kt
J y ‘ P ß
The real value of capital goods imports is assumed to be a fixed proportion of real 
gross fixed investment ( / )  and the real value of non-capital goods imports is a fixed
proportion of real income (Z ). Hence,
Jy, -  y„Z, (7 .7 .2)
where and j  are import coefficients of capital goods and non-capital goods 
respectively. The current value of exports (E ) is defined as a product of real value of 
exports at base year prices (X  ) times dollar price index with base year equal to unity
( P) .
p-, -  XA, - (x , /w ,)w ,px
and W is the total world exports in real terms (at base year prices).
(7 .8)
The current dollar value of net payments of factors services is defined as
V , (7 .9)
where r is the rate of return on foreign debts or liabilities and F  / is the dollar value of 
net foreign liabilities at the end of the previous year.
Thus, the current account deficit can be expressed as:
D, = P J J ,  + Pyjy.Z, + r,F_-  P ß X J W  (7. 10)
Let the value of potential output or GDP in current dollar be
P Z1 yl l (7 . 11)
where P is the implicit price deflator of GDP with base year equal to unity. Hence, the 
ratio of current account deficit to potential output in current prices can be expressed as:
/
J k t
\
(
yt
\P J
+ r,
f  y1 i-1
y,I
P.M x . )
P y , / \ W J
W.)
4 - - L  (7. 12)
y yi t
Then the effects of external shocks in terms of the change in the ratio of current account 
deficit to potential output at current prices for year t can be decomposed as
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+ second- and third-order effects terms.
The bracketed expressions on the right-hand side are labelled as follows: [terms- 
of-trade shock| + [interest rate shockj + [world recession shock| + [positive policy 
response! + [negative policy response! + [effect of change of accumulated debtj - [impact 
of other external variables[ + second- and third-order effects terms.
The Bacha method was used by Helleiner (1986) to estimate the effect of external 
shocks on the current account of seven developing countries including the Philippines 
(see Remolona, Mangahas and Pante, Jr. (1986)). The counterfactual analysis suggested 
that during the period after the first oil price shock (1974-78), the Philippines responded 
to the shock by expansionary fiscal policy to counter the deflationary effect of the oil 
price shock. There had been an increase in imports other than oil and an investment 
boom. This increased the current account deficit and after the second oil price rise, 
became aggravated.
11.3 The Pros and Cons o f the Two Methods
The Balassa and Bacha methods have a common starting point. They utilised the 
accounting identity of the balance of payments but with different decomposition concepts. 
Balassa used the resource gap concept while Bacha used the current account balance. 
The Balassa method has been widely used because of its simple computation. However, 
as it was the pioneering method in 1980, it did not take into account the adjustments of a 
country to multiple shocks such as the rising interest rate and the debt shock which
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occurred in the early 1980s. On the other hand, the Bacha method involves many a priori 
assumptions as well as more computational work but gives more detail of the adjustment 
mechanism. The major differences between the two methods are in two assumptions. 
Firstly, the Balassa method ignores the role of the non-factor services account. It has 
been already shown in chapter 3 of this thesis that the changes in non-factor services 
income were another significant source of external shocks in the Philippines and Thailand 
in the 1980s. Secondly, a decomposition in the Balassa method requires certain 
assumptions about the trend and hypothetical resource gaps, imports, and exports. The 
policy adjustments are thus measured by the departure of the economy from the trend and 
the hypothetical situations. On the other hand, the Bacha method does not invoke the 
same assumptions and the policy adjustments are measured by the change in the 
composition of the current account from one period to another.
Although both methods have been widely used in the study of external shocks 
and policy responses in developing countries, there remain some weaknesses. The 
Bacha method of decomposition yields the second-order effects or "residuals" which 
arise from the interaction of non-marginal changes in "explained" variables. FitzGerald 
and Sarmad (1990) showed that these "residuals" could become larger than the 
"explained" portion of the current account variations. In turn, they suggested a further 
decomposition of these residuals and used an improved version for a study on structural 
adjustment and macroeconomic problems in 22 LDCs over the period of 1970-88.
Nonetheless, the most crucial problem, yet unresolved, is that both methods still 
give only a partial analysis of the changes on the external sector. There is no clear 
relationship between the effect of external shocks on the current account and how they are 
responded to by domestic macroeconomic variables such as consumption and investment 
decisions. Both methods decompose the current account into various components based 
on some exogenously given relationships. The variations in the current account are then 
explained by the adjustment of those exogenous components. This does not show how 
an economy responded to the shocks by adjusting consumption and savings levels. It is 
shown in the preceding chapters that the adjustment of a country in response to external 
shocks involves an adjustment in consumption, savings and investment. Thus, the next 
section proposes an alternative way of decomposing the current account and to explain 
how the country can respond to shocks by adjustments in consumption and saving levels.
Ill A Proposed Decomposition of the Current Account
The national accounting identity for the gross national product is utilised to obtain 
the relationship between the external account and the internal macroeconomic variables 
such as investment and savings decisions. The ex-post identity of the gross national 
product is
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GNP = C + I + (X -  M) + F + D (7.13)
where C is total consumption which includes private consumption (Cp) and government 
consumption (C?). /  is gross domestic capital formation which also includes private 
investment (Ip), public investment (/?) and change in stock (X). X is export of goods and 
non-factor services. M is import of goods and non-factor services. F  is net income from 
abroad, and D is statistical discrepancy.
Rearrange the identity (7.13) above we can write the resource balance as
where Y is the gross domestic product (GDP). This equation is a point of departure 
between this decomposition and the methods used by Balassa and Bacha. In the earlier 
methods, the change in the external account or the resource gap on the left hand side is 
explained by the adjustments of some other exogenous factors. There is no linkage with 
the adjustments on the right hand side which are the domestic endogenous varaibles, i.e. 
the investment-saving decision. In this decomposition method, this linkage is explicitely 
included.
The resource gap (M - X)  is derived from the National Income Account concept 
and is not necessarily the same as the current account in the balance of payment statistics. 
Therefore, this term is adjusted by defining the import of goods and non-factor services
as
where PmQm is the value of merchandise imports as recorded in the balance of payments 
statistics. K is the residuals which comprise all other services payments. Similarly, the 
export of goods and non-factor services is
where PXQX is the value of merchandise exports as recorded in the balance of payments 
statistics; W is workers' remittances; T is tourist income; V is U.S. governm ent 
expenditure in the country; and U is the residuals which comprise all other services 
receipts. Note that the import and export of goods and non-factor services need not be 
disaggregated only in this way. The above disaggregation is proposed to give a 
consistent analysis to the external shocks identified previously in chapter 3. Substitute 
the terms M  and X on the left hand side of equation (7.14) gives
R = M  -  X -  (I p + Is + S) -  ( Y -  Cp -  Cg) + D (7.14)
M  = PmQm + K
X  = PXQX + W + T + V  + U
R = ( PmQm + K ) ~ ( PxQx + W + T + V + U ) (7.15)
The change in the resource balance can be decomposed into: the volume of trade effect; 
the terms of trade effect; the change in non-factor services income; and the residuals or 
the interaction terms arising from a linear approximation of the changes in the value of 
merchandise imports and exports.
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AR -P.Q.
Aß, (volume of trade effect)
+ (terms of trade effect)
+ ( AK  - AIT - AT - AV - AU)
+ interaction terms
(the change in non-factor 
services income)
The symbol "A" denotes the change in the value of a variable from the last period. Thus, 
the terms AQ J Q m and AQJQX are the percentage change in volumes of imports and 
exports, and the terms AP J P m and APJPX are the percentage change in prices of imports 
and exports respectively.
As equation (7.14) is an identity, the change in the resource balance on the left 
hand side has to be met by the adjustments in one or all of the components on the right 
hand side, i.e. investment, savings, and the statistical discrepancy.
Investment by both private and public sectors consists of long-term planned 
investment and an unplanned component. Long-term planned investment in any year is 
assumed to be determined by the expected level of income in that year. This assumes the 
interest rate and other factors affect investment only in the short-term, and so their effects 
are included in the unplanned component. A simple expectation formation is also 
assumed and that the expected level of income in a particular year is equal to the gross 
national income of the previous year. Regressing the actual level of investment in any 
year on the level of gross national income in the previous year gives the predicted value 
of investment which is considered here as long-term planned investment and the residuals 
or unplanned investment. Thus, the investment level can be decomposed into
/=(/>/;>+(/;+ C)+S
where / and /  are the long-term planned investment in private and public sector. / “ 
and I“ are the unplanned component in private and public sector. Note that the
disaggregation of total investment into long-term planned investment and the unplanned 
component may not strictly satisfy the theory of investment. However, it is an attempt to
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isolate the short-run effect of external shocks on a decision to invest in the private and 
public sectors.
Finally, the domestic adjustments in response to the change in the resource 
balance on the right hand side of equation (7.14) can be decomposed as
AR = (AI“ + AI“) (adjustment in unplanned investment)
- (AT -  (A C + AC„) -  (AI + A/?)) (adjustment in the excess of
domestic saving over 'planned' fixed 
investment)
+ A S (adjustment in the change in stock)
+ AD (change in statistical discrepancy)
As the long-term planned component of investment in any year is determined by 
the past level of income, the unplanned component or the residuals represents the amount 
of additional investment that takes place in that particular year. This is influenced by the 
economic environment in that year which also includes the effects of interest rates and 
other factors that are left out from the consideration of long-term planned investment. By 
decomposing total investment into long-term planned and unplanned components the 
response of an economy can be observed with regard to its expectation of the nature of a 
shock and how it will adjust the unplanned investment level. This response is shown by 
the first term on the right hand side (adjustment in unplanned investment). If there is an 
unexpected positive shock in that year, and the economy anticipates that it is temporary, 
consumption will not increase very much and there will be an increase in unexpected 
saving. This will then lead to an increase in unplanned investment. However, if the 
positive shock is anticipated to be permanent, consumption will rise in response to the 
rise in income. Thus, savings may not increase and unplanned investment may not rise 
noticeably. On the other hand, the response toward negative shock is asymmetric. If 
there is an unexpected negative shock in that year and the economy anticipates that it is 
temporary, consumption and investment will not fall very much and there is a dissaving. 
There may not be a decline in unplanned investment. If the negative shock is anticipated 
to be permanent, consumption as well as investment will fall in response to a fall in 
income. Therefore, both planned and unplanned investment will decline. In effect, it is 
assumed that total investment in the economy will converge to the long-term planned 
investment level when there are no external shocks.
As long-term planned investment is determined prior to the change in economic 
situation, it can be considered as autonomous investment. Thus, the change in long-term
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planned investment together with the change in final consumption expenditure forms the 
change in autonomous spending. This will be subtracted from the change in GDP to give 
the adjustment in savings. This is shown by the second term on the right hand side. 
Noting that the change in consumption expenditure also shows how the economy 
anticipates the nature of the shock and adjusts its consumption level accordingly.
The adjustment in the change in stock reflects the change in inventories which 
includes durable equipment. This term arises because the data does not allow us to 
decompose it into the change in private and public stocks of investment. Finally, the 
adjustment in statistical discrepancy is the balancing term to reconcile the components of 
the national income account balance and the resource balance.
TV. Application to the Case o f  the Philippines and Thailand
T his section applies the above method of decomposition to the Philippines and 
Thailand to see what were the major factors contributing to the change in the current 
account deficit during 1972-1989, and what were the domestic adjustments in response to 
those shocks in the same period. The data on the ex-post identity of the gross national 
product were obtained from the National Income Account Statistics produced by the 
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) of the Philippines and the National 
Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) of Thailand. The period of 1970- 
1989 was used to perform the regression of total investment on the previous year's GNP 
and to derive the long-term planned investment and unplanned component. The balance 
of payments statistics obtained from the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Bank of 
Thailand were used to decompose the exports and imports of goods and non-factor 
services into merchandise and non-merchandise trade. The year 1971 was chosen as the 
base year in the calculation of the volume of trade and the terms of trade effects.
In order to facilitate a cross-country comparison the change in the current account 
deficit of a country is divided by its GNP. The results for the Philippines and Thailand 
are presented in Tables 7.1 and 7.2 respectively. To focus on the domestic adjustments 
in response to the major shocks, the period of analysis is divided into 4 periods which 
correspond to the major episode of the external shocks. These are
- adjustment to the commodity boom: 1973
- adjustment to the first oil price shock: 1974
- adjustment to the second oil price shock: 1979
- adjustment to falling oil prices and rising non-merchandise incomes: 1983-89
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Adjustment to the commodity boom: 1973
The commodity boom in 1973 helped to reduce the resource gap in the 
Philippines. This reduction stemmed from both the volume of trade and the terms of 
trade effects turning in its favour. 3 The volume of trade effect and the terms of trade 
effect contributed to a decline in the resource gap by 1.47 and 1.60 per cent of GNP 
respectively. In Thailand, the terms of trade effect contributed to a reduction in the 
resource gap by 2.29 per cent of GNP but this was overshadowed by a worsening in the 
volume of trade effect of 2.71 per cent of GNP.
The commodity boom caused income to rise unexpectedly during 1973-74. In 
response to the rise in income there was a sharp rise in consumption in both countries. 
Consumption in the Philippines rose from 9.72 per cent of GNP in 1972 to 12.74 per 
cent in 1973. It rose further to 21.68 per cent in 1974 even though the commodity boom 
had by then passed. In comparison, the change in consumption in Thailand went up 
from 8.07 per cent of GNP in 1972 to 15.59 per cent in 1973, and to 16.32 per cent in 
1974.
Although the consumption response was similar, the investment response was 
quite different. Planned investment in the Philippines actually declined. It was only to be 
picked up in 1974-75. After that the increase in planned investment fell to the pre-boom 
level. In Thailand, planned investment rose suddenly to a high level and this remained 
stable until 1985-86.
The adjustments in unplanned investment and the change in stock also showed a 
remarkable difference. In the Philippines, unplanned investment rose to only 0.34 per 
cent of GNP in 1974. This was in sharp contrast to Thailand where the change in 
unplanned investment rose to 2.75 per cent of GNP in the same period. Note that this 
was attributed to the change in unplanned investment in the private sector. The 
adjustment in stock showed an accumulation of inventories by 4.01 per cent of GNP in 
the Philippines but by 5.32 per cent of GNP in Thailand.
This different adjustment in investment showed that the responsiveness of 
investment in the Philippines to the rise in income was passive. This may have been 
because the Philippines anticipated the commodity boom to be permanent and therefore 
the increase in income was mainly spent more on consumption and less on savings which 
can be turned into investment.
3 A minus (positive) sign in front of any number indicates that it contributes to a decline (an increase) in 
the resource balance as a percentage of GNP in that year.
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Adjustment to the first oil price shock: 1974
The first oil price rise affected the Philippines abruptly and for more severely than 
Thailand. The resource gap in the Philippines widened and expanded further during 
1974-76. First, it suffered from the volume of trade effect which contributed to a rise in 
the resource gap by 2.16 per cent of GNP in 1974. Then, the volume of trade improved 
but the terms of trade turned unfavourable. For Thailand, the adverse terms of trade was 
responsible for an increase in resource gap during the same period.
In both countries, the response to an unexpected increase in oil price in terms of 
consumption adjustment showed a similar pattern. Both maintained a high level of 
consumption by about 8-10 per cent of GNP. This suggests the first oil price rise was 
anticipated as being transitory and so the current consumption pattem was maintained. In 
terms of the change in planned investment, this also rose for the first two years in 1974- 
75. However, this might have been influenced by a commodity boom in the earlier 
period. When the effects of the oil price shock was fully felt the change in planned 
investment declined substantially. Note that the trigger off effect in planned investment in 
Thailand which started as a result of the commodity boom declined in 1976-77, but was 
still high compared to the Philippines.
The adjustment in unplanned investment and the change in stock also showed a 
different response. In the Philippines, unplanned investment continued rising despite the 
oil price shock. The change in stock was also maintained at a high level except in 1977. 
In Thailand, unplanned investment was reduced immediately in response to the oil price 
shock. This was shown by a sudden fall in unplanned investment in 1974-75 and a 
decline in the change in stock from previous years.
Again the responsiveness of investment to a negative income shock in the 
Philippines showed an opposite outcome from Thailand. The Philippine economy might 
have anticipated the negative shock as transitory and therefore did not reduce 
consumption and investment. In Thailand, response to the shock was prompt and sharp 
by reducing unplanned investment and the accumulation of inventories.
Adjustment to the second oil price shock: 1979
Unlike the first, the effect of the second oil price shock was abrupt for Thailand. 
Its resource gap widened by 3.07 per cent of GNP in 1979. After that, the expansion in 
the resource gap was smaller and then reversed in 1982. Surprisingly, the major factor 
that explained the rise in the deficit was not the volume of trade or the terms of trade 
effects but the change in the interaction terms or the residuals in our decomposition. T his 
phenomenon is discussed later in the section. In the Philippines, the second oil price 
shock caused its resource gap to widened by 1.47 per cent of GNP in 1979 and this was
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still expanding until 1983. Similarly, the major factor that explained the increase in the 
resource gap was the interaction terms.
The response of both countries to the second oil price shock also differed. 
Although consumption rose in 1979-80 as a result of the increase in oil expenditure, it 
declined after that by much more in Thailand than in the Philippines. The difference in 
the investment response was more obvious. In the Philippines, the adjustments in 
planned investment and the change in stock increased despite the oil price shock. 
Further, there was a continual increase in unplanned investment. This type of adjustment 
could only suggest that the Philippine economy still perceived the oil price shock to be 
temporary. In Thailand, the shock was perceived as permanent. Unplanned investment 
fell immediately, particularly in the private sector. The adjustments in the change in 
planned investment and the change in stock also declined.
There is a conundrum here in that the adjustment in statistical discrepancy was 
unusually high in this period. This coincided with the high value of residuals or 
interaction terms mentioned earlier. Since the adjustment in statistical discrepancy is the 
balancing term to reconcile the national income account balance and the balance of 
payments statistics, this could be explained by the high interaction terms that 
coincidentally arose in that period.
Adjustment to fa lling  oil prices and rising non-merchandise
incom es: 1983-1989
The fall in oil price helped to reduce the resource gap in both countries during 
1984-86. However, after 1986 the resource gap became widening again because of the 
change in non-merchandise incomes. The contribution of the volume of trade and the 
terms of trade effects showed very little impact on the change in the resource balance 
while the change in non-merchandise incomes exhibited much more fluctuation. In the 
Philippines, the change in non-merchandise incomes significantly affected the resource 
gap. For example, during 1985-86 the change in non-merchandise incomes contributed 
to a reduction in the resource gap by more than any other factor. In 1987, the resource 
gap abruptly widened to 4.67 per cent of GNP and this was due to a sudden fall in tourist 
income, other services receipts and the interaction terms.
In Thailand, the change in non-merchandise incomes also helped to close its 
resource gap during 1983-86. The resource gap became widening only in 1983. This 
was observed as being the result of the change in the interaction terms. After 1987 the 
resource gap again widened and this was also associated with high interaction terms.
The response of the two economies showed different adjustment. In the 
Phi ippines, the change in consumption dramatically increased up to 26.8 percent of
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GNP in 1984. After that the economy was in recession and the change in consumption 
fell to 12.41 per cent of GNP in 1985, and to the lowest levei of 1.67 per cent of GNP in 
1986. This gradually increased after 1987. The change in planned investment did not 
change substantially in this period except in 1985. The change in unplanned investment 
showed a down-turn only in 1983, 1985 and 1986. This was probably due to the crisis 
of confidence following the political instability of the previous years. The adjustment in 
change in stock showed a drastic fall only in 1984 but increased gradually thereafter. The 
adjustment in statistical discrepancy also showed high value during 1985-87.
In Thailand, the change in consumption as a percentage of GNP declined until 
1986. The change in planned investment fell slightly during 1983-87 but quickly picked 
up thereafter. The change in unplanned investment and the change in stock also declined 
during 1984-86. Unlike the decline in the Philippines, the reason for this could be that 
the fall in oil price was expected to be only temporary and so the private sector did not 
revise their unplanned investment.
V. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter discussed the decomposition approach to the current account. While 
the earlier methods by Balassa and Bacha were useful in isolating the various effects of 
external shocks on the current account, they were not able to explain satisfactorily how 
the shocks, which were exogenous in nature can be related to the domestic responses of a 
country such as consumption and investment, which are endogenous factors. With the 
understanding of the macroeconomic adjustment to external shocks analysed in chapters 
4-6, a new decomposition method was proposed and applied to the case of the 
Philippines and Thailand.
A comparison between the Philippines and Thailand revealed different behaviour 
as far as consumption and investment are concerned. These were
1. The positive external shocks, such as the commodity boom in 1973, was 
responded to in the Philippines by drastically increasing consumption but not investment 
levels. This adjustment was pursued as if the Philippine economy perceived the positive 
shock to be permanent. Thus, consumption increased as the income level was anticipated 
to rise permanently. On the other hand, Thailand responded to the positive shock with 
more caution. Consumption also increased but so did the investment levels.
2. When there were negative external shocks, such as the oil price rise in 1974 
and 1979 the Philippines responded with an increase in consumption and investment. 
This adjustment was as if the negative shock was perceived to be temporary. In contrast, 
the response in Thailand was an immediate decline in investment. In both positive and
negative cases, the response of investment to the external shock was strong and 
immediate in Thailand but passive in the Philippines.
The opposite responses of the Philippines and Thailand to external shocks in 
terms of the change in unplanned investment can be seen in Figure 7.2. Most noticeably, 
the negative external shocks were responded to in the Philippines as if they were the 
positive. Unplanned investment rose instead of declining. It was only when the 
Philippines economy was beset with more internal and external shocks in 1984 that 
adjustment in unplanned investment followed the same pattem as that of Thailand.
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Figure 7.2 Adjustment in the unplanned investment component of 
the Philippines and Thailand
Philippines Thailand
CHAPTER 8
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A COMPARISON OF THE FISCAL, MONETARY AND EXCHANGE 
POLICIES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND 
DURING 1971-1989
I. Introduction
The analysis in the previous chapters suggests that poor macroeconomic 
adjustment in the Philippines in the last two decades were the major causes of the 
country's economic failure in recent years. On the other hand, the success of Thailand 
was attributed to better macroeconomic management. To see whether that proposition has 
some validity the conduct of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies in the two 
countries is investigated in this chapter. The chapter also seeks to identify any relevant 
factors, as far as these policies are concerned, that can explain the relatively poor 
economic performance of the Philippines compared with Thailand.
The chapter is organised into four sections. The next section discusses conduct of 
fiscal policy in the two countries during 1970-1989. In developing countries, the major 
factor that determines the conduct of fiscal policy comes from the expenditure side rather 
than from the revenue side through tax policy. Thus, the chapter first examines the 
budgetary expenditure trend in the two countries. This is to see how the fiscal authorities 
in the two countries reacted to the changes in economic situation during the boom and the 
bust periods in the last two decades. Then, the actual budget deficit of the government 
and how it was financed is considered. Finally, the chapter looks at the operation of the 
public sector as a whole and how the public debts were built up in the past.
Section three deals with monetary policy in the two countries. In order to 
understand the rationale behind formulation and conduct of monetary policy, it also 
examines the institutional setting of the monetary authorities in both countries. It then 
discusses the set of monetary policy instruments that were employed in both countries 
and the effectiveness of those instruments. In section four, it discusses exchange rate 
policy in the two countries. The last section concludes the analysis about fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies, and suggests the major differences in macroeconomic policy 
that were relevant in explaining the difference in economic performance of the two 
countries.
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II. Fiscal Policy
In the Keynesian macroeconomic framework, the major instruments of fiscal 
policy are government expenditure and the tax policy. However, in developing countries, 
the major factor that determines the conduct of Fiscal policy comes from the expenditure 
side rather than from the revenue side through tax policy. Budgetary expenditure reflects 
the intention of the government to stimulate economic growth. Tax policy plays only an 
accommodating role in financing the government's operation. As expenditure typically 
exceeds revenue, the government expenditure program and financing of the budget deficit 
becomes the most important instruments affecting the economy. Therefore, the budgetary 
expenditure trend of the national government is considered. This represents the policy 
intention of the government to have a stimulative or restrictive effect on the economy in 
response to change in economic conditions such as recession or high inflation. The 
government budget deficit and the way it was financed is then examined. This also 
includes the build up of public debt in the two countries.
II.1 The Budgetary Expenditure Trend of the National Government
The size of budgetary expenditure in the Philippines and Thailand during 1971- 
1989 is presented in Table 8.1. This is the budgetary expenditure program proposed by 
the government to the Congress or the Parliament in each country. The concept of 
budgetary expenditure differs in the two countries and therefore needs clarification.
In the case of the Philippines, the level of expenditure shown is based on the 
obligation basis. This is the level of expenditure that the national government has 
committed and is authorised by Congress or National Assembly to spend in one fiscal 
year. It differs from the "cash disbursement" basis in which actual cash disbursements 
from the Treasury are recorded. Often, the cash disbursement budget constitutes about 
half of the obligational expenditure due to the multi-year obligations and lags in the 
implementation of projects and disbursement of funds. However, to gauge the actual 
fiscal intention of the government in response to the economic situation in any year, the 
obligational budget should be used. The use of the cash disbursement budget, though 
reflecting the true effect of government spending on the economy, understates the 
intention of fiscal policy.
In Thailand, the budgetary expenditure is the proposed expenditure that the 
government submits to the Parliament or National Assembly as part of the Annual Budget 
Appropriation bill. In most circumstances, appropriation of the expenditure will be 
adhered to. Only in exceptional cases will the government increase its spending by 
passing an Extra-budget Appropriation bill.
Table 8.1 The size and percentage growth o f national budgetary 
expenditures in the Philippines and Thailand
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Philippines ^ Thailand -
Obligation Percentage Percentage Budgetary' Percentage Percentage
basis growth growth basis growth growth
(million peso) (CPI adjusted) (million baht) (CPI adjusted)
1971 5080.86 28645
1972 6159.28 21.2 5.2 29000 1.2 -3.6
1973 8380.17 36.1 19.9 31600 9.0 -6.6
1974 13490.30 61.0 26.5 360(X) 13.9 -10.4
1975 18734.73 38.9 32.0 48000 33.3 E 28.0
1976 21936.22 17.1 7.4 62650 30.5 26.3
1977 21690.75 -1.1 -11.0 68790 9.8 2.7
1978 28066 29.4 E 22.3 81000 17.7 9.3
1979 34154 21.7 4.2 92CXX) 13.6 E 3.7
1980 38079 11.5 E -6.7 109000 18.5 -1.2
1981 49083 28.9 E 15.8 140000 28.4 15.7
1982 51142 4.2 E -6.1 161000 15.0 9.8
1983 55811 9.1 -0.9 177000 9.9 E 6.1
1984 68625 23.0 E -27.3 192000 8.5 7.6
1985 87390 27.3 4.2 213000 10.9 8.5
1986 114505 31.0 E 30.2 218000 2.3 E 0.4
1987 154975 35.3 31.5 2275(X) 4.4 1.8
1988 167409 8.0 -0.8 243500 7.0 E 3.2
1989 227421 35.8 25.2 285500 17.2 11.8
Mean 24.35 9.53 13.95 6.28
S.D. 15.02 16.87 9.20 10. (X)
Sources: (1) Data for 1971-77 were obtained from Malixi, Boneodin and Follosco (1979), pp. 8-9.
Data for 1978-1989 were obtained from Philippine Statistical Yearbook 1990.
(2) Bureau of the Budget, Thailand's Budget in Brief.; 1970-1990.
Note: From 1971-1975, the fiscal year in the Philippines ends at June 30, after that
it ends at December 31. The fiscal year in Thailand ends at September 30.
S.D. is standard deviation.
E is the year when there was a general election.
From Table 8.1, it is observed that the Philippines' budgetary expenditures 
exhibited more expansionary nature than Thailand. They also moved erratically, with 
expenditure increased sharply in one year and dropped quickly the following year. This 
is even more pronounced when the percentage growth of budgetary expenditure adjusted
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with the inflation rate to reflect the growth of budget expenditure in real terms is 
examined. If a simple rule of thumb that the budget expenditure that grows more than 20 
per cent in real terms reflects budgetary expansion, there were 7 years of such expansion 
in the Philippines. These were the years 1973-75, 1978, 1986-87 and 1989. The 
expansion of budgetary expenditure in 1973-75 was proposed to boost economic growth 
that had been adversely affected by the first oil price shock. In 1978 budgetary 
expenditure again rose sharply despite relatively buoyant economic growth. This was 
politically driven as President Marcos tried to win the election for his party in the National 
Assembly (Batasang Pambasa) in that year. When the price of oil rose for the second 
time in 1979-80, the proposed budget was also expansionary although it was smaller in 
real terms. Expenditure expanded again in 1986 when President Marcos held an election, 
but was later overthrown by "People Power". When President Aquino took office in late 
1986, the country was plunging into deep recession and expansionary expenditure was 
called for to stimulate economic growth.
In Thailand, there were only 2 years that expenditure grew by more than 20 per 
cent in real terms. These were in 1975-76, when expansionary budgetary expenditure 
was proposed in response to the first oil price shock. Expansionary budgetary 
expenditure also occurred in 1981 after the second oil price rise, although it was small 
compared to the previous oil price shock. By and large, the budgetary trend in Thailand 
exhibits modest growth in real terms compared with the Philippines.
The expenditure pattern in the Philippines was the result of both economic as well 
as political motives. Electoral cycles played an important role in shaping the budgetary 
expenditure in the Philippines (Dohner and Intal, 1988 and Haggard, 1990). This feature 
was however less influential in Thailand. The jerky expenditure pattern can have serious 
implication for an economy. First, rising price levels can be expected by the public when 
the government sector suddenly increases its demand. Second, high interest rate 
expectations may also arise that will crowd out private investment. Finally, if a sharp 
increase in budgetary expenditure is beyond the current revenue trend, the public will also 
expect taxes to be raised which further dampens the private sector's aggregate spending. 
Whether or not the actual cash disbursement budget keeps up with the obligational 
budget, this expenditure pattem is likely to result in a different equilibrium than have been 
expected or desired by the government.
II.2 The Budgetary Deficits of the Government
The previous section considered only half of the fiscal operation on the 
expenditure side. The entire operation of fiscal policy, which includes government 
revenue and expenditure and the financing of budget deficits in both countries, is 
presented in fables 8.2 and 8.3. The data are expressed as a percentage of GDP to
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provide a comparable measure of the two countries. The source of data were the 
Government Finance Statistics compiled by the IMF which are available from 1972. The 
reason for using the IMF data is for a reasonably similar coverage of the government 
entity. 1 The budget deficit represents the deficit of the budgetary central government in 
the Philippines and the consolidated central government in Thailand.
A comparison of the two countries reveals a number of significant distinctions 
which can be highlighted as follows: First, on the revenue side, it is shown that total 
revenue and grants as a percentage of GDP in Thailand rose steadily while in the 
Philippines they hardly increased over the last two decades. In 1972 total revenue and 
grants as a percentage of GDP in both countries was at the same level -around 13 per 
cent. By 1989 the ratio in Thailand has risen to 18.93 per cent whereas the ratio in the 
Philippines remained unchanged, exception in 1989 when total revenue and grants in the 
Philippines rose to 15.8 per cent of GDP. This increase was mainly due to the rise in 
non-tax revenue, particularly from the proceeds of sequestered assets by PCGG and the 
sales of the government assets.2 Therefore, an overall ability to increase revenue from 
the taxation system in the Philippines was still lacking.
The revenue to GDP ratio in the Philippines in the 1970s and 1980s was 
considered poorer than Thailand, and even poorer relative to other developing countries 
(Tait, Gratz and Eichengreen, 1979; Manasan, 1988). There are at least four reasons for 
such poor performance.
1. The taxing performance in the Philippines was poor because of less efficient 
tax structure and tax administration (Manasan, 1988). Despite an improvement in recent 
years, it was still lower than the average of the middle-income countries, and is also the 
lowest in the ASEAN region (Manasan, 1990). The evaluation of the taxing performance 
in the two countries by Manasan (1988) and Krongkaew, Mongkolsamai and Samakoses 
(1988) showed that tax buoyancy and tax elasticity in the Philippines was lower than in 
Thailand. 3 In the Philippines, tax buoyancy estimates during 1975-1985, for all taxes 
with the exception of excise and the corporate income taxes, were below one. The tax 
elasticity estimates showed even smaller value with the average elasticity for the 
aggregates of all taxes at 0.25 (Manasan, 1988; pp. 56-57). In contrast, tax buoyancy 
estimates in Thailand computed by various studies showed the value around one or
* The budgetary central government in the Philippines comprises Presidency, Prime Minister's Office, 
Batasang Pambansa (Legislature), Judiciary, 18 Ministries, 3 Constitutional Offices and 3 other agencies.
The consolidated central government in Thailand comprises Monarchy, Prime Minister's Office, 
Legislature, Judiciary, 13 Ministries, 4 Departments, 7 government agencies, Government Officials 
Provident Fund, and 131 revolving funds. For detail, see Government Finance Statistics Yearbook. 
z The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was set up in 1986 by the Aquino 
government to recover the sequestered assets allegedly stolen by the last President Ferdinand E. Marcos 
and his cronies.
3 Tax buoyancy is defined as total response of tax revenue to the change in aggregate income or GNP. 
The total response of the tax revenue consists of both the change in revenue as a result of discretionary 
policy such as the adjustment of tax rates or the tax base, and the change in revenue that is automatically 
generated through economic activity. The latter is considered the tax elasticity.
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slightly higher (1.00-1.18), and the tax elasticity to be between 0.85-1.39 (Krongkaew, 
Mongkolsamai and Samakoses, 1988; pp. 39). This means tax revenue in Thailand was 
more responsive to the change in economic conditions than in the Philippines. Also, the 
value of the tax elasticity in Thailand that was close to one implies that, even if there were 
no discretionary change, tax revenue would still be growing at about the same rate as the 
growth rate of the economy. In other words, the revenue ratio would at least be at a fairly 
constant level.
2. The budgetary process in the Philippines was controlled by the government but 
the power to raise tax rates was exercised by the Congress. The Congress mainly 
consisted of a rural-based landowning elites, who were keen to limit the scope of the 
government activity to a minimum. Proposed government tax bills were often rejected by 
the Congress because they were seen as directly affecting their interests. Furthermore, 
they feared that an increase in revenue might give the central government the power to 
implement programs such as land reform that would erode their influence at the regional 
level. There was, therefore, a conflict of interest that led the government being unable to 
implement a drastic measures to raise tax revenue.
In contrast, the government in Thailand had less difficulty implementing taxation 
bills. The parliamentary system in Thailand is the Westminster system. So, as the 
majority party, or a coalition, will form a government, any legislation initiated by the 
government is certain to pass the parliament. Even in a period of non-democratic rule, the 
National Assembly will be elected and those members are usually supportive to the 
government. Thus, there is less conflict of interest between the government and the 
parliament.
3. During the Marcos administration, the government had embarked upon a 
massive industrialisation program. To achieve this aim, the government provided many 
fiscal incentives to attract domestic as well as foreign investment. This resulted in a loss 
of potential revenue. Although there was no direct estimate of this loss, the World Bank 
mission in 1979 calculated that nearly 45 per cent of taxable corporations were exempted 
from paying taxes and that deductions claimed by corporations amounted to about 70 per 
cent of gross income (Dohner and Intal, 1988). In Thailand, there was no study on the 
potential loss of revenue given under investment incentive schemes, but it can be safely 
claimed that the magnitude of a revenue loss was less than the Philippines due to a less 
ambitious industrialisation program.
4. The increasing intervention in economic activity by the Philippines government 
also contributed to a contraction of the government's tax base. For example, as the 
government established more public enterprises, it also had to provide not only more 
capital investment but also Fiscal subsidies to make the operation viable. Examples were
167
tax credits, exemption, accelerated depreciation allowance, and other privileges, including 
cheap loan and loan guarantees, etc.. Furthermore, intervention by the government also 
extended to a monopoly of business by some interest groups and the President's cronies. 
Examples are the operations of the United Coconut Mills (UNICOM), the Philippine 
Veterans Investment and Development Company (PHILVIDEC) and Nivico Company. 
UNICOM was allowed to impose a levy on exports of coconut products, but the revenue 
collected was administrated by its own organisation. There was no contribution to the 
government treasury. Since the fund was not controlled by the government, it was later 
misused and became riddled with fraud and corruption. PHILVIDEC was given tax free 
importation of finished products such as tyres and appliances, which it then sold to 
favoured companies. Nivico Company was allowed to import televisions tax free to 
support a program of extending television use in the countryside, but it actually sold the 
televisions in Manila stores (Dohner and Intal, 1988).
The low revenue effort in the Philippines has been one of the major problems for 
the government as it caused an increase in expenditure for economic development to be 
more difficult. In 1986, the Philippine government initiated a Tax Reform Program to 
raise the efficiency of tax collection. Among many initiatives was a new system of value- 
added tax introduced in 1988 to replace the sales/turnover tax. However, despite this 
reform the revenue ratio did not increase noticeably. Manasan (1990) again estimated the 
elasticity of the tax revenue with respect to GNP during 1986-88, and found that it was 
not significantly different from elasticity in earlier years.
On the expenditure side, the level of government expenditure in Thailand seems to 
have moved more flexibly and more counter-cyclically with respect to economic activity. 
During the commodity boom in 1973-74, total expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 
Thailand declined noticeably. It went up in the period of the oil price shocks and the 
economic slump during 1975-1985. After 1986, when the economy recovered and high 
growth rates picked up, total expenditure as a percentage of GDP gradually declined.
T his flexibility in expenditure pattern is assisted by two factors. First, government 
budget expenditure for the coming year is often planned with an expectation that the level 
of total revenue will increase only moderately from the previous year. Thus, when there 
is a boom, although total revenue may rise, expenditure will be slow to catch up. This 
causes the ratio of expenditure to GDP during boom years to decline more than to rise. 
Secondly, when the economy slows down, the government has a tendency to cut capital 
expenditure rather than current expenditure if there is a revenue shortfall. Thus, the size 
of expenditure can be reduced swiftly, although long-term development could be at risk.
By comparison, total expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the Philippines did 
not clearly exhibit counter-cyclical movement with respect to economic growth. During 
the commodity boom in 1973, government expenditure went up. When the economy was
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faced with negative growth rates during 1984-85, the government expenditure also failed 
to increase. One obvious reason was that the inability to raise sufficient revenue over 
time caused the expansion of budget expenditure to be tightly restrictive.
Also on the expenditure side, the net lending in the Philippines was larger than in 
Thailand and rose sharply in the first half of 1980s. This reflects the fact that the state 
enterprises in the Philippines were drawing more resources from the central government 
than in Thailand. 4 In the 1980s, interest payments were also rising quickly in the 
Philippines in the 1980s. This was a direct consequence of the government's heavy 
borrowing in the last decade. Therefore, although the overall budget balance shows a 
large deficit as if the government was implementing an expansionary policy, in reality the 
government was forced to run a primary budget surplus (the overall deficit net of the 
interest payments) despite the deepening of economic recession. This has the implication 
that fiscal policy in the Philippines will have less impetus to stimulate the economy until 
the size of the debt and interest payments is reduced.
Finally, the financing of budget deficit in the two countries also shows different 
approaches. In Thailand, the budget deficit was largely financed from domestic sources, 
and primarily from the monetary authority. Foreign financing was used in 1978-80 when 
domestic resources exhausted. In the Philippines, although the budget deficit was 
financed by domestic sources during 1972-77, after that foreign financing became more 
important. In 1984, the heavy burden of foreign debts led the government to restrict its 
foreign financing and substituted domestic sources. Most came from the domestic money 
market.
The evidence above shows only the operation of the central government during the 
last two decades. What was the historical trend? In the Philippines, a government budget 
deficit was common and was always financed from foreign sources. In the early history 
of the Philippines, the archipelago was governed by Spain through the Vice Regal 
Governor in Mexico. Imperial rule extended over a wide range of political and economic 
affairs. For almost two and a half centuries of Spanish colonialism, the Philippine 
treasury suffered constant budget deficit and bankruptcy and Mexico had to send a regular 
subsidy in the form of silver currency to replenish the treasury. This was the start of 
foreign financing growth and was known as the real situado or royal subsidy (Bauzon; 
1981). Foreign financing of the budget deficit also continued through the period of 
American colonialism.
In comparison, the history of fiscal management in Thailand was different. The 
cornerstone of fiscal policy was a balanced budget regardless of any political and
4 It is noted that the number of state-owned enterprises in the Philippines increased from 70 in 1972 to 
245 in 1984 (Haggard, 1990; pp. 227). In comparison the number of public enterprises in Thailand was 
68 in 1988 (Viasvanna, 1988).
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economic changes that might occur. Before the WWII, the amount of government 
revenue expected in a year usually determined the annual expenditure. During 1892- 
1950, despite the drastic changes in political situation (the transformation into 
constitutional monarchy in 1932) and the world wide depression in the same period, there 
were only 14 years of budget deficit as compared to 45 years of budget surplus 
(Nophakoon; 1979). When adding the modem period of 1951 to 1990, there were 45 
years of budget deficit as compared to 54 years of budget surplus. It was feared that 
irresponsible fiscal management or bankruptcy could lead to a fall in the political 
institutions due to political insurrection, or the intervention by outside forces, or both. 
This conservative fiscal tradition could not have been passed on to the present day 
government had the country been colonised and the attitude of public administrators 
thereby broken with the past.
So, what can explain the difference in fiscal policy? First, there was no lesson or 
experiences to learn from the past of the consequence of imprudent fiscal management in 
the Philippines. Before independence, the country had a history of chronic budget deficit 
for more than two centuries. This deficit was always sustained with the financial support 
from the colonial master. The fact that Thailand was never colonised helped to create the 
desire and preserve the need to stay independent in fiscal affairs.
Second, there was a lack of commitment by political leaders in the Philippine to 
maintain sound fiscal policy. Until recently, both countries were ruled by an authoritarian 
style of government but the budgetary expenditure trend was quite different. The fact that 
President Marcos was in power for so long gradually produced a dictatorial style of 
administration with no balancing force. Laws or regulations that were aimed to impose 
discipline on budgetary management were either bypassed or ignored. Although a 
political leader may be able to initiate expansionary fiscal program, there must be a limit in 
terms of laws that he can manoeuvre or a balancing power from other sources. There 
used to be rules in the Philippines that limited excessive budget expenditure. Pascua and 
Araza (1979) stated that "to control the level of domestic and foreign borrowing, certain 
statutory ceilings and benchmark maxima have been set by law or government policy. 
Such ceilings are reviewed periodically and include a limit of $ 5 billion in outstanding 
foreign loan which the President can contract, the 20 per cent foreign debt service ratio 
and the '3.0 per cent of GNP rule of thumb' on total borrowing" (Pascua and Araza, 
1979; pp. 141). The evidence is that the statutory ceiling on the liabilities that the 
President can contract on behalf of the government was stipulated in the Republic Act No. 
4860 ( Re: External Borrowing) in 1970. However, the abolition of the constitution and 
the beginning of martial law administration by President Marcos in 1972 resulted in 
certain disciplinary clauses on fiscal laws being ignored or bypassed. In 1972, the Act 
was over-ruled by Presidential Decree. By 1973 the ceiling prescribed in this Republic
Act was relaxed and eventually lifted. 5 Since then, expansion of budgetary expenditure 
was easily motivated by political interest and less consciousness on the consequences of 
the policy.
In Thailand, changes of government occurred more often, although authoritarian 
leaders may come and go. This helped to brake the grip of power and the monopoly of 
economic policy on the part of a particular group of politicians. Moreover, they were 
usually more interested in political play rather than economic interference. Management 
of the economy was left in the hands of the bureaucrats and the Bank of Thailand. In 
terms of the law that imposes a discipline on the budgetary process, there was the Budget 
Procedure Act B.E. 2502 passed by the Parliament in 1959. The Act, inter alia, 
stipulated that if the total amount of expenditure in the approved annual budget or in the 
approved supplementary budget exceeds total budget revenue, the Ministry of Finance 
shall have the authority to borrow money as necessary but the total amount of such 
borrowing in any one year cannot exceed 20 per cent of the total expenditure. The 
purpose of this provision was to eliminate the necessity to enact a separate Loan Act and 
to correlate the amount and the need for official borrowing in each year within the annual 
budget. Since the amount of expenditure does not include expenditure financed by 
foreign aid, whether in forms of loans or grants, this provision, in effect, means the 
government intended to keep the total amount of borrowing in each year within the limit 
of 25 per cent of the total budget revenue plus the existing amount of treasury balance 
(Bank of Thailand: Annual Economic Report 1960, pp. 11). This law effectively helped 
to control growth of public expenditure in line with the ability to raise the total revenue.
Third, there is a political economy of economic interest resulting from the 
difference in the structure of public administration. The influence of the civil servants in 
the Philippines was not strong enough to counter political interference from time to time.
In Thailand, the rivalry of interests among factional powers such as the military, 
bureaucrats, and recently business, has not been altered the colonisation of the country. 
Political leaders may come and go but they must enjoy support from these factions. Most 
often, competent senior civil servants were appointed to key economic posts. This tactic 
has been traditionally used to gain public support despite political suppression. As a 
result, there were balancing forces from civil servants and also an expectation by the 
public of sensible economic policy. The instinctive aversion to high inflation is a good 
example of this interplay, as it seriously affects the real income of public servants which 
always fails to keep up with the private sector.
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5 The Act was amended by Presidential Decree No. 81 in December 1972 to allow the President to 
contract additional loan or indebtedness by not more than 1 billion US dollars in the interests of national 
security and rehabilitation resulting from natural calamities. In March 1973, Presidential Decree No. 150 
allows the government to engage in more borrowing for government owned and controlled corporations. 
By December 1973, Presidential Decree No. 351 eventually lifted the ceiling on external borrowing that 
the President can contract.
So far, only the operation of the central government has been observed. It is 
noted that if one looks at the ratio of government deficit to GDP, the Philippine 
government had a relatively lower deficit ratio than Thailand. The exception was in a few 
years -1974, 1981, 1986 and 1988-89. This means the effect on the economy of the 
central government budget deficit in the Philippines should not be as great as anticipated. 
Thus, it is also appropriate to consider the operation of the public sector as a whole. The 
consolidated public sector deficits of the two countries are presented in Table 8.4.
Table 8.4 The consolidated public sector deficit as a percentage of GDP
171
Philippines 1 Thailand ~
National Public Consolidated National Public Consolidated
Government Enterprises Public Government Enterprises Public
Deficit D eficit3 Deficit Deficit D eficit3 Deficit
1971 n.a. n.a. n.a. 6.1 0.3 5.7
1972 n.a. n.a. n.a. 5.4 0.3 5.8
1973 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.1 0.6 3.6
1974 n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.8 0.4 -0.5
1975 0.8 1.1 0.5 2.0 0.6 2.6
1976 1.7 4.9 4.8 3.7 1.2 4.7
1977 1.9 7.8 7.6 3.1 1.0 4.1
1978 1.1 2.1 3.5 3.7 1.8 5.4
1979 0.1 3.3 0.5 3.3 1.4 4.6
1980 1.5 1.5 -0.3 4.8 2.6 7.3
1981 3.8 3.8 4.3 4.0 2.5 6.6
1982 3.9 3.8 4.6 6.0 2.1 7.8
1983 1.9 3.4 3.2 4.2 1.6 5.9
1984 1.9 2.3 2.5 3.8 0.6 4.4
1985 1.8 1.3 5.0 5.3 1.2 6.0
1986 5.0 1.1 4.8 4.6 0.4 4.7
1987 2.4 0.5 2.7 2.2 -0.2 1.5
1988 2.8 -0.2 3.6 -0.8 0.4 -1.1
1989 2.0 0.5 4.0 -3.2 -0.3 -3.9
Notes: (1) Calculated from the PIDS data provided by Dr. Josef T. Yap.
(2) Data from the Bank of Thailand.
(3) Non-financial public enterprises, 
n.a. = data not available.
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It is shown that the entire public sector deficits in Thailand were larger than that in 
the Philippines. The exception was in the period of 1977 and after 1987. In the 
Philippines, public enterprises had been the major contributor to public sector deficits 
until 1986. It is also noted that the public enterprises deficits in the Philippines have 
always been larger than in Thailand. As consolidated public sector deficits were higher in 
Thailand than in the Philippines until in recent years, the accumulation of public debt in 
Thailand should also be larger. However, the fact is that the accumulation of public debt 
in the Philippines grew faster than in Thailand. A comparison of public internal and 
external debt in the two countries is presented in Figures 8.1 and 8.2 respectively. The 
source of data were the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Bank of Thailand.
It is shown that public internal debt in the two countries as a percentage of GNP in 
1970 were almost equal. Then public internal debt in Thailand grew faster than in the 
Philippines during 1970-73. After the first oil price shock, public internal debt in 
Thailand dropped markedly while in the Philippines it continued almost at the same level. 
After 1980, public internal debt in Thailand went up again. It was not until 1986 that the 
size of the debt fell. In the Philippines public internal debt started to rise after 1984.
Figure 8.1 Comparison of the public internal debt outstanding in the 
Philippines and Thailand
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Sources: National Statistical Coordination Board, Philippine Statistical Yearbook, 
various issues.
Bureau of the Budget, Thailand’s Budget in Brief’, various issues.
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Figure 8.2 Comparison of the public external debt outstanding in the 
Philippines and Thailand
Philippines -----------------Thailand
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Sources: Central Bank of the Philippines, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators: 
1989 Yearbook.
Bank of Thailand.
In Figure 8.2, a comparison of public external debt tells a different story. The 
size of the public external debt as a percentage of GNP in the Philippines in the early 
1970s was twice as high as that of Thailand. After 1975, public external debt in the 
Philippines began to build up and in 1982 it shot up significantly. Public external debt 
went to its highest level in 1987, at about 65 per cent of GNP (US$ 15.8 billion). In 
Thailand, public external debt started to rise after 1976. In 1985 public external debt 
climbed up to 25.6 per cent of GNP (US$ 9.4 billion), and the government began to 
impose a ceiling on external borrowing. A National Debt Committee chaired by the 
Minister of Finance was set up to control borrowing by the national government as well 
as public enterprises. One of the measures implemented was the restriction of the debt 
service ratio to 9 per cent, with a further restriction on increases of more than 2 
percentage points for the next 3 years starting from the enforcement of the regulation as 
approved by the Cabinet (Bank of Thailand: Annual Economic Report 1985, pp. 139). 
Since then the build up of public external debt was maintained at around 25 per cent of 
GNP until 1987 when it began to decline.
II.3 The Actual Thrust of the Fiscal Policy
The previous section discussed that the Philippine government tended to 
implement expansionary expenditure program more than the Thai government. From 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3, we also see that both countries ran overall budget deficits most of the 
time during 1972-1989. The exception was only in Thailand and in the recent years of 
1988-89. However, this does not necessarily mean that continual budget deficits would 
create a positive thrust onto aggregate demand in the economy. This is because the actual 
budget position does not adequately distinguish which part of the Fiscal deficit is due to a
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deliberate change in policy, and which part is the result of a change in economic 
environment that policy itself causes. For example, an increase in government spending 
will stimulate aggregate demand and this in turn may lead to an increase in government 
tax revenue. As a result, the actual budget position could become surplus when the actual 
determination of fiscal policy is expansionary. Thus, there is a need to decompose the 
fiscal deficit into two components: the "cyclically neutral budget position" that would 
have normally been in place in the economy, and the fiscal stance that reflects the actual 
thrust of the fiscal policy on the economy. This led to the development of the "fiscal 
impulse" measure in the 1970s by the German Council of Economic Experts (GCEE), 
and later used by the IMF and OECD. 6 This section adopts the Heller, Haas and 
Mansur's formula but derives it in a different way.
The actual budget balance is expressed as difference between total government 
revenue and total government expenditure.
B = T - G  (8.1)
Total government revenue can be decomposed into three components: the trend in 
government revenue; the cyclical component of the revenue due to the business cycle; and 
the change in the revenue effort.
T = t0YP +t0( Y - Y P) + ( t - t 0)Y (8.2)
Where t0 is the ratio of total government revenue to GDP at the base period; t is the actual 
ratio of total revenue to GDP in that year; Y r is the potential nominal GDP; and Y is the 
actual nominal GDP. The first term on the right hand side is the level of government 
revenue that would have been observed if the revenue effort (represented by the ratio of 
the total government revenue to GDP at the base period) was the same as in the base 
period and Y = Y ' . The second term is the component of total revenue that varies 
cyclically because of the business cycle. If actual output exceeds potential output there 
will be an additional increase in government revenue. On the other hand, if actual output 
falls below potential output there will be a slight fall in government revenue. The last 
term is the component of government revenue that varies because of the change in the 
revenue effort from the base period.
Analogously, total government expenditure can be decomposed into two 
components: the neutral expenditure trend and the discretionary expenditure level, i. e.
G = g0YP + G0 (8.3)
Where g0 is the ratio of government expenditure to GDP at the base period, and G0 is the 
discretionary expenditure level. The first term on the right hand side is the level of
 ^ For a review of the fiscal impulse measure, see Heller, Haas and Mansur (1986).
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planned expenditure that would have grown along the potential level, and with a constant 
expenditure ratio as in the base period. The second term is discretionary expenditure, 
reflecting the intention of the government to spend more or less from the neutral trend. 
This decomposition assumes implicitly that the government plans to maintain its 
expenditure according to the trend in potential output, and that the rest is the intention of 
the government to affect the economy through increasing or decreasing its discretionary 
expenditure. Obviously, the intention to increase discretionary expenditure also takes into 
account the ability to raise revenue, the availability of financing funds, and the objectives 
of the government to stimulate the economy. Substituting (8.2) and (8.3) into (8.1) gives 
the result that the budget balance consists of three components:
The first term on the right hand side is the trend in the budget position when the revenue 
and expenditure ratios were the same as in the base period. If the appropriate period is 
selected to reflect the full-capacity of the economy this represents the structural budget 
balance which can be positive, negative or zero. In other words, this is the size of a 
budget that will add no further stimulus into the economy, compared with the base year. 
The second term is the cyclical component of government revenue. The last term is the 
fiscal stance, reflecting the actual thrust of fiscal policy. If discretionary expenditure in 
that year is greater than the increase in the revenue effort, the fiscal stance will be 
positive. This means fiscal policy is imparting a positive stimulus into the aggregate 
demand in the economy. On the other hand, if discretionary expenditure in that year is 
less than the increase in the revenue effort, the fiscal stance will be negative. There will 
be a restrictive effect of fiscal policy on the economy. The first and second terms can be 
combined to reflect the cyclically adjusted budget position which will exert no stimulus on 
the economy relative to the base period. Thus, rearranging the terms gives the fiscal 
stance expressed as
This is the formula for the fiscal stance which has been used by Heller, Haas and Mansur 
(1986). The fiscal impulse measure, which gauges the impulse of the stimulative or 
restrictive effect of the fiscal policy from year to year, is then calculated by taking the 
change in the FS from the previous year and is expressed as the ratio to GDP, i. e.
b  =  ( t X - z X )  + I X  - y F) -  {G„ - i t -  OK} 
= ( t X - goyP) + ‘o ( Y- YP) - FS
(8.4)
FS = ( t J - g X ) ~ B
FI =
tlFS dB dYr clY
(8.5)
The fiscal impulse measure suggests how the fiscal policy stances have changed 
since the base period. If the thrust of fiscal policy has become more expansionary
(contractionary) relative to the previous year, the fiscal impulse measure will be positive 
(negative). Thus, this information can be used to characterise the thrust of fiscal policy 
whether it has an expansionary or contractionary effect on the economy.
In the following, this FI formula is applied to calculate the fiscal impulse that 
prevailed in the Philippines and Thailand during 1972-1989. The summary results are 
presented in Table 8.5. The results are crucially dependent upon the level of potential 
output and the choice of the base year being selected. The potential output level can be 
determined by several methods. For example, one can estimate the potential output from 
the aggregate production function with suitably adjusted levels of capital and labour 
growth. Alternatively, one can identify the future path of the economy's output that can 
be attained and then seek a potential growth rate that will achieve that target. The other 
method is to derive the potential output level based on the historical trend of the GDP.
The last method has been selected as it involves less assumptions and 
computational work. The level of potential GDP is computed by regressing the logarithm 
of nominal GDP on the time trend for the fiscal years of 1970-1989. The specification of 
the equation and the estimation of coefficients are presented in Appendix 8.A of this 
chapter. For the choice of the base year, the year 1988 has been arbitrarily chosen as the 
base period for the Philippines and the year 1987 for Thailand. These were the years in 
which actual GDP was close to the potential GDP derived from the estimation above, and 
with a low inflation level. Thus, the base year can reflect a period of full-capacity in the 
economy.
As mentioned earlier the fiscal impulse measure is sensitive to the potential output 
and the base year being selected. Thus, the direction of the fiscal impulse derived from 
our calculation has been compared with other studies that have calculated the FI measure 
in both countries before. 7 This is to verify whether the results are generally valid when 
different methods of calculating the potential output and base year are selected. It is 
found that the fiscal impulse direction generally conform to those studies. That is, the 
signs of the fiscal impulse in this study are similar to those studies.
176
7 The study on the Philippines is from Lambertc, Lim, Vos, and Yap (1991) for the period of 197S 
1989, and from Manasan, Rosario G. (1990) for the period of 1986-88. The study on Thailand is from 
Robinson, Byeon, Teja and Tseng (1991) for the period of 1980-1989.
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Table 8.5 The estimation of the fiscal impulse measure in the 
Philippines and Thailand
Fiscal impulse measure (percent ol GDP)
Philippines Thailand
1973 -0.28 1.48
1974 -0.57 -4.93
1975 0.82 0.84
1976 0.73 3.48
1977 -1.26 -0.13
1978 -0.72 1.07
1979 -0.49 -0.51
1981 0.81 2.25
1980 1.89 -1.28
1982 -0.29 2.48
1983 -2.26 -1.53
1984 2.69 -1.09
1985 -2.46 1.46
1986 1.06 -0.58
1987 -1.40 -1.47
1988 0.60 -2.86
1989 -0.91 -3.44
Sources: Appendix Tables 8.1 and 8.2 in this chapter
From Table 8.5, it appears that fiscal policy in the Philippines in the 1970s 
showed a cyclical impulse, with two years of expansionary trend followed by another 
two years of contractionary trend. It was only after 1984 that the fiscal impulse changed 
course every year. This impulse can be interpreted as being the result of a discretionary 
policy on the expenditure side or because of a rigidity in the revenue side. However, it is 
quite likely that the poor government revenue effort did play a significant role in causing 
the cyclical impulses. In Thailand, the fiscal impulse changed course more often in the 
1970s but in the late 1980s it moved towards a contractionary trend.
The fiscal impulse shows the stimulative or restrictive effect of fiscal policy on the 
aggregate demand in the economy. So, to what extent has this fiscal impulse moved with 
the real economic activity in the two countries in the last two decades ? A simple indicator 
is used by relating the fiscal impulse measure with the real GDP growth rates. If the 
fiscal impulse moves counter-cyclically with real output growth, this means the design of 
fiscal policy, no matter whether it is intended to be expansionary or contractionary, will 
result in the actual thrust of a policy that promotes stabilisation. In other words, the fiscal
policy that shows counter-cyclical impulse will not accelerate excessive growth when the 
economy is booming nor decelerate growth further in a period of economic downturn.
It has been generally conceived that both the Philippines and Thailand pursued 
counter-cyclical responses to the oil price shocks in the 1970s. However, what really 
happened was that, despite the government intention, the effect of fiscal policy was pro­
cyclical in the Philippines, and counter-cyclical in Thailand. This can be seen in Figures 
8.3 and 8.4. In the case of the Philippines, the direction of fiscal impulse was generally 
pro-cyclical to real GDP growth. There were only six years (1978, 1980-81, 1984-85, 
and 1987) that the fiscal impulse shows reverse relationship. This suggests that fiscal 
policy in the Philippines may have promoted instability rather than contributing to 
stabilisation of the economy. In contrast, the relationship between fiscal impulse and real 
GDP growth in Thailand shows a remarkable counter-cyclical relationship except in 
1973-76. This implies that fiscal policy in Thailand may have contributed to stabilisation 
of the economy.
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Figure 8.3 The relationship between real GDP growth and fiscal 
im pulse m easure in the Philippines
Real GDP growth Fiscal impulse
179
Figure 8.4 The relationship between real GDP growth and fiscal 
impulse measure in Thailand
Fiscal impulseReal GDP growth
One may argue that the counter-cyclical fiscal impulse in Thailand could have 
arisen because of luck or coincidence rather than the result of skilful management by the 
fiscal authority. This could partly be right, but there is a suggestion that the Thai fiscal 
policy has a peculiar behavioural pattern which produces a self-correcting mechanism in 
fiscal management that promotes stabilisation. Siamwalla (1975) cited that the self- 
correcting mechanism stems from the fact that the government is usually reluctant to use 
tax policy flexibly, while it is also tardy in adjusting the expenditure pattern. Therefore, 
during a period of economic boom government revenue, whose major contributions are 
domestic and international trade taxes, will be hefty but government expenditure will be 
slower to catch up. As a result, there is less impetus from fiscal policy onto aggregate 
demand in time of economic boom. The same feature also operates in the opposite 
direction when there is a recession.
In conclusion, the conduct of fiscal policy during 1972-1989 was quite different 
in the two countries. Budgetary expenditure tended to be more expansionary in the 
Philippines despite the poorer ability to raise sufficient revenue over time. When it comes 
to the actual thrust of fiscal policy that will affect aggregate demand in the economy, fiscal 
policy in the Philippines imparted pro-cyclical impulses, and that promotes instability. In 
the case of Thailand, the opposite was observed.
What can explain the differences in their fiscal management ? As mentioned 
earlier there are three factors. First, there was no previous experiences of prudent fiscal 
management in the Philippines. Before independence, the country had a history of 
chronic budget deficit for more than two centuries. As Thailand was never colonised, a 
conservative fiscal tradition was passed on to the present day government. It was feared 
that irresponsible fiscal management could lead to the fall of political institutions or the 
loss of independence. Second, there was a lack of commitment by political leaders in the
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Philippines to maintain sound fiscal policy. The fact that the late President Marcos was in 
power so long gradually brought about a dictatorial style of administration with no 
balancing force. Certain laws or regulations that were aimed to impose discipline on 
budget management were either bypassed or ignored. Third, there is a difference in the 
structure of public administration. The influence of civil servants in the Philippines was 
not strong enough to counter political interference.
III. Monetary Policy
This section will discuss monetary policy in the two countries. As it will help to 
understand the rationale behind the formulation and conduct of monetary policy, it first 
examines the institutional setting of the monetary authority in both countries. It then 
discusses the set of monetary policy instruments that were employed in both countries. 
This is to investigate how effective the policy was in influencing the monetary aggregates 
which are the target of monetary policy.
Ill A The Monetary Authority
The responsibility for the formulation and conduct of monetary policy in the 
Philippines rests with the Central Bank of the Philippines. In Thailand, the responsibility 
is vested in the Bank of Thailand. From a historical perspective, the monetary authorities 
in the two countries evolved from different circumstances and objectives. The Central 
Bank of the Philippines was established with American assistance and with development- 
oriented objective. The Bank of Thailand followed conservative operation of the British 
Central Bank. The primary objective was the maintenance of sound financial 
management of the country in order to avoid foreign interference. The conservative 
attitude of the Thai monetary authority did not just occur in recent years but it had evolved 
since the 19th century. A similar point was mentioned earlier in relation to the conduct of 
fiscal policy. This section examines the institutional aspect of the monetary authorities in 
the two countries in case it may shed some light on the principle and conduct of monetary 
policy.
P h ilipp in es
The Central Bank of the Philippines was established after the end of WWII under 
the Republic Act No. 265 in June 1948 and commenced operation on 3 January 1949. 
Originally, the idea to set up the country’s central bank began in early 1939 when the 
Philippines was still a Commonwealth. However, the idea was abandoned because it did 
not gain support from the President of the United States (Central Bank of the Philippines, 
1974). After the war there was a need to rehabilitate the shattered economy and the idea 
of establishing a central bank became active. The model for the central banking operation 
was instituted by the Joint Philippine-US Finance Commission in 1946, which
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recommended the Latin American type of Paraguay and Guatemalan Central Bank for the 
Philippines (Tan, 1980). As a result, the Bank was set up to assist economic development 
rather than performing the traditional role of the guardian of the monetary system. The 
need to collaborate with the fiscal authority on the financing of development projects also 
shaped the composition of the Monetary Board. Under the original charter, the Monetary 
Board consisted of seven members. They were the Secretary of Finance (Chairman); the 
Governor of the Central Bank; the President of the Philippine National Bank; the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of the Philippines; and the 
other three representatives were from the private sector which were appointed for a term 
of six years. The Philippine National Bank and the Development Bank of the Philippines 
were commercial banks owned by the government for development purposes. Thus, the 
membership of the President and Chairman of both institutes highlights the predominance 
of the development commitment over the independent operation of the Central Bank.
In 1972, the role of the Central Bank in development was reviewed and a quest 
for independent operation arose. The composition of the Board was changed by 
Presidential Decree No. 72 in November 1972 to comprise the Governor of the Bank 
(Chairman), the Secretary of Finance, Director General of the National Economic and 
Development Authority (NEDA), Chairman of the Board of Investment, Budget Minister, 
and two part-time members from the private sector appointed by the President of the 
Philippines. Although this has elevated the status of the Central Bank's governor, it still 
gives the government, through the President of the Philippines, the control of monetary 
policy via his appointed members. Also, the Governor of the Central Bank would be 
appointed by the President with recommendation by the Commission on Appointment in 
the Congress for a term of six years, with half of the term overlapping with the election of 
the President. However, it did not actually happen when the President Marcos abolished 
the constitution and ruled the country by Presidential Decrees from 1972 to 1986.
Thailand
The Bank of Thailand was established during WWII in 1942. The idea to set up 
the country's central bank originated during the reign of King Rama V (1868-1910). The 
fear that the incoming European banks were trying to control the foreign trade of the 
country led the King to set up a bank owned by Thai nationals in 1904. Later, a plan to 
empower this commercial bank with full functions as the central bank was drawn up but 
failed. After the revolution in 1932 that ended the absolute monarchy, the idea to 
establish a central bank to serve the government was rekindled. In 1939 the government 
established the "National Banking Bureau" to operate some functions of a central bank 
such as receiving deposits from government institutions and other banks, exchange 
control, and managing of the government's borrowing activity. When Thailand was 
invaded by the Japanese army in December 1941, the government was forced to conclude
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an alliance treaty with Japan. Among several proposals for cooperation, the Japanese 
proposed to set up a central monetary authority with advisers and key personnel from 
Japan. This was objected to as it would give Japan complete control of the economy and 
the currency. The pressure led the government hastily to enact the Bank of Thailand Act 
B.E. 2485 (1942) in April, setting up the central bank as an independent institution. It 
was clear to the Thai government that the establishment of an independent central bank 
with Thai personnel would avoid direct interference from Japan. This could have been 
accepted by the Japanese in order to gain cooperation in another area from the Thai 
government. Later in December of that year the parliament then passed a bill outlining the 
functions and operations of the Bank which was opened on 10 December 1942.
As prescribed in the Bank of Thailand Act B.E. 2485, the Minister of Finance has 
the power to control and supervise operation of the Bank of Thailand but the formulation 
of monetary policy rests with the Board of the Bank of Thailand which originally 
comprised five members. They were the Bank Governor (Chairman) and the Deputy 
Governor (Vice-Chairman) who was to be appointed by the King; and three other 
members appointed by the Cabinet upon the recommendation of the Minister of Finance.
In 1946, membership of the Board expanded to seven by having five other members 
appointed by Cabinet. The Board was again expanded in 1959 to nine with seven 
additional members appointed by Cabinet. In terms of monetary policy formulation, the 
Board of the Bank of Thailand enjoys, to a considerable extent, an independent initiative 
because of statutory protection and because of the personality of the Governor. When the 
Bank was first established, Prince Wiwat who was highly regarded by the government 
was appointed the first Governor. He used his elevated status to institute the principle 
that only when the Bank and its Governor are freed from government interference, will 
the credibility of the Bank's policy as well as that of the government's be accepted by the 
pubic. Thus, the appointment of an impartial Governor and the members of the Board 
has become a tactic to shore up the image of the government itself. Also, as most of the 
other members of the Board are senior public servants or technocrats, the attitude of the 
Board in regard to monetary policy is, therefore, that of the orthodoxy if not entirely 
conservative. This is similar to the case of fiscal policy formulation we mentioned earlier.
111.2 The Conduct of Monetary Policy
The ultimate objective of monetary policy is to influence macroeconomic variables 
such as inflation, growth rate of the economy and the balance of payments position. To 
achieve this objective there must be a close and predictable relationship between the 
ultimate target variables and the monetary aggregates that affect them. Also, the monetary 
authority must be able to control movement of the aggregates by means of monetary 
policy instruments. The monetary aggregates that usually serve as a guiding post for the 
monetary authority are the level of money supplies, narrowly defined as M 1 or broadly
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defined as M2, M3, etc. The set of monetary policy instruments usually consists of (1) 
control of reserve money of the banking system via the central bank credit to commercial 
bank; the open market operation; and the legal reserve requirement, (2) interest rate 
policy, (3) other selective regulations on banking operation such as the margins imposed 
on banking services, and (4) moral suasion. Exchange rate policy is also used to 
supplement other instruments although it may not directly influence monetary aggregates.
In both countries, some of these instruments have been used by the respective 
central banks although their importance and effectiveness vary. This section considers 
the major instruments of monetary policy and discusses their effectiveness. It then 
presents the movement of the monetary aggregates and the changes in some of the 
monetary policy instruments to characterise the direction of monetary policy are 
presented.
Philippines
In the Philippines, the major instruments in monetary policy are the control of 
reserve money of the commercial banks and interest rate policy. These two policies also 
exert the most profound effects on the economy. The control of reserve money of the 
commercial banks is achieved by (1) the open market operation in the repurchase market 
of government and the Central Bank liability instruments; (2) the change in the 
rediscounting policy for the credit granted by the Central Bank to commercial banks; and 
(3) the variation in legal reserve requirement. Interest rate policy operates by imposing 
ceilings on the deposit and lending rates of the commercial banks. However, after 1981 
this policy became less instrumental when there was a financial deregulation.
The open market operation is the most active instrument used by the Central Bank.
In the 1970s the Central Bank's open market operation was considered fairly successful 
and was the Bank's major instrument of monetary policy (Aghevli, Khan, Narvekar and 
Short; 1979). This was possible due to its well-developed secondary financial market 
and the availability of government securities for trading. The Central Bank engaged more 
heavily in the securities market when it started to issue its own Certificates of 
Indebtedness, known as CBCIs, and repurchased them in the early 1970s. After 1981 
there was a rationalisation program for government securities to be traded in the 
repurchase market and the CBCIs were gradually replaced with treasury bills. 
Nevertheless, despite the program, the amount of CBCIs traded in the market jumped 
from 674 million pesos in 1981 to 5,810 million pesos in 1982. This declined to 3,861 
million pesos in 1983 and gradually phased out in 1987 (Central Bank of the Philippines, 
1990; pp. 99). The open market operation in the middle of the 1980s was even more 
active when the country faced excessive money growth. The Central Bank had to 
increase the discount rates substantially to absorb the excess liquidity of reserve money 
created by the expansionary monetary policy of the previous decade.
The rediscounting policy is primarily aimed at influencing the volume of credits 
and loans in the banking system. This is achieved by (a) changing the quotas on the 
rediscount facility provided to commercial banks; (b) regulating the cost of credits via the 
rediscount rates; (c) setting priorities in the types of collateral papers eligible for 
rediscounting. In the past, the rediscounting policy was used primarily to channel funds 
to priority sectors rather than being the major instrument to control reserve money. 
Presently, its role has been significantly diminished and loans from the Central Bank to 
commercial banks have been channelled more through overdraft facility.
The legal reserve requirement for commercial banks is another instrument of 
control that has been used to supplement open market operations. The Central Bank Act 
of 1948 allowed the legal reserve requirement for time and savings deposits to be set 
between 5 and 25 per cent, and for demand deposits to be between 10 and 50 per cent. 
Notwithstanding this provision, the Monetary Board may, in periods of inflation, 
prescribe higher reserve ratios but not exceeding 100 per cent for any further increase in 
the deposits of each bank above the amount outstanding on the date on which the bank is 
notified of the requirement. In addition, whenever the reserve requirements established 
by the Monetary Board places any bank under obligation to maintain minimum reserves in 
excess of 25 per cent of its total demand deposits, the Central Bank may pay interest on 
said excess at a rate which will not be higher than the Bank's lowest rediscount rate. In 
the past, the actual legal reserve requirement was also set differently depending on the 
type of institution and the kind of deposit. For example, the reserve requirement for 
commercial banks was set higher than that for thrift banks and rural banks. Also, the 
reserve requirement against demand deposits was set higher than those against savings 
and time deposits.8 These effectively discriminated against the urban commercial banks 
which hold more demand deposits, and led to increasing cost for the commercial banks' 
operation.
In the late 1960s, there was a move towards a uniform reserve requirement ratio 
for all types of deposits for commercial banks, but the rules for other financial institutions 
still remained. Throughout the 1970s the reserve requirement for commercial banks was 
invariably set at 20 per cent, while the reserve requirements for thrift banks, rural banks 
and other non-bank financial institutions were adjusted from time to time.9 Considering 
that the total deposits of commercial banks accounted for 75-85 per cent of the total 
deposits liabilities of the financial system, the invariable reserve requirement ratio for the 
commercial banks reflected the confidence of the Central Bank to control reserve money 
by other means, particularly the open market operations.
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8 For the actual reserve requirement ratios, see Central Bank of the Philippines (1990), pages 5-9.
9 In 1970 the reserve requirement of commercial banks was set initially at 17 per cent of the total 
deposits but this was raised in a staggered fashion of one-half a per cent until it reached 20 per cent in 
August. Alter that, it was maintained until September 1981.
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However, since 1981 the legal reserve requirement of the commercial banks has 
been adjusted more frequently. It was set to 16 per cent in 1981 and gradually rose to 19 
per cent in September 1983. In 1984, the ratio was raised to its highest level of 24 per 
cent to reduce excess liquidity in the banking system. After that it was reduced slightly to 
21 per cent but was still considered to be the highest in Asia (Fry, 1988).
Interest rate policy is another instrument that affects demand and supply of credits.
In the Philippines, the policy consists of ceilings on both deposit and lending rates of 
commercial banks and other financial institutions. In the 1970s, the ceilings were hardly 
adjusted although price inflation fluctuated sharply. Thus, the real interest rate moved 
inversely with the inflation rate. This created excess demand for credits that entailed the 
quantitative control of loans by the Central Bank. As a result, the interest rate policy not 
only failed to serve as an effective instrument but also became a problem for the monetary 
authority. After 1981, the interest rate policy was revised and the ceilings on interest 
rates was gradually lifted to make it an effective policy instrument.
It can be argued that the inflexibility of interest rate policy resulted from prevailing 
impractical law and banking practices. The ceilings on the loan rates were driven by the 
Catholic virtue that usury is a sin, rather than by the need to control investment (Viksnins, 
1980). This was reflected by the passing of the Anti-Usury Law of 1916, which 
imposed limits of 12 and 14 per cent on secured and unsecured bank loans respectively. 
The ceilings on loans was abolished in 1981 when free-market rates were far higher than 
the ceiling.
The ceilings on deposit rates were affected by two factors. As the ceilings on loan 
rates were inflexible, the ceilings on deposit rates could not be adjusted either. In the 
1970s when inflation rose sharply, there was an emergence of non-bank deposit 
substitutes which offered higher interest rates than the ceilings. This led to further control 
of the non-bank institutions and increasing pressure from commercial banks to enforce 
the ceilings. Second, there was an increasing concentration of the Financial system which 
led to a bankers' cartel that practically replaced the Central Bank as the authority on 
interest rate policy (Fry, 1988). The Bankers' Association tried to hold deposit rates 
down and appeared to be able to manipulate the Manila Reference Rates, which are 
average deposit rates offered at different maturities as calculated by the Central Bank.
The margins on banking services and moral suasion are also used although they 
are less effective than other instruments. The fact that ceilings on loan rates were Fixed 
when there was constantly excess demand for loans has led to the practice of commercial 
banks imposing margins on loans. This effectively raises the cost of lending and further 
increases the distortion and discrimination against small borrowers. Moral suasion has 
also been used, but it seems less effective when there is less competition in the financial 
market.
Thailand
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In Thailand, the important instruments of monetary policy are also under the 
control of reserve money of commercial banks and interest rate policy. Reserve money is 
controlled by the Bank of Thailand’s credits to commercial banks and the legal reserve 
requirement. The credit to commercial banks is provided in three windows. The loan 
vindow  is the operation of the Bank as the lender of last resort to commercial banks. 
The amount of credit under this window is influenced by the Bank's loan rates and the 
cuota for each commercial bank's access to the facility. The refinance window is 
provided for the purpose of allocating financial resources at preferential interest rates, 
through commercial bank channels, to priority sectors. The availability of credit is 
influenced by the policy of the Bank on economic development as well as the 
rediscounting policy of the Bank. The repurchase window  is operated for the 
transaction of government bonds and is influenced by the repurchase rates. In the 1970s, 
the loan window was the most important channel to control reserve money. Hence, the 
announcement of the Bank's loan rates reflects the determination of the monetary 
authority to affect the liquidity of the banking system. However, in the 1980s, the 
availability of government securities has increased and the open market operation in the 
repurchase window has become more active.
Unlike the Philippines, the legal reserve requirement in Thailand exists for 
prudential purpose rather than being an instrument of monetary policy. It was also set 
with a low reserve ratio and made no discrimination against demand or savings deposits. 
The range of legal reserve requirements that was first prescribed in the Bank of Thailand 
Act B.E. 2485 was between 9 and 20 per cent of total deposits, but the actual reserve 
ratio was initially set at 10 per cent. Later, the range of legal reserve requirements was 
revised by the Commercial Banking Act of 1962 to between 5 and 50 per cent of total 
deposits. Instead, the actual legal reserve requirement ratio was reduced to 6 per cent of 
total deposits. It went up to 7 per cent in 1969 and has not changed since. There can be 
two reasons why the legal reserve requirement has never been practically used to 
influence the reserve money of commercial banks. First, as the reserve money of the 
commercial banks is the inventory for the bank to expand credits, the banks will only 
hold the minimum reserve that is sufficient for managerial needs involved in currency 
payments and check transfers. This reserve holdings may well be above the legal 
requirements if the requirement is low. The fact that the legal reserve requirement in 
Thailand is already at a low level, and is indeed the lowest in Asia (Fry, 1988) means that 
this legal reserve requirement may not be binding. Therefore, to raise the legal reserve 
ratio may not lead to a contraction of credits unless the ratio is increased considerably. 
Furthermore, the commercial banks can and always borrow from abroad when they need 
to increase their reserves. Thus, the upward adjustment in the legal reserve requirement 
will have no effect in curtailing credit expansion of the commercial banks. Second, the
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legal reserve requirements pay no interest. Therefore, the commercial banks will attempt 
to use their political influence to resist any increase in the reserve ratio. Often, this is 
exchanged with the moral suasion to voluntarily restrict the commercial banks' credit 
expansion when requested by the Bank of Thailand (Trescott, 1971).
Interest rate policy is operated by the Bank’s announcement of ceilings on interest 
rates for loans and deposits. The ceiling is determined by three major considerations: 
mobilisation of domestic savings; efficient use of financial resources for productive 
investment; and the effect on capital movement. The ceiling of interest rates on deposit is 
purposely adjusted from time to time to keep real interest rates high so that domestic 
savings are sufficiently mobilised. On the lending side, the ceiling is used to control the 
level of domestic investment. However, in practice the two ceilings have to be adjusted 
optimally so as to also prevent massive capital outflows.
In the past, the interest rate policy was an effective instrument to control the 
expansion of credits. This was possible because of generally low inflation rates and tight 
control on capital outflows. Thus, the ceiling on lending rates could be kept higher than 
abroad while at the same time the ceiling on deposit rates could be kept lower than 
abroad. However, in recent years the effectiveness of this policy was diminished by a 
closer integration of the domestic and international money market. Moreover, as the 
balance of payments position of Thailand improved, together with a policy to attract 
foreign investment, control of capital flows has been relaxed. In 1989, the Bank of 
Thailand started to remove interest rate ceilings on time deposits with maturity over one 
year. It also announced the acceptance of the Article VIII obligations of the IMF 
Agreement in 1990. This entailed unrestricted international payments relating to current 
account transactions and the abstention of a multiple exchange rate regime. Therefore, it 
is expected that the Bank will have less influence over domestic interest rates than before.
As the interest rate policy created less distortion in the allocation of credits, other 
instruments such as margins on banking services have never been practiced by the 
commercial banks. Moral suasion is also rarely used because other measures are more 
effective as instruments of control.
Comparison
With the set of monetary policy instruments described for both countries, the 
conduct of monetary policy in the Philippines and Thailand in the last two decades can be 
considered. They are presented in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 respectively. The first column is 
the growth rate of narrow-based money supply (Ml), which is one of the monetary 
aggregates commonly targeted by monetary authorities in both countries. Then the 
movements of this monetary aggregate are correlated with the changes in policy 
instruments such as the repurchase rate, the ceilings on domestic interest rates, and the
change in reserve requirements. These form the basis on which monetary policy will be 
described as expansionary or contractionary. The policy statements of the Central Bank 
of the Philippines and the Bank of Thailand and the information that appeared in their 
respective Annual Economic Reports are also used supplementarily to assist in the 
characterisation of monetary policy.
From Table 8.6 , it can be seen that the Philippines pursued an expansionary 
policy through most of the 1970s. This was operated by downward adjustments of the 
rediscount rates in the repurchase market of government securities. During 1981-85, the 
policy was reversed into contraction. The switch was forced by two reasons: the balance 
of payments problem and internal developments in the domestic financial market. The 
latter was the result of liberalisation of interest rates which caused domestic interest rates 
to rise sharply, particularly the lending rate. This, in turn, caused the rediscount rate of 
treasury bills to rise. At this stage, it seems the open market operation, which was used 
mainly for controlling reserve money in the 1970s, was also used for another objective of 
influencing domestic interest rate changes. This is shown by the fact that the Central 
Bank of the Philippines had to introduce a new Certificate of Indebtedness, popularly 
called JOBO bills with high interest rates to compete with the market interest rate. 10 
Contraction of the money supply in this period was also assisted by several upward 
increases in legal reserve requirements.
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*^  JOBO bills were named after Mr. Jose Fernande/. Jr., the Governor of the Central Bank of the 
Philippines at that time.
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After the new government of President Aquino took office in 1986 the monetary 
policy changed course to expansion. The Philippines economy was already in deep 
recession. Expansionary monetary policy was called for despite the balance of payments 
remaining unstable. This was achieved by a decrease in the interest rate on treasury bills 
and a relaxation of legal reserve requirements.
From Table 8.7, monetary policy in Thailand was contractionary in 1973-74 when 
the country was faced with the first oil price shock and rising inflation. After 1974, the 
policy turned into expansion and the Bank's loan rate declined. Nevertheless, the growth 
rate of money supply only rose moderately. In 1978, the policy was again contractionary 
until 1986. This was motivated by a balance of payments problem arising from the 
second oil price shock and slow export growth. The policy was operated through 
frequent upward adjustments of the Bank's loan rate and repurchase rate. When the 
economy recovered in 1986 monetary policy was again expansionary. The Bank's loan 
rate and the repurchase rate were gradually reduced and the money supply expanded 
again.
As movement of the money supply is not only determined by the policies 
prescribed above but is also dependent upon movement of the money base, the following 
section investigates the factors behind the movement of money supply. The movement of 
the money supply is influenced by the movements of the monetary base or the high- 
powered money or reserve money, and the money multiplier. The money multiplier, in 
turn, is negatively related to the reserve ratio (reserve money/total deposits) and is 
negatively related to the currency ratio (currency/demand deposits). If the authority 
increases the legal reserve ratio the money multiplier will be smaller. On the other hand, 
if the public prefers to hold less currency there will be more reserve money that can be 
used by the commercial banks to expand credits, and the money multiplier will rise. If 
the money multiplier is stable, the movement of the monetary base will induce a stable 
movement of the money supply. So, this section looks at the movement of the monetary 
base and the money supply in both countries. This is shown in Figures 8.5 and 8.6 for 
the Philippines and Thailand respectively. The source of data is the Central Bank of the 
Philippines and the Bank of Thailand.
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Figure 8.5 Monetary base and money supply in the Philippines
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Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators:
1989 Yearbook.
Figure 8.6 Monetary base and money supply in Thailand
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From Figure 8.5, it can be seen that the movement of the monetary base and the 
money supply in the Philippines was quite stable in the 1970s. The money supply was 
higher and moved parallel to the monetary base. However, in 1982, the monetary base 
began to rise and in 1984 became larger than money supply, the variable which the 
monetary base is supposed to influence. Why this happened and the implications for the 
economy are elaborated in the following section.
In the case of Thailand (Figure 8.6), it is shown that the monetary base and the 
money supply grew parallel until 1985, when the money supply was close to the 
monetary base. During 1984-85, the policy was extremely contractionary as the authority 
wanted to contain the balance of payments deficit. Thus, despite an increase in the
monetary base, the credits on government and financial institutions were squeezed and 
growth rate of the money supply became negative.
The monetary base, or the reserve money, consists of two major components: net 
foreign assets and net domestic assets. The former is closely linked with a country's 
balance of payments conditions. If there is a balance of payments surplus, the amount of 
foreign exchange will rise and there will be an accumulation of foreign assets. Thus, the 
balance of payments conditions indirectly influence movement of the money supply. Net 
domestic assets comprise the net claims on the government and the claims on financial 
institutions. Expansion of credits by the monetary authority to the government will result 
in the increase of the Central Bank's assets and this serves as the base for money 
creation. Similarly, the expansion of credits to commercial banks will also result in an 
increase in the reserve money of commercial banks for expanding their deposits.
The components of the monetary base or reserve money in the two countries are 
shown in Tables 8.8 and 8.9. From Table 8.8, it is evident that the movement of reserve 
money in the Philippines was very peculiar. In the 1970s, the movement of reserve 
money was influenced both by the movement of net foreign assets and net domestic 
assets. However, in the 1980s, reserve money was entirely driven by the massive 
increase in net domestic assets, while net foreign assets decumulated substantially and 
continually. The major factor that contributed to the increase in net domestic assets in the 
1970s was money creation by the government. This was reflected by the rise in net 
claims on government which comprises loans and advances, and the increase in the 
Central Bank's Certificate of Indebtedness (CBCIs) sold in the market. The net claims on 
the government accounted for about 40 per cent of total net domestic assets. In the early 
1980s, although money creation by the government declined, the Central Bank's 
operation became the major factor contributing to the increase in reserve money. The 
notable operation was the losses in its forward cover differential in the foreign exchange 
market.
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In Thailand, the source of reserve money was very different from the Philippines. 
The increase in reserve money was supported to a large degree by an increase in net 
foreign assets. The change in net domestic assets played a minor role in the movement of 
reserve money. Although net claims on the government also showed a steadily rising 
trend until 1985, it was the adjustment in other liabilities of the Bank of Thailand, notably 
the capital account of the Bank, that helped to absorb the effect of money creation. The 
claims on financial institutions were also smaller than the net claims on government until 
1988. This suggests that the increase in net claims on government crowded out the 
reserve of commercial banks.
T
ab
le
 8
.8
 T
he
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 re
se
rv
e 
m
on
ey
 in
 th
e 
Ph
ili
pp
in
es
 (
m
ill
io
n 
pe
so
)
194
X  h  n  h  n
ci oo x  ci O n VO X
CO X
c i co co co ■'tf
co co
o
CO C~~
C l CO VO X  Cl C l
cl NO ON NO
C Cl Cl o
NO On c l co
\p  0 \  h  On Cl co C
X o O C X
»— 1 *—H »—H
h  X  On
So
ur
ce
: 
Se
le
ct
ed
 P
hi
lip
pi
ne
 E
co
no
m
ic
 I
nd
ic
at
or
s 
19
89
 Y
ea
rb
oo
k,
 p
p.
48
-4
9.
T
ab
le
 
8.
9 
T
he
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 r
es
er
ve
 m
on
ey
 in
 T
ha
ila
nd
 (
m
ill
io
n 
ba
ht
)
195
8
X
j
1
rX ir\ Q> ^  r^i -v5 r-J
S ' *  
£ 3  «> El
c i x  h  m «  c i o  h  >n t  o  o  m x  in c i h  co re 
—1 c l  c i  t j- noI I I I I
c i h c o O T t i n ^ t o M O c o-w’ *-H __* £*>*. * * *
2  0 0
o  op ~
r -  x  onI I I
C t no o  c i  _  §  C- \D ^  ^  
°  C l X  CO 2  
'—' C l CO ,
>n h  o
§
1
£
C- C l
m o v o c o ^ O N ^ o i m o x o N N C ^ t m o a N o i r - ' ^ N C - -
v ö ! ß ' d 3 o ö S v o o ö Q £ v o ^ o ö o \ m i v o c ö S o N
r ^ L j o O ' —^ o \ o \ ' - < v o ^ r i c i C ' 0 ' n c i ' 0 ^ - M o o  
* 5 0 O \ - i Ö O \ - ' i n ^ ' O O \ O 0 ^ c o X ' O X ' O  
C l  r o  h  O  O  O  On r i  t  n  h  c i  x  x  n  Cl  h  —I < c i  c i  c i  co co in  in
B  .2
o
toa>
B
o-o
«3
Z
<D
S
£
>
ooc
c
o
c3
Z
B
o
E—
wa3CO
3
c0Ü
’53
«§
c3
Z
o
2
JS
St
o
a
o
E
<L>
£
<UCO
<Uc*
■^r vo m
& g g
X  On O n 
3  r -  x
T t ' t r H i o \ q i n i n c i ^ t h o o \
c o c o c i - H O N c o ' o g i ^ c i O ' O C h  
o l c r Q c r t g r ' ' T1' c g c i ' - ^ 0  —1 c i  ^  c l  
X  CO m> cl c l co mi
co c l  o r  g  tj- 
CO
CO NO Tj-
3  r- mo
tt  —  O n 
O X O i
mo ON
C l C l 
CO C l
co  c  i n  o \  i n  no
-H C l ^  CO
r-H *—I «—< r—I TT
vq ^  *0 —; ^  rj
•— •—1  ■—' O X  — O ' O  C l Nt i / i  CO 
O C O N O X - H N f n c O O N C I C ^ i O  
O  X  CO O  - 1 o  - *»“H r-H3  ci
Cl On On X  X  ' I  
c i  d  c  n  ^  c  
Q  X  X  NO O  CO
mo co no c i  x  —1 
no in  x  o  —• c i
«—I >—1 —I C l CO CO
CO NO
CO NO X  
iri mi iri iri 
no o  x  x
mo in no ’—1
no On t—' mi 
C l NO '—1 
C l ON mo mo cl *“h in  Tt r t
no mo co x  
.  n  o  x  in
CO CO C l —■ C l O
h  O  C  o r  ON
—i P  c i d  mi* ot X  mo 
—I co mo
NO C l C l
T f O ' C l NO CO 
cO O n nO
C~C l
CO X  Cl h
ö r ^ S c d - ^ c i O N N Ö N c ^ N O
mo C  X  On 
mo On ^  “mö CT CO Z  x  O'1 
Ö  mi x  - J  —i 3  NO
I ■—' r -
O N N O ^ J - r ^ C O m O N O —. O N N O c O N O —I CO
c  c i  d  c  oo mi c i  mi ^  rn’ n i  g  c i  o
ONXNOinoN»n—• vo o  c  ^  on on mo
t ^ ^ C X O C X ^ C l U O t o m i  
i n h O c o N O O c o N O t n o 1 ' - '
^  - I  c i  c i Cl CO CO CO
x  mo
NO NO t- '
X  —I 
r -  mi
ON NO 
f "  X
x  co mo 
Cl  mo On 
co no On
*
N t m o N O h X O i O ^ c l c o
i ^ c ^ r ' - r - r - ' t ' ~ x x x x
mi g  h  x  on 
X X X X X
On On On B n On On On On On On On On Ön On On ö n On On On On
O
•C
I
m>>—
Ia
TJ
’5
XH
r—
2ao
X
B
2
U -,
2
tcC
oo
O
S '
cd
CO
CO
<D
£e
S
£
CO
cd x: 
-*-»
e
<2
2
. cH
mi
g
2
2
Ü T3 <L> C =3 aJC\3•° ’3
f t
8 |  
£  £  
<u CQ 
w co
 ^ -S 
- 2 - 8  B  -aJ C
^  O ^  8  
<D O
Q - <
E i/l
o  .2o  .t;
o  ~
e lo
£  TD 
^  C 
2
196
III. Exchange rate policy
Exchange rate policy is another important instrument of monetary policy. This 
section examines the movement of the exchange rate and how the monetary authority has 
employed it in conjunction with other instruments.
First, the long-term movement of the exchange rate in the Philippines and 
Thailand is presented in Figures 8.7 and 8.8 respectively. The source of data is from the 
International Financial Statistics produced by the IMF. The most striking feature is the 
maintenance of the exchange rate in Thailand at around 20-25 baht/US$ for the last 40 
years. In contrast, the exchange rate in the Philippines depreciated considerably almost at 
the turn of each decade. The peculiar exchange rate stability in Thailand, together with its 
record of low inflation, demonstarted the success of the Thai authority in maintaining 
stability of its currency both internally and externally.
Figure 8.7 The market exchange rate of the Philippine peso (peso/US$)
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Sources: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues.
Central Bank of the Philippines, Selected Philippine Economic Indicators: 
1989 Yearbook.
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Figure 8.8 The market exchange rate of Thai baht (baht/US$)
25 - -
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15 -  ■
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Sources: IMF, International Finance Statistics Yearbook, various issues. 
Bank of Thailand.
Phil ippines
The exchange rate system in the Philippines prior to 1970 was a fixed exchange 
rate regime. During 1949-1961 the exchange rate was maintained at 2 peso/US$. In 
1961 the country faced a severe balance of payments crisis and the exchange rate was 
devalued by 96 per cent. In 1968-69 the balance of payments deficit grew substantially 
and the country's foreign reserves dropped to the lowest level since WWII. The 
government then decided to change to a floating exchange rate regime, with the peso first 
devalued by 65 per cent. After that the exchange rate was stabilised until another balance 
of payments crisis emerged again in 1983. Since then, the peso has continuously lost 
value against other currencies and the exchange rate was effectively depreciated every 
year until the present. The dates and the magnitudes of the official exchange rate 
devaluation are presented in Table 8.10.
Table 8.10 The dates and magnitudes of the official exchange rate 
devaluation in the Philippines and Thailand
Philippines Thailand
Dates From To Percent Dates From To Percent
(peso/US$) (baht/US$)
Jan 1962 2.02 3.95 96
Feb 1970 3.95 6.45 65
Jun 1983 8.5 11.0 29 May 1981 20.775 21.0 1.1
Oct 1983 11.0 14.0 27 Jul 1981 21.0 23.0 8.7
Jun 1984 14.0 18.0 28 Nov 1984 23.0 26.4 14.9
Oct 1984 18.0 20.0 11 Dec 1985 26.4 27.0 1.9
Thailand
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In Thailand, the exchange rate system after World War II until 1955 was a 
multiple exchange rate regime. This policy was introduced by the monetary authority to 
solve the problem of foreign exchange shortfall following the war. The shortfall was a 
result of the loss of foreign assets seized by the Allies, and also the writing off of the 
special Japanese Yen reserves that became worthless when Japan was defeated. The 
implementation of the multiple exchange rate regime not only help to raise foreign 
reserves but also reduced the excess of money supply and inflation quickly after the war 
period. 11 When the multiple exchange rate regime was abolished, the exchange rate was 
fixed at the market rate of 21 baht/US$. The Bank of Thailand also established an 
Exchange Equalisation Fund (EEF) to intervene actively in the exchange market. The aim 
was to maintain a stable but fixed exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. In 1984 the 
Bank of Thailand abandoned the tradition of pegging the baht to the U.S. dollar and 
switched to a managed float of the baht against a basket of major currencies. 
Nevertheless, the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the country's international trade still led 
the exchange rate to be closely tied to the U.S. dollar.
Comparison
The use of exchange rate policy indicated more of the difference between the 
Philippines and Thailand. The exchange rate was tightly controlled in the Philippines. 12 
The degree of control is endogenous to the balance of payments conditions. Despite the 
managed floating exchange rates in the early 1970s, the equilibrium rates was always 
higher. The black market rates during 1950-1984 were estimated to range from 105 to 
167 per cent above the official rates (Daquila, 1987). This exchange rate disequilibrium 
severely jeopardised monetary stability and served to aggravate capital flight when 
financial crises occurred.
In early 1984, the government tried to curb the operation of the black market by 
setting up the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force, popularly known as the 
"Binondo Central Bank." The major black marketeers were arrested and later released 
with a pledge to cooperate with the government in buying and selling foreign exchange at 
the government dictated rate. Under this scheme, they were allowed to continue their 
purchase of US dollars at the black market rate and deposit the U.S. dollars receipts in 
Hong Kong. The dollars were then sold as a telegraphic transfer to Philippine exporters 
who could not obtain dollars through official channels in the Yuchengo Building in the 
Binondo district of Manila. The excess of dollars not sold were purchased by the Central 
Bank of the Philippines through the Philippine Associated Smelting and Refining
11 For detail, see Nidhiprabha (1988)
12 However, in September 1992, the Philippine government began to remove control on foreign 
exchange transaction.
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Corporation (PASAR) in Hong Kong at the dictated rate. The operation was initially 
successful in narrowing the gap between official and black market rates. During two 
years of operation, the Binondo Central Bank has contributed about US$ 400 million to 
the Central Bank although the PASAR itself was later claimed to have corrupted about 
US$ 743 million from this operation (Fajardo, Manansala and Borbon; 1987).
The failure of the Central Bank to eliminate exchange rate disequilibrium also cost 
dearly. In the early 1980s, the Central Bank started to operate the forward cover in 
foreign exchange transaction to ensure stability of the exchange rate for importers. 
However, the peso continued to lose value and the Central Bank incurred a heavy loss 
from its forward cover operation. This was shown earlier in Table 8.8 as the major 
contributor to the increase in net domestic assets in the reserve money.
In Thailand, there was less control in the foreign exchange market and the 
exchange rate much more stable. Since the abolition of the multiple exchange rate regime 
in 1955 a black market has not existed. The Thai authority has also been known for its 
ultra-conservative exchange rate policy (Ingram, 1971 and Trescott, 1971). In the past, 
devaluation of the exchange rate was only used to defend the level of the country's 
foreign reserves, rather than being used for other trade protection objectives. The 
authority always considered the accumulation of foreign reserves to be the means of 
maintaining stability of the baht internationally. Furthermore, the power given to the 
Bank of Thailand to safeguard the reserve funds and the management of the Currency 
Reserves (to be discussed below) gave a sense of responsibility expected by the public 
that the funds must be properly looked after. Thus, the Bank would never want to see a 
decumulation of reserves even though they could have been used more efficiently in 
public investment (Silcock, 1967 and Nontapunthawat, 1976). The balance of payments 
deficit would be avoided and the authority was ready to use import restriction at any cost 
to reduce the deficit. The ultra-conservative exchange rate policy in Thailand is shown in 
Table 8.10 where the numbers and magnitudes of the official exchange rate devaluations 
were small.
The determination to maintain a stable exchange rate in Thailand was partly 
attributed to the attitude of the monetary authority or the Bank of Thailand but it was also 
the result of the ultra-conservative law to accumulate foreign reserves. The Currency Act 
B.E. 2471 (1928) which was drafted by the British financial adviser to Siam, Sir Edward 
Cook, has been the pillar of this conservative monetary and exchange rate policy. The 
Act requires that the issuing of baht notes not be done unless the equivalent value in terms 
of gold and pound sterling were put into the Currency Reserves. Thus, the value of baht 
was 100 per cent backed by the equivalent value of strong foreign liquid assets. In fact, 
during 1928-1932 the baht was backed by more than 100 per cent of foreign assets. The 
composition of Currency Reserves was amended later to include other foreign currencies
and securities as well as government securities but the principle of backing up the baht 
with strong foreign liquid assets still remained. The amended law requires that the 
amount of gold, foreign exchanges and foreign securities must be maintained at all time at 
an amount not less than 60 per cent of the total amount of baht issued. In effect, this put 
a ceiling on to the printing of money so that it cannot exceed 1.67 times of the total 
foreign liquid assets held in the Currency Reserves. Since 1928, the ratio of foreign 
liquid assets to the total amount of baht issued has not fallen below 70 per cent. The only 
exception was in World War II during 1945-48, as shown in Figure 8.9.
200
Figure 8.9 The ratio of foreign liquid Assets to the total amount
of baht issued
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Source: National Statistical Office, Thailand Statistical Yearbook,
various issues.
Whether the authorities in the Philippines and Thailand are likely to succeed in 
maintaining stability of the exchange rate in the near future can be seen in Figure 8.10. It 
shows the accumulation of total reserves including gold in the two countries. The source 
of data is the IMF, the Central Bank of the Philippines and the Bank of Thailand.
It can be seen that the total reserves of the Philippines and Thailand in 1949 were 
at a similar level. In 1961, total reserves in the Philippines fell to its lowest level and a 
major devaluation occurred. Total reserves grew sharply in the 1970s, only to fall back 
to lower levels during 1981 to 1985. A series of devaluations then followed, but reserves 
have still recovered to the level of 1980. This implies that the maintenance of exchange 
rate stability in the Philippines will be very difficult if not impossible.
In Thailand, the amount of reserves increased steadily except during 1969-71 and 
1982-84. These were the years in which a large balance of payments deficit occurred. 
After 1985, total reserves increased by an average of almost 37 per cent per year. 
Judging from this trend, the monetary authority in Thailand will be able to maintain 
exchange rate stability without much difficulty.
Figure 8.10 Total reserves 
including gold (m illion US$)
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V. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter analysed the conduct of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies in 
the Philippines and Thailand to see if there was any major differences in macroeconomic 
management during 1971-1989.
In the area of fiscal policy, it was found that the Philippine government had a 
tendency to implement a budgetary expansion. This policy was motivated by more of 
political and less of economic objective, and despite the very low revenue effort (total 
government revenue to GDP). When it comes to the actual thrust of fiscal policy that 
affects the aggregate demand, the fiscal policy in the Philippines resulted in pro-cyclical 
impulses. Hence, the use of fiscal policy tended to promote instability. In Thailand, the 
budgetary expansion was less interfered by politics. Also, the use of fiscal policy 
imparted counter-cyclical impulses on the economy and hence promote stability.
What are the factors that explain the differences in the conduct of fiscal policy? 
Three factors are identified. First, there was no history of prudent fiscal management in 
the Philippines. Before independence, the country had a history of chronic budget deficit 
for more than three centuries. This deficit was always sustained by financial support 
from the colonial master. In Thailand, as the country was never colonised, a conservative 
fiscal tradition was passed on to the present day government. Irresponsible fiscal 
management or bankruptcy could mean a fall of political institutions or the loss of 
independence to outside forces, or both. Second, there was a lack of commitment by 
political leaders in the Philippines to maintain sound fiscal policy. The fact that President 
Marcos was in power so long gradually created dictatorial style of administration with no 
balancing force. Certain laws or regulations that were aimed to impose discipline on 
budgetary management were either bypassed or ignored. Third, there was a difference in 
the structure of public administration. The influence of the civil servants in the 
Philippines was not as strong as in Thailand to counter political interference.
Monetary policy in the Philippines was operated within a different environment. 
The Central Bank of the Philippines was set up with a development-oriented objective and 
has been less independent in policy formulation. On the other hand, the Bank of Thailand 
was set up with a conservative tradition and is relatively independent in its operation. 
Avoidance of irresponsible monetary policy was believed to be a means of saving the 
country from foreign interference.
The most active instruments of monetary policy in.the Philippines are the open 
market operation, the legal reserve requirement, and interest rate policy. Among these, 
the open market operation was fairly successful in facilitating economic development in 
the 1970s. However, in the 1980s it became an instrument to control money supply
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growth, and hence retarded economic development. Until recently, interest rate policy 
was highly inflexible. As a result, it was a problem for the monetary authority rather than 
an instrument of monetary policy. Financial liberalisation and the abolition of ceilings 
after 1981 helped to rectify the distortion in demand and supply of credits, but also meant 
the monetary authority has less control over interest rate policy. The legal reserve 
requirement ratio in the Philippines is the highest in Asia. It was used occasionally in the 
1960s and 1970s, but most actively in the 1980s to contract the monetary supply.
Until recently, the most active instruments in Thailand was the adjustment in loan 
rates for credits to commercial banks and the interest rate policy. Unlike the Philippines, 
the interest rate policy has been used effectively in the past to supplement the other 
instruments. This was possible because the inflation rate had been controlled at a low 
level and there was tight control on capital movement. The legal reserve requirement in 
Thailand is the lowest in Asia, and has never been practically used as a policy tool.
The success in the maintenance of exchange rate stability explained more of the 
difference between the two countries. The presence of the black market in foreign 
exchange in the Philippines over the past 40 years suggests that official exchange rates 
had been over-valued for a long time. The authority could not maintain a stable exchange 
rate because of both external and internal forces. The external force was a downward 
trend in the country's terms of trade that worsens the balance of payments. The internal 
force was a tendency of the government to accommodate fiscal deficit by money creation.
In comparison, the exchange rate stability in Thailand stands out clearly. The monetary 
authority has been very conservative in its exchange rate policy. The experiences of the 
mess after World War II led the authority, as well as the public, not to tolerate exchange 
rate uncertainty.
Appendix 8.A Estimation of the long-term growth trend in the Philippines 
and Thailand (fiscal year basis)
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The estimation of the long-term growth trend for the two countries during 1970-1989 
adopted a simple specification as follows:
Log Y = a  + ß  T
Where Y is the nominal GDP in fiscal year period and is expressed in unit of local 
currency, and T  is time trend. The coefficients a  and ß  are constant term and the 
predicted long-term growth rate respectively. The Ordinary Least Squares technique was 
first employed to estimate the coefficient ß but there are auto correlation in the estimation. 
Thus, the problem is corrected by using the autoregressive estimation. The results for 
Thailand and the Philippines are
Thailand
log Y = 11.8111 + 0.1295 T
(0.066) (0.0055)
\o(R,')2 = 0.9976 DW-statistics = 1.6437
U = 1.38711t-! -  0.673Ut.2 + V
(t = 8.39) (t =-4.07)
Philippines
log Y = 10.478 + 0 .17T
(0.0951) (0.0074)
\o(R f)2 = 0.9958 DW-statistics = 1.5024
U = 0.7527Vt-i + V
(t = 5.1134)
The numbers in parentheses are the standard errors.
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CONCLUSIONS
I. Conclusions
This thesis studies the macroeconomic adjustment in response to external shocks 
confronting the Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989. It investigates why, despite 
similarities in economic characteristics, Thailand economic performance has outstripped 
that of the Philippines?
Four possibilities were identified that could explain the different economic 
performance. First, differing political and economic structures could lead to varying 
initial economic conditions. It was found that although the Philippines and Thailand had 
different historical and political backgrounds there was no fundamental difference in their 
economic structure in the early 1970s. Both countries possessed similar economic 
characteristics in terms of size of the economy, population, and the level of economic 
development. They were also operating under relatively free market system, with the 
Philippines more dependent on external conditions than Thailand. The dependency on 
external sources in the Philippines was the legacy of colonial rule which, although leading 
to better economic opportunities, also introduced certain characteristics which influenced 
the functioning of the economy. For example, the concentration of landownership 
amongst a few groups was the result of the Spanish introduction of large-scale estate crop 
production and exports. This created the rural-based interest groups which opposed land 
reform and the transformation of an agricultural-based to a manufacturing-based 
economy. Government intervention and monopolisation of business was also common 
and these led to rent-seeking activity and an increasing Fiscal burden by the state. In 
addition, the heavy dependence on a few exported commodities to the US market under 
preferential treatment, was the result of closer economic ties with the US. This increased 
the vulnerability of the export sector to world agricultural trade. Thailand, on the other 
hand, was never colonised by foreign powers, and as a result, its own institutions and 
values were preserved. However, because of less dependency on external sources, 
economic development during the 1850s to 1950s was slower.
Until recently, both countries have undergone a similar process of economic 
transformation. The importance of the agricultural sector declined and was replaced by a 
growing contribution from the manufacturing and services sectors. However, in the 
Philippines economic recession in the early 1980s retarded that process whereas 
continuing high economic growth in Thailand helped accelerate it. The only characteristic 
that differed between the two countries was dependence on imported energy. In the early 
1970s, the Philippines and Thailand both relied heavily on imported energy. But by
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1981, Thailand had discovered natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand that helped lessen the 
impact of the energy price shock on the Thai economy.
Second, even with the same initial conditions, economic performance could vary 
if both countries were faced with a different external environments. It was found that the 
two countries were facing similar external shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
major adverse shocks were: the decline in the terms of trade, of which the increases in oil 
prices in 1974 and 1979-80 were a major factor; a worldwide economic recession; and 
rising international interest rates in 1980-1982. Positive external shocks were: the 
commodity boom in 1973; a rise in services income; and the investment boom of the late 
1980s. Also, the magnitude of the shocks on the balance of payments of both countries 
was found to be no difference. As the terms of trade deterioration was the major adverse 
shock affecting both, this thesis estimated the potential loss in income as a result of the 
worsening terms of trade. It was shown that the Philippines suffered marginally more 
from the terms of trade loss than Thailand. During 1973-1989 the terms of trade loss in 
constant prices in the Philippines amounted to US$ 14.16 billion, compared with US$ 
11.66 billion in Thailand. About 56 percent of the total terms of trade loss in the 
Philippines was attributed to the oil terms of trade loss, whereas 54 percent of the total 
terms of trade loss in Thailand was attributed to the oil terms of trade loss.
Third, the different economic performance, particularly the decline in economic 
growth in the Philippines and the increasing growth in Thailand, could be the result of 
different major macroeconomic policies such as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate 
policies in response to the changing economic environment. This possibility was 
advanced by many studies and was also the focal point of research in this thesis.
The thesis examined the areas in which economic performance in the two 
countries was different in chapter two. These were identified as follows:
1. In the 1950s, the Philippine economy was experiencing high and stable growth rates 
whereas growth rates in Thailand were lower and fluctuated. However, after 1960, there 
was declining and unstable economic growth in the Philippines but high and strong 
growth performance in Thailand.
2. While population growth remained higher in the Philippines than Thailand, the per 
capita GNP in the Philippines grew slower and remained below that of Thailand.
3. In the 1950s, inflation in the Philippines was lower than in Thailand. In the following 
decades, the Philippines was unable to control inflation whereas Thailand successfully 
kept inflation rates low, despite exposure to the same external shocks.
4. Foreign trade performance (as a percentage of exports and imports to GDP) in the 
Philippines was lower than Thailand. This was the result of external and internal factors.
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Externally, the terms of trade in the Philippines deteriorated more than in Thailand and 
internally, the Philippines was less successful in diversifying its export structure.
5. Investment and savings (as a percentage to GNP) in the Philippines was lower than in 
Thailand. In the 1970s and early 1980s, there was a substantial increase in investment 
and saving ratios in the Philippines whereas there was no change in investment and 
saving ratios in Thailand.
6. Although the development of trade and current account balances in the Philippines and 
Thailand during 1970-1989 did not differ greatly, the Philippines accumulated more 
foreign debt than Thailand. Philippines foreign debt rose by US$ 25.3 billion whereas 
Thailand foreign debt rose by only US$ 15.6 billion. Also, the Philippines paid three 
times more interests on its debt than Thailand.
The thesis then investigated macroeconomic policies adopted in the two countries 
in response to the external shocks that arose between 1970-1989. Four approaches were 
used to analyse this issue. The first approach was the application of a simple model with 
one final good in chapter four. This model explained the effects on the economy of the 
volume of trade shock (a fall in foreign demand for the country's exports) and the terms 
of trade shock (a rise in the price of oil relative to the price of home goods), and the 
possible adjustment policies in response to both shocks.
In general, a negative external shock leads to a fall in home goods output and 
employment (internal imbalance) as well as a trade deficit (external imbalance). In the 
case of a volume of trade shock, the model predicted that there would be a fall in the level 
of gross output and a rise in the real exchange rate (a fall in the price of home goods 
relative to the price of foreign goods). In the case of a terms of trade shock, the level of 
gross output would fall but the real exchange rate may rise or fall depending upon the net 
effect of the terms of trade change on the trade balance.
There could be four policy responses to both shocks. First, the government could 
respond by doing nothing (a neutral response), thereby internal and external imbalances 
remained. Second, the government could attempt to maintain the level of gross output 
and hence full employment (a response with an internal balance objective). However, 
this would cause a worsening external balance. Third, the government could prevent the 
trade balance from worsening (a response with an external balance objective), but it 
would have to expect a fall in output and employment. Lastly, the government could 
attempt to restore both internal and external balances. This was possible with certain 
conditions about the effect of the nominal exchange rate change on the trade balance.
Which policy option should be used depended upon the nature of the shock. In 
the first place, a neutral response could be chosen, and this was often the case. But
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ultimately the appropriate policy must be selected to resolve disequilibrium. The decision 
rests on whether the shock is going to be temporary or permanent. The optimal rule is 
that a temporary (permanent) shock should be met with a response to restore an internal 
(external) balance objective.
With this framework, actual macroeconomic responses to the volume of trade and 
terms of trade shocks in the Philippines and Thailand during 1970-1989 was investigated.
In general, both responded to the shocks in a similar manner. Adjustment to commodity 
boom was characterised as neutral response. The adjustment to the first oil price shock in 
1974 was to restore internal balance. In retrospect, this was inappropriate as a rise in the 
prices of oil remained until 1978. The adjustment to the second oil price shock in 1979- 
80 was first to restore internal balance. Then policy shifted to restore external balance by 
early 1983 in Thailand, and late 1985 in the Philippines. Adjustment to the fall in export 
demand in 1981-1983 was not clearly seen as the two countries were still continuing their 
adjustment in response to the second oil price shock. Although both countries responded 
to the volume of trade and terms of trade shocks in a similar way, their economic 
performance showed different outcomes. The Thai authority was comparatively 
successful in stabilising the internal balance and to lesser extent the current account 
balance. Second, the poorer performance in the Philippines after 1983 was aggravated by 
domestic political shock. In Thailand, a spectacular performance was aided by an 
increase in tourist income, the investment boom and a significant substitution of imported 
energy with a domestic source.
The second approach was the application of the Australian model of traded/non- 
traded goods in chapter five. This model explained the effects of the oil terms of trade 
shock (a rise in the price of oil relative to the price of traded goods) on the traded and 
non-traded sectors of the economy. The resource allocation effect as a result of the 
adjustment in another real exchange rate concept (the relative prices of traded to non- 
traded goods) which followed the oil price shock would affect the expansion or 
contraction of the traded sector. This had important implications for the current account 
balance and the use of fiscal policy to restore internal balance.
In general, the oil terms of trade deterioration can lead to an appreciation or 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. This depends upon the adjustment in the non- 
traded sector. If the input substitution effect dominates the income effect, the real 
exchange rate will appreciate. On the other hand, if the income effect dominates the input 
substitution effect, the real exchange rate will depreciate. In the first case, the current 
account balance is expected to deteriorate further because resources will move away from 
traded to non-traded sector following the oil price shock. The use of fiscal policy to 
restore internal balance is also in conflict with the external balance objective as it leads to 
further appreciation of the real exchange rate and a worsening trade balance. In the
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second case, the current account may worsen in the immediate-run but will later improve.
A depreciation of the real exchange rate following the oil price shock will produce a 
favourable switching effect that leads to expansion of the traded sector. Also, the use of 
fiscal policy to restore internal balance may be possible to some extent without 
aggravating the trade balance.
Chapter five also examined the real exchange rate movement in the two countries 
using the relative value-added deflators of the traded to non-traded sector as a proxy for 
the real exchange rate. It was found that after the first oil price shock, the real exchange 
rate in the Philippines appreciated markedly. This was also associated with an increase in 
the share of non-traded output to total real GDP. In Thailand, the real exchange rate 
maintained its depreciating trend. This was also associated with an unchanged but not 
rising share of non-traded output to total real GDP.
The relatively poorer performance of the traded sector in the Philippines could be 
explained by a combination of the appreciative effect of the oil terms of trade shock on the 
real exchange rate and the impact of its expansionary fiscal policy. Following the first oil 
price shock the real exchange rate in the Philippines appreciated more than in Thailand. 
The increase in government expenditure in the Philippines led to further appreciation of 
the real exchange rate, and more resources moved out from the traded to non-traded 
sector. The traded sector therefore contracted and the ability to increase exports and 
reduce imports to offset the worsening trade balance was weakened. In Thailand, 
maintenance of the real exchange rate on a depreciative trend was possible because the 
effect of the oil terms of trade shock on the real exchange rate was depreciative and there 
was less fiscal expansion. As a result, the traded sector did not contract.
The third approach, examined in chapter six, was the application of a simple 
dynamic model with two periods of adjustment. The model explained in more detail the 
appropriate adjustment of a country in response to a temporary and a permanent oil price 
shock and interest rate shock. It also considered the welfare cost to the economy if an 
incorrect expectation was made. In general, it was demonstrated that a country should 
maintain (reduce) investment in the wake of a temporary (permanent) oil price shock. In 
the case of a temporary (permanent) interest rate shock, a country should respond by 
maintaining (reducing) investment. The welfare cost to the economy if an incorrect 
expectation was made arose in two categories. A type I error occurs when the shock is 
perceived as being temporary when it is actually permanent. A type II error occurs when 
the shock is perceived as being permanent when it is only temporary. The welfare cost 
associated with a type I error was not necessarily equal to the cost associated with a type 
II error. In the case of an oil price shock, if a permanent oil price rise causes the marginal 
productivity of capital to fall significantly, it is likely that the cost of making a type I error 
will exceed the cost of making a type II error.
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Investigation of investment behaviour in the Philippines and Thailand revealed 
that, despite the permanent oil price rise during 1974-79 (but also a temporary fall in the 
international interest rates), the Philippines increased investment noticeably much more 
than savings. The Philippines' response to the first oil price shock was not consistent 
with the optimal adjustment prescribed by the theory. This might have occurred because 
the government perceived that the low international interest rates were a permanent 
positive shock. Thus, it borrowed heavily from abroad to finance investment projects.
In Thailand, there was no indication that the country perceived either the oil price shock 
or the low international interest rates to be permanent. Investment and savings ratios in 
Thailand during the same period remained largely unchanged.
Chapter six also evaluated whether the Philippines economy benefited from a 
decision to invest heavily during 1974-1983. A simple measure of the 'incremental 
capital output ratio (ICOR)' is used to determine the efficiency of investment. The lower 
the ICOR, the higher the increase in efficiency of investment. It was revealed that the 
incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) in the Philippines during the investment boom 
actually increased. This means there was no increase in potential output even though 
more investment was made. In comparison, the ICOR in Thailand generally declined 
even though the investment ratio to GNP was constant.
The last approach discussed in chapter seven is a decomposition of the current 
account. This approach was developed by Bela Balassa, Edmar Bacha and Gerald 
Helleiner. The previous decomposition methods had a shortcoming in that the linkage 
between the changes in the current account and the domestic macroeconomic adjustment 
in terms of consumption, savings and investment were not explicitly shown. Thus, 
chapter seven modified the previous decomposition methods and applied them to the 
study on the Philippines and Thailand. The results supported the analysis on the 
investment-savings behaviour of the two countries in the previous chapter. When there 
were positive external shocks, the Philippines responded to those shocks as if they were 
permanent while Thailand responded with more caution. In the Philippines, consumption 
increased more than investment. In Thailand, consumption also increased but so did the 
investment level. When there were negative external shocks, the Philippines responded 
with an increase in consumption and investment as if they were temporary while Thailand 
responded with an opposite action and swiftly. Although in Thailand consumption was 
slowly adjusted, investment was immediately and substantially cut down.
The last possibility that could explain the differences in economic performance 
between the Philippines and Thailand was the different institutional structure in which 
economic interaction takes place. Chapter eight examined the conduct of fiscal, monetary 
and exchange rate policies in the Philippines and Thailand. In the area of fiscal policy, it 
was found that the Philippine government had a tendency to implement budgetary
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expansion more than the Thai government. This policy was motivated more by political 
and less by economic objectives. However, when the actual fiscal outcome was 
investigated, it was shown that the national government deficit as well as the total public 
sector deficit (as a percentage of GDP) in the Philippines was lower than in Thailand. 
This could be interpreted that the fiscal policy in the Philippines was 'less expansionary' 
than in Thailand. Nonetheless, this must be treated with caution as it was also found that 
the public debt outstanding in the Philippines was growing larger than in Thailand.
As the actual budget deficit does not necessarily mean that it imparts a positive 
thrust onto aggregate demand in the economy. Thus, the measurement of Fiscal Impulse 
(FI) was applied for the period of 1973-1989. It was found that fiscal policy in the 
Philippines imparted a pro-cyclical impulse on the economy and created instability. In 
Thailand, fiscal policy imparted a counter-cyclical impulse on the economy which 
promoted stability. Three factors were identified as leading to the different conduct of 
fiscal policy. First, the Philippines has no experience of prudent fiscal management. The 
country had a history of chronic budget deficit for more than three centuries which was 
sustained by external support. As Thailand was never colonised, a conservative fiscal 
tradition was passed on to the present day government. Irresponsible fiscal management 
or bankruptcy was viewed as a route to the collapse of political institutions or the loss of 
independence to outside forces, or both. Second, there was a lack of commitment by 
political leaders in the Philippines to maintain sound fiscal policy. The fact that President 
Marcos was in power for 22 years (1965-1986) gradually brought about dictatorial style 
of administration. Certain laws and regulations that were aimed at imposing discipline on 
the budgetary process were either bypassed or ignored. Third, there was a difference in 
the structure of public administration. The influence of civil servants in the Philippines 
was not as strong as in Thailand and therefore unable to counter political interference.
In the area of monetary policy, it was found that the same instruments of monetary 
policy available to the authorities in Thailand were more effective than to their counterpart 
in the Philippines. The operation of the Central Bank of the Philippines was less 
independent and less conservative than the Bank of Thailand. This was partly the result 
of different historical roots. In the area of exchange rate policy, Thailand pursued the 
policy that was more conducive to macroeconomic stability than the Philippines. 
Exchange rate stability in Thailand for the last forty years, together with its record of low 
inflation, demonstrated the success of Thai authorities in maintaining stability of the 
currency internally and externally. The difficulties facing the authorities in the Philippines 
were the country's tendency to balance of payments crises together with a government's 
tendency to accommodate fiscal deficit by money creation.
II. Lessons to be learnt from the Two Countries
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The comparative study of the Philippines and Thailand in response to external 
shocks in the 1970s and 1980s presented in this thesis has suggested four possible 
lessons for other developing countries. These "lessons" must be considered somewhat 
speculative because they were based upon a sample of only two countries.
1. In response to an unexpected and negative external shock, a country may adopt a 
neutral response in the first place. Thus, there will be a fall in output, unemployment and 
a worsening current account. Then, if that shock is certain to be temporary (permanent), 
the next response should be to restore internal (external) balance. Fiscal policy is the first 
best policy for both objectives while exchange rate policy can be used only when its 
impact on the real exchange rate is known. The policy to always keep domestic inflation 
below foreign inflation also helps maintain a realistic real exchange rate that will not 
further upset the external balance. If the nature of the shock is still unclear, a 
conservative response should be pursued. That is, to treat the shock as if it is permanent 
and respond with a policy to reduce consumption and investment. If this expectation 
becomes wrong the cost of making this mistake is likely to be less than the cost of 
choosing the opposite adjustment.
2. In response to an unexpected and positive external shock, a country may adopt a 
neutral adjustment in the first place as well, but not too optimistic. A conservative 
response is again preferred.
3. A country should build up its capacity to withstand any adverse external shocks that 
may arise. More integration with external markets will help increase the country's 
exports and foreign exchange earnings. At the same time, diversification of exports will 
also help lessen the effect of a terms of trade decline which will be greater when the 
country is dependent on a few exported commodities. More importantly, prevention of a 
real exchange rate appreciation (a fall in the prices of traded relative to non-traded goods) 
will help retain incentive and encourage expansion of the traded sector.
4. To have adjustment policies work effectively needs a good environment. Political 
leaders should hold a long-term horizon. There should also be a mechanism that ensures 
disciplined and sound fiscal, monetary and exchange rate management. Finally, lessons 
from the past must not be forgotten. Most of the mistakes we have observed were 
repetitions of earlier mistakes.
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